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1Chapter 1: Introduction
Background
The idea for the dissertation evolved from a reading of Edward Fursdon’s 
classic history of the European Defense Community (EDC).1  As I was reading the 
book in early 1999, it had only been a few months since the French and British 
governments at St. Malo had announced their intention to cooperate more closely in 
defense.  Specifically, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President 
Jacques Chirac had agreed to pursue greater European defense autonomy through the 
framework of the European Union (EU) in what has since become known as the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).  Shortly thereafter, the US 
government produced several statements that exhibited skepticism and suspicion of 
this latest European defense initiative.2  In particular, US government officials 
expressed concern that ESDP in no way threaten NATO.  As I read Fursdon’s book, I 
was struck by the similarity of the situation compared to the development of the 
European Defense Community (EDC).  In the earlier case, however, the US came out 
in strong support of the EDC.  I wondered what accounted for the apparent reversal.  
Was it simply a matter of the end of the Cold War, as some neorealists would posit?  
Or was there something else?  Has the existence of NATO hindered or fostered 
greater cohesion in the European foreign and security context?  In other words, has 
the institutionalization of the Atlantic Alliance, which took shape in the early 1950’s, 
1
 Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community: A History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1980).
2permitted Europeans to draw closer to developing their own security policy, or did it 
cement American interest in maintaining its military presence in Europe even after 
the threat of a Soviet attack ceased after the end of the Cold War?
Throughout my educational and professional experience, I have been 
fascinated by transatlantic relations and European politics.  I also have been interested 
in American foreign policy because of the relationship between domestic politics and 
the international system.  From my work studying NATO and the EU, I became 
aware of the relationship between state preferences and international institutions in 
pursuing foreign policy objectives.  Thus, researching this apparent puzzle seemed an 
ideal topic, given my combined interests in European politics and American foreign 
policy.
Research Question and Dissertation Proposal
Since the end of World War II, transatlantic security relations have reflected a 
tension between American desires for Europeans to share more of the defense burden 
without having to give up its hegemonic leadership role, and European desires for 
greater defense autonomy without having to devote more resources toward military 
capabilities.3  While there are an increasing number of studies seeking to explain the 
dynamics of European security and defense cooperation, there has not been the same 
level of attention to the policy responses of the United States.  Most of the literature 
on the subject addresses US policy only from the perspective of NATO or Alliance 
2
 For example, see Madeline Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future,” Financial 
Times (December 7, 1998): 12.
3politics, but few explore the determinants of US policy specifically toward European 
defense autonomy.  This dissertation seeks to rectify this deficiency in the literature 
by examining US policy toward the European Defense Community during the early 
1950’s and systematically comparing it with US policy toward the European Security 
and Defense Policy during the late 1990’s.  Why in the 1950’s did the United States 
promote the creation of a new security institution besides NATO, an institution of 
which the US would not be a member?  On the other hand, in the 1990’s, despite 
American reluctance to become involved in security crises in the Balkans and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Washington fought hard to preserve NATO as the 
premier security organization.  Were the structural components of the Cold War, 
highlighted by the division of Germany and perceptions of the Soviet threat, 
sufficient explanations to explain this apparent anomaly?  
A subset of questions also will be addressed: when officials are faced with 
several policy choices to achieve a stated goal, what determines their selection?  For 
example, neorealists would argue that a prime reason of the United States in the late 
1940’s and early 1950’s for supporting European security integration was in response 
to the emerging threat from the Soviet Union.4  Because of the structural conditions 
of the international system, it was in the American interest to counterbalance the 
Soviet threat to the European continent.  The only way to do that was to rearm 
Germany.  As Dulles told the National Security Council in August 1954, “The 
3
 For example, see John C. Hulsman, “The Guns of Brussels: Burden Sharing and Power Sharing with 
Europe,” Policy Review (June/July 2000): 35-49.
4
 See John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1972); Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar 
American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Gaddis, The Long Peace: 
Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); and John J. 
4Soviets successfully used Mendes-France to kill, or at least to maim, EDC.  Will they 
now try to destroy NATO?”  Dulles went on to say, “We must not assume that we can 
go ahead independently to rearm Germany if the French won’t agree.”5 The question 
remains: why did the United States allow France to possess so much blocking power 
on an issue of vital importance to the national security of the United States?  Why did 
Washington risk its own security interests to ensure French approval, even when it 
was apparent that French indecision could put in jeopardy not only French security, 
but also the final question in Germany, which was key to Western security and the 
entire American strategic posture in Europe?
Was the European Defense Community the best option?  NATO already 
existed as a political and security institution, and there was a plan to rearm Germany 
through the Alliance.  Why, then, did the United States not pursue the NATO plan?
One explanation was that the French worried that NATO’s plan would not 
meet their needs.6  Consequently, the French devised the Pleven Plan, which sought 
to adapt the European integration model that had been used in steel and coal to 
security and defense.  Neorealists might contend that the Soviet threat was the main 
concern, and, therefore, the United States would support the EDC to assuage France 
and ensure its support for defending Europe.  This raises two concerns: if the Soviet 
threat was so looming (which, from a structural point of view, would be axiomatic), 
should not the French (from their own calculus) want to counterbalance the Soviets 
Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15 
(1): 5-56.
5
 Quoted in Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 
1945-1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 26.  Also, FRUS, 1952-54: Vol. 2, Memorandum 
of discussion, 215th meeting of the NSC (September 24, 1954), 1266.
6
 See Fursdon, 86-97.
5and be willing to work through NATO?  Second, there was no indication that the 
EDC had any better chance of passing the French Assembly than a purely 
intergovernmental Alliance arrangement as proposed by the NATO plan.  Thus, 
neorealist theory appears to be insufficient to explain why the Americans did not opt 
for the NATO plan and devote their energies toward demonstrating how the Alliance 
could accommodate French security concerns as effectively as the EDC.
Once the choice is made and a particular institutional or policy equilibrium 
achieved, those outcomes often are “locked-in,” making it particularly difficult for 
new actors to change the situation.  Certain actors benefit from the status quo and 
resist efforts to change it.  George Tsebelis has called these actors “veto players,” and 
he observes that the more veto players there are, the harder it is to change policies or 
institutions.7  I would argue that US policy toward European defense autonomy 
reflects this condition.  Once NATO as an institution was “locked-in” as the 
institutional preference, actors in the Pentagon, as well as at NATO headquarters and 
elsewhere, developed a transnational network geared to preserving the Alliance for its 
own sake.  Maintaining NATO became the end political goal.8
7
 George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002).
8
 For more on the nature and impact of transnational networks and path dependence from an 
institutional perspective, see Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and George Tsebelis, Nested Games: 
Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990).  Also, 
Tsebelis, Veto Players. 
6By seeking answers to the above questions, the dissertation contributes to the 
debate over America’s role in the world, especially given the discussion in recent 
years over American unilateralism.9
The focus will be on decisions as outputs of the political system that result in 
policy choices that may not be congruent with the structural imperatives of the 
international system of the time.10  While the notion of a political system and its 
relationship to the role of nation-states in the international system continue to spark 
debate, a general consensus is emerging, with different schools focusing on different 
aspects of the political system.  Simon Hix has posited that political science as a 
discipline involves “the systematic study of the processes of government, politics, and 
policymaking.”11  It involves political structures and institutions, such as 
governments, bureaucracies, decision-making rules, and norms, but it also involves 
the interests, motivations, and behaviors of political actors.  Contemporary political 
scientists see these two dimensions - institutions and actors - as complementary, and 
there has been an attempt to integrate the two into a more coherent analytical 
framework.12
According to Hinich and Munger, policy outputs can be described in a simple 
equation:
9
 For recent examples, see Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations (London: Atlantic Books, 2003); 
Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review 113 (June 2002): 1-18; and Walter Russell 
Mead, Power, Terror, Peace, and War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).
10
 For more on the notion of a political system, see David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965).  For a modern elaboration, see Simon Hix, The Political 
System of the European Union, 2nd edition (London: Palgrave, 2005).  Roy Ginsberg also adopts a 
political system model when evaluating the EU’s foreign policy.  See Ginsberg, The European Union 
in International Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).
11
 Hix, 9.
12
 Ibid., 12-14.  For example, see Kenneth Shepsle, “Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the 
Rational Choice Approach,” Journal of Theoretical Politics (1989): 131-147, and Peter Hall and 
7Preferences + Institutions = Outcomes13
This “fundamental equation of politics” can be broken down, where 
“preferences” refer to the desires and wants of political actors, and “institutions” -
both formal and informal - reflect the rules that constrain political actors’ options in 
collective decision-making.14  “Outcomes” or “outputs” reflect the result (either 
policies or new institutions) of the interactions between preferences and institutions.
If one changes and the other remains constant, the outcomes will change.  Thus, the 
political situation is fluid and dynamic.  As Simon Hix notes, “Actors choose actions 
to maximize their preferences within a particular set of institutional constraints and a 
particular structure of strategic interests.”15
However, preferences and institutions alone are not enough.  Policy outcomes 
also depend on actions, which means that the role of the actors is also important.  If 
preferences are only the desires and institutions are only the constraints, an additional 
element must be factored in – action itself.  After all, if actors have certain 
preferences but are not willing to act on them (whether because they perceive the cost 
too high or the risk too great), the outcome will be different despite everything else 
being equal.  Thus, an additional variable I call “action” needs to be included.16  Now, 
the new equation should read: 
Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 
952-973.
13
 Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger, Analytical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 17.
14
 See North, Institutions, and Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The “New” 
Institutionalism (London: Pinter, 1999).  Also, Hix, 13-14. 
15
 Hix, 12.
16
 This additional variable is derived from prospect theory.  See Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in 
International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of 
8Preferences + Institutions + Action = Outcomes
It is my contention that, because systemic theories of international relations 
place too much emphasis on one aspect of the equation, they are not sufficient to 
understand US behavior toward European efforts to increase their defense autonomy.  
Rather, the domestic imperatives also matter (particularly the role of the actors 
themselves) and are necessary to understand the influences on the formation of US 
policy responses toward both the EDC and ESDP.
Post-Cold War Developments in Europe
The end of the Cold War renewed interest among European states in exploring 
ways to cooperate more fully in the realm of security and defense.  Political 
developments since the December 1998 St. Malo declaration by the UK and France 
have attracted the attention of scholars and practitioners alike to the issue of European 
security and defense cooperation.17
Regarding European efforts during the 1990’s to develop their own security 
and defense instruments, neorealists might argue that, in the absence of a Soviet 
Michigan Press, 1998).  Also, see Daniel Little, Microfoundations, Method, and Causation (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998).
17
 The literature on European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has grown quickly during the last 
five years.  For example, see Richard Medley, “Europe’s Next Big Idea: Strategy and Economics Point 
to a European Military,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 1999): 18-22; Phillip Gordon, “Their 
Own Army? Making European Defense Work,” Foreign Affairs 79 (July/August 2000):12-17; Simon 
Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2000); Kori Schake et. al., “Building a European Defense Capability,” Survival 41 (Spring 1999): 22-
25; Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge? (Chaillot Paper No. 
9threat, the United States would be concerned about the Europeans forming their own 
cohesive military capabilities.  For example, John Ikenberry argued the notion of 
“soft-balancing” to describe the EU’s behavior after the Cold War.18  Europeans 
reacted to the sole superpower by “soft balancing” the United States.  Because the EU 
had emerged as a counterweight to American economic power, the United States 
would want – as the world’s lone superpower – to stop any challenge to its status.  In 
other words, the United States would seek to prevent any potential competitor –
including its European allies – from arising.  To some extent, this appears to conform 
to events.  
Democratic peace theorists and social constructivists posit that the United 
States and European states reflect a security community because they share similar 
values. 19  Proponents of a pluralistic security community would find it difficult to 
explain why the Europeans would fear the United States or vice versa.  If transatlantic 
values were similar, then one should expect the Americans to trust the Europeans to 
develop their own security arrangements.  A subset of this approach would argue that 
identity development on the part of Europeans would explain the efforts to build 
ESDP (originally known as ESDI – a European Security and Defense Identity). 
However, the neorealist explanation requires that the US consider the 
Europeans as the primary threat or area of concern.  Yet, according to stated US 
national security strategies, the main security threats to the US originate from 
43, Paris: WEU-ISS, 2000); Jolyon Howorth and John Keeler (eds), Defending Europe: the EU, NATO 
and the Quest for European Autonomy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
18
 John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after 
Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
19
 On notions of a security community and community of values, see Karl Deutsch et. al., Political 
Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).  Also, Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
10
elsewhere, notably instability in the Middle East and South Asia, as well as threats 
from transnational terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  The 
leading states of concern are China and Russia, not countries in Europe working 
together.20  Consequently, neorealism fails to address an essential US interest: with 
worldwide responsibilities (and interests), the United States needed the Europeans to 
secure the Balkans and tend to the Europeans’ own backyard.  Thus, one would 
expect Americans to appreciate European efforts, but that was not the case.
Liberal institutionalists would contend that economic interests explain why 
the United States would support the EDC but resist ESDP.21  Policy preferences are in 
fact a large component in shaping the outputs.  However, given the increasing 
economic interdependence (particularly in terms of transatlantic foreign direct 
investment), one might expect that these arguments fare better in explaining US-EU 
political economy than US-EU security relations.22
Foreign Policy: National Action in International Politics
Foreign policy decision-making sits at the nexus of domestic politics and the 
international system.23  To understand foreign policy outputs, one needs to trace the 
20 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 17, 2002), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsall.html (accessed November 12, 2004).  Also, Department of 
Defense, Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A US Strategy for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2000).
21
 For example, see Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
22
 See Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan, Partners in Prosperity: The Changing Geography of the 
Transatlantic Economy (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins 
University, 2004).
23
 The literature on foreign policy is vast.  For a sample, see Henry Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and 
Foreign Policy,” Daedulus 95 (2) (Spring, 1966): 503-529;  Richard L. Merritt, ed., Foreign Policy 
11
inputs in the domestic and bureaucratic contexts as they relate to outputs in the 
international context.24  According to Richard Merritt, “Foreign policymaking is 
essentially the task of devising strategies that utilize a nation-state’s capabilities to 
achieve the goals its leaders set.”25   There are external constraints from the 
international system and internal constraints from the domestic political scene.  
Foreign policy reflects the interaction of these two – sometimes cross-cutting –
dynamics.  As Merritt goes on to say, “The ecology of national foreign policy 
decision system poses varying degrees of constraint upon its options and 
behavior….[Such] constraints include the structure of the international system, 
varying levels of technology, enduring patterns of trade and other transactions, 
perceptions, norms of individual and state behavior, and…religion and other cultural 
components.”26
Standard theories of international relations may be insufficient to gain an 
adequate understanding of the interactions and behaviors related to US behavior 
toward European attempts to increase defense autonomy.  As Alexander George has 
noted, structural realist theory, rational choice theory, and game theory (i.e., 
deductive approaches) often “black-box” the process of policymaking and strategic 
interaction between states by using assumptions to introduce the process.  In George’s 
Analysis (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975); Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982); Alexander George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and 
Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1993); Richard Snyder et. al., Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making (Revisited) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Laura Neack, The New 
Foreign Policy: U.S. and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2003).
24
 Often foreign policy can be described as a two-level game, with actors toggling between the 
domestic and international levels.  For a classic treatment, see Robert Putnam, “Two-Level Games: 
The Impact of Domestic Politics on Transatlantic Bargaining,” in Helga Haftendoon and Christian 
Tuschhoff (eds.), America and Europe in an Era of Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993): 69-
83.
12
words, “I felt it necessary to engage in direct but admittedly difficult empirical study 
of policymaking processes and strategic interaction between actors.”27  Of course, the 
two approaches are not mutually exclusive; they both serve to illuminate and 
contribute to a better understanding of international relations and the substantive 
undertakings of American foreign policy.
George also notes the need to broaden the scope of international relations 
theory in a way that still provides value and stresses systematic methods of sound 
social science.28  In addition, George takes issue with those who argue that 
incorporating insights from foreign policy analysis is not relevant to international 
relations theories when he writes, “Indeed, proponents of structural realism explicitly 
acknowledge that it is not a theory of foreign policy – although a theory of foreign 
policy is precisely what policymakers need.”29 Rather than discounting the value of 
incorporating foreign policymaking processes into general theories of international 
relations, there is a growing recognition of the utility of examining “how leaders, 
groups, and coalitions of actors can affect the way foreign policy problems are 
framed, the options that are selected, the choices that are made, and what gets 
implemented."30
25
 Merritt, Foreign Policy Analysis, 1.
26 Ibid., 1-2.
27
 George, Bridging the Gap, xxi.
28
 For an analysis of the appropriateness of qualitative research methods in social science, see Gary 
King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
29
 George, Bridging the Gap, 136.  See Kenneth Waltz, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” 
Security Studies 6 (Autumn 1996): 54-57.
30
 “Preface: Leaders, Groups, and Coalitions,” International Studies Review 3 (Summer 2001): 1.
13
One area to consider is the decision unit shaping foreign policy: is it 
individual, group, or bureaucracy?31  One needs to examine the situational variables 
and different stages of the policy processes to identify circumstances likely to 
influence the priority (or preferences) of different decision units.  A superficial 
reading of the two periods (1950’s and 1990’s) might suggest that external factors 
and constraints were the primary variables affecting the policy, but a more careful 
analysis reveals that the cases are more complex and interesting.  In particular, the 
domestic and internal forces were much more influential than commonly attributed.  
As Snyder and his colleagues observed, the definition of the situation and how it is 
defined influences who gets involved in the policymaking process, and the 
consequent shape of the foreign policy depends on the configuration of the particular 
groups, leaders, and coalitions involved.32  Thus, relying upon systemic theories of 
international relations alone does not fully capture the interaction between the United 
States and Europe.  The explanatory value is insufficient.  One needs to delve down a 
level and integrate the domestic and international levels of analysis in order to gain a 
more complete understanding of the determinants of American ambivalence toward 
European defense autonomy.
31
 See Margaret Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework,” 
International Studies Review 3 (Summer 2001): 47-81.
32
 Richard Snyder et. al., Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univeristy Foreign Policy Analysis Project Monograph 3, 1954),  referenced 
in “Preface: Leaders, Groups, Coalitions,” International Studies Review 3 (Summer 2001): 1-4.
14
Research Methods
This dissertation concentrates on two major periods in transatlantic defense 
relations: the first covers the period from 1949 to 1954 (from the creation of NATO 
to the defeat of the EDC), and the second covers the period from 1998 to 2003 (from 
the St. Malo declaration to the first EU military mission).  Isolating and “freeze 
framing” these two periods through the use of process tracing will permit a discrete 
and systematic treatment of the contributing factors influencing American foreign 
policy, essentially turning them into comparative case studies.33  Bennett and George 
define process tracing as “the attempt to trace empirically the temporal and possibly 
causal sequences of events within a case that intervene between independent variables 
and observed outcomes.”34  There indeed are limitations to process tracing, just as 
there are to other methods (including statistical methods).  Nevertheless, process 
tracing can highlight the path to an outcome, identify decision points, and suggest 
causal inference, especially if the case sample is small.35
To provide context, the first case study will be preceded by a discussion of 
developments following the end of World War II, the start of the Cold War, and the 
impact of the Korean conflict.  The second case study will be preceded by a 
33
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34
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discussion of the end of the Cold War, the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, and the 
conflict in the Balkans (both Bosnia and Kosovo).
While historical periods are by their very nature unique and impossible to 
control for all variables, the 1950’s and 1990’s exhibit striking similarities, thus 
lending themselves to systematic comparison.   First, both reflect a dramatic break in 
the international order (World War II and Cold War).  Therefore, there was an 
opportunity for states to establish new positions and policies.  There was the 
opportunity for states to rethink previous ways of interacting with other states.  Both 
periods centered on the establishment or reappraisal of institutions to address 
international problems.  Of course, the most notable difference is the explicit absence 
of a perceived military threat from the Soviet Union.
Much of the research for the first case study involved reviewing detailed 
secondary sources and supplemented where necessary by primary sources to 
determine the main purposes and motives for US policy formation regarding the 
creation of the European Defense Community.36  I also turned to excellent 
biographies and memoirs of principal actors at the time (e.g., Acheson, Bruce, Dulles, 
Eden, Eisenhower, Macmillan, Monnet, Spaak, and Truman).  Examining such source 
material through alternative theoretical lenses helped me to sift through the rhetoric 
and revision regarding the US role, thinking, and interests in this area.  It also 
facilitated testing the strength of various independent variables that influenced US 
policy.  As Achen and Snidal note, “In international relations, only case studies 
36
 In particular, I relied heavily on Furdson, European Defense Community and Kevin Ruane, The Rise 
and Fall of the European Defense Community (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).  Both of these 
sources have been thoroughly researched and provided useful data.  Primary sources included archival 
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provide the intensive empirical analysis that can find previously unnoticed causal 
factors and historical patterns.”37
Much of the research for the second case study involved structured interviews 
and examination of primary material where available (some material was still 
classified or sensitive).  Because of the recentness of the period, many important 
actors are still accessible, and their perspectives were invaluable.  Moreover, enough 
time has elapsed to permit a more objective perspective and, perhaps, candor from 
those removed from the day-to-day policymaking activities of governments and 
institutions.  I also benefited from employment at the Department of State during 
some of the period of the second case study, which allowed for an “insider” 
perspective to the deliberations and policymaking process.
Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter Two explores the contending theoretical perspectives and reviews the 
academic literature related to international relations and foreign policy decision-
making that are most relevant to transatlantic defense relations.  The factors shaping 
policy formation – from initial discussion and decision shaping to policy output and 
implementation – are explored in further detail as they pertain to the dynamic 
between national and international spheres.
Chapter Three is a structured empirical account of case one: the development 
of US policy toward the EDC.  The chapter outlines the strategic context, the choices 
material from the Foreign Relations of the United States series, official NATO documentation, and 
declassified material at the National Defense University library.
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facing American decision-makers, the principal actors and decision units, patterns of 
interaction, and the policy output.
Chapter Four is a structured empirical account of case two: the development 
of US policy toward ESDP.  In similar fashion to the first case, it outlines the 
strategic context, the choices facing American decision-makers, the principal actors 
and decision units, patterns of interaction, and the policy output.
Chapter Five considers theoretical explanations for the first case.  After 
evaluating the first case from the perspectives of major contending international 
relations theories, the chapter explicates the role and influence of domestic political 
forces and policy entrepreneurs in shaping US policy.
Chapter Six considers theoretical explanations for the second case.  Again, 
after evaluating US policy toward ESDP from the perspectives of major contending 
international relations theories, the chapter shows how the role and influence of 
domestic political forces and presence of institutional elements shaped and 
constrained US policy.
The final chapter summarizes these findings in comparative perspective and 
explores avenues for further research.  It also delineates uncertainties in the outcome, 
ambiguities and difficulties in the investigation.
37
 Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case 
Studies,” World Politics 41, 2 (January 1989), 167.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives – The Links Between 
Domestic Actors, Foreign Policymaking, and International 
Relations
Introduction
The field of International Relations (IR) seeks to understand the dynamics of 
interaction between and among state and non-state actors in the world.  Unlike in 
other fields of political science, here there is less consensus on the range of 
perspectives by which to study international political phenomena.  There is the level-
of-analysis question, including the debate over whether the study of international 
relations should take into account the role of leadership and governmental decision-
making bodies or units, as well as the relationship between international relations and 
foreign policy decision-making.
The central core of IR as a field is to understand the “causes of conflict and 
the conditions for cooperation” in an international context characterized by anarchy.38
Although there is no universal agreement on the term “anarchy,” many use it to 
describe the absence of a central government possessing a global monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence.  At the same time, almost all would concede that the 
international system is not completely chaotic; there is some order and expectation of 
reciprocal treatment.  As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff note, “Even in the anarchic 
society posited by classical realists and their neorealist successors, states achieve their 
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security goals by both cooperative and conflictual means.  Therefore, theories of 
cooperation, together with theories of conflict, form the necessary basis for a 
comprehensive theory of international relations”39
And yet, the field of IR is in flux and disarray.  Ethan Kapstein argues that the 
study of international relations is experiencing a “theoretical crisis.”  That is because 
the dominant theory, structural realism, or neorealism,40 has been under attack, and 
these "broadsides leave a sinking hulk" where neorealism "once ruled the theoretical 
seas."41   However, no adequate replacement has yet been found.
In the following section, I will examine structural realism, outlining its ability 
to explain state behavior, particularly in terms of its ability to explain specific policy 
actions.  This will be followed by a review of criticisms and weaknesses to the theory.  
Then, I will examine a second major theoretical framework, liberalism,42 to judge its 
ability to explain and predict state behavior.  I will then examine the latest approach 
to explaining state behavior – social constructivism – before concluding with some 
thoughts on the implications of such debates on US views towards European defense 
autonomy.
38
 James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New 
York: Longman, 1997), 418.
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(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Robert Lieber, The Oil Decade: Conflict and 
Cooperation in the West (New York: Praeger, 1983); Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation 
and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Robert 
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40
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Structural Realism: Is It Structurally Flawed?
Structural realism continues to be the dominant paradigm for explaining world 
politics.43  Structural realism is identified with the work of Kenneth Waltz.44
Updating the thought of classical realism, Waltz strove to develop a generalizable and 
universal theory of international relations.45  The basic assumptions are: the state, 
representing the aggregate interests of society, is the primary unit of analysis; the 
international system, composed of states, is inherently conflictual, anarchic, without a 
global or supranational force; and power is the final arbiter of politics and economics.  
It is assumed that states, which act in their own self-interest, are generally in conflict 
with one another for survival.  The crucial independent variable is power, especially 
its distribution within the system.   
One of the first to clearly formulate a framework stressing the systemic 
constraints on state capabilities, Waltz emphasized the structure of the international 
system, which he described as horizontal and anarchic, in the sense that the units (i.e., 
states) are equal with regard to each other.  This differs from the structure of domestic 
politics, which is hierarchical in nature.  However, that is not to say states do not 
possess different capabilities.  On the contrary, it is the variance in capabilities that 
distinguishes one state from another and places it in the international system.  
Fundamentally, neorealists believe it is power and its distribution that influence the 
behavior of states.   In short, the structure, characterized by the distribution of power, 
determines what state actors can and cannot do.  
43
 See Kapstein, “Is Realism Dead?”  Also, John Vasquez and Colin Elman (eds.), Realism and the 
Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2003).
44
 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
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Neorealists contend that the international distribution of power (defined as military 
and economic capacities) leads states to maximize their power in order to assure their 
survival.  Consequently, states will seek to balance other powers in order to prevent a 
hegemonic power from dominating the entire system.  The type of state actor 
(democracy, authoritarian, etc.) is of little relevance, and domestic politics do not play 
a major role in explaining state behavior.  Such neorealists believe in the billiard ball 
approach to understanding international relations, where what goes on inside the state 
is of little consequence to explaining conflict, cooperation, war, and peace.
Neorealists tend to explain order in one of two ways: through either balance of 
power theory or hegemonic stability theory.  Thus, either states feeling threatened 
will balance against increasing concentrations of power or one single state wields a 
preponderance of power that reduces the incentives of others to counterbalance or 
resist.  In the latter case, the weak states will “bandwagon” by either joining the 
hegemon through alliance or allowing themselves to be dominated by the hegemon.  
States may balance internally through domestic mobilization, or they may seek 
temporary coalitions or alliances with other states.46
Because states are treated as unitary actors “who, at a minimum, seek their 
own preservation and, at a maximum, strive for universal domination,” a key 
ingredient is balance of power.  As Waltz writes, “balance-of-power theory is micro 
theory precisely in the economist’s sense.  The system, like a market in economics, is 
made by the actions and interactions of its units, and the theory is based on 
45
 For examples of classical realism, see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: 
Knopf, 1948) and Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964).
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assumptions about their behavior.”47  Therefore, one should expect to see states form 
alliances and balance against potential hegemons.  
According to Joseph Grieco, there are three main assumptions underlying 
balance-of-power as the natural order of world politics: 1) all states seek security, but 
security is never absolute; 2) because a state’s intentions are never absolutely 
knowable, an ally may become an adversary, thus turning alliances into temporary 
pacts against a common threat; and 3) relative power is more important than absolute 
power, since states only care about their power in relation to other potentially 
competing states.48
A second explanatory theory within the neorealist framework is hegemonic 
stability theory, which at first glance seems to be the opposite of balance-of-power 
theory.  Such a view of the preponderance of power often is taken from an 
international political economy perspective.  Some have fused elements of political 
realism with economic liberalism to create the theory of hegemonic stability.  For 
example, Charles Kindleberger uses public choice theory and the theory of 
hegemonic stability to explain changes in the world’s economy.  Combining neo-
classical economics’ methodological individualism with Mancur Olson’s theory of 
collective action, Kindleberger argues that an open and liberal world trading system 
requires an economic hegemon.   This hegemonic or dominant power is required to 
provide necessary stability.  In Kindleberger’s words, “For the world economy to be 
stable, it needs a stabilizer, some country that would undertake to provide a market 
for distress goods, a steady if not countercyclical flow of capital, and a rediscount 
47
 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 118.
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mechanism for providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic.”49
The role of the hegemonic power is to maintain the international economic order by 
preventing cheating or “free-riding” of public or collective goods.  Kindleberger 
defines a public good as “one the consumption of which by an individual, household, 
or firm does not reduce the amount available for other potential consumers.”50
Examples of public goods at the international level include collective security, an 
open trading system, and stable currency.
One way the hegemonic or dominant power performs its role is to use its 
influence to create international regimes that determine proper and improper 
behavior.51   It is also the case, according to proponents of this theory, that if there 
were no hegemon to impose and maintain these international regimes, the world 
economy would become unstable, prone to economic nationalism, protectionism, and 
a general break-down in free trade.52
The danger implicit from this theory is that the system is prone to decay as the 
hegemon has the tendency to shift from providing proper leadership to exploitation, 
or when the hegemon fails to lead.  This can occur because the hegemon is tired of 
48
 Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism,” International Organization 42 (August 1988): 485-507.
49 Charles Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy,” in International 
Studies Quarterly 25, 2 (June 1981): 247.  For Olson’s theory, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of 
Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
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51 See Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,” in International Organization 36 (1982):185-205, and ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).  Krasner defines regimes as “principles, norms, rules, and 
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see Oran R. Young, “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” in World Politics 32 
(April 1980).
52 For a critique of the need for a hegemonic power for the preservation of a liberal international 
economy, see Keohane, After Hegemony.
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carrying what it perceives as the bulk of the burden of maintaining the system.  
Kindleberger suggests that the inability of Britain to maintain international monetary 
stability after the First World War was a key factor which led to the Great 
Depression, and “[p]art of the world’s economic problem today is that the United 
States has resigned (or been discharged) as leader of the world economy, and there is 
no candidate willing and acceptable to take its place.”53
Kindleberger concludes that entropy of world economic leadership is 
inevitable, and that the demise of the hegemon can come either from within or 
without.  What happens, in Kindleberger’s view, is that the system breaks down, and 
instability ensues until a new leader emerges.  As he writes, “After breakdown, there 
follows a long, drawn-out, and dangerous process of establishing a new basis of 
legitimacy, under a new leader.”54
A weakness of this theory is that it tends to ignore or underemphasize the 
importance of domestic political factors and social forces in the development of the 
international market.  Critics also note its inability to predict hegemonic behavior 
under various conditions or to demonstrate the causal links between power and 
outcome.55
Realists tend to view international economic relations from the perspective of 
“national interest,” paramount of which is the survival of the state.  Such a collective 
interest is often assumed clear and definable.  Many realists interpret the world 
economy in terms of a zero-sum game; thus, it is critical to maximize one’s wealth at 
53
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55 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
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the expense of others.  As two scholars put it, “From this perspective, the national 
interest is usually seen to imply the need for increasing the dependence of other states 
on the home state’s economy.  The other side of the same coin is reducing the home 
state’s dependence on others.”56  Dependence is to be avoided because it could lead to 
dominance by others.  Thus, for a realist, a state’s ideal position in terms of economic 
security would be complete self-sufficiency.  As Gill and Law note, “Given that self-
sufficiency is largely unobtainable for most states, the second-best condition would 
be one of asymmetrical interdependence, balanced in favour of the home state.”57
Realists working from this perspective would advocate countries identifying strategic 
industries and “see domestic and international aspects of the global political economy 
as linked in that they view ‘national capital’ operating internationally.”58  Realists and 
mercantilists blame the export of corporate expertise in transnational firms to less 
developed regions for the relative decline of economic power in the United States.   If 
they pay any attention to transnational social forces and the role of non-state actors, 
they view, as Ruggie notes, “transnationalization as a direct reflection of 
hegemony.”59
The essence of the neorealist position is one that attempts to explain the 
economic difficulties of the 1970’s while responding to critics who argue that the end 
of the nation-state is near.  In the words of one author, “The inability of nation-states 
to control or manage turbulent change in the 1970’s was not attributed to the demise 
56 Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems, and Policies
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 27.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 30.
59 John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in 
the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), 383.
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of the nation-state,...but to the power vacuum resulting from the decline of American 
hegemony....”60  For neorealists, “International agreements are nothing else than 
tough bargains struck between conflicting parties in which the strongest gets its way.  
Not to strive for hegemony is to lose the game.”61
Waltz’s theory, however, unleashed a debate that has “dominated the 
international-relations theoretical landscape since the early 1980’s.”62  Structural 
realism has been attacked and faulted for a number of reasons.  Although a realist 
himself, Stephen Walt disputed the claim that states balance solely against the 
strongest state in the system, arguing that instead “states balance against the greatest 
threats to their interests, defining threats as a product of perceived intentions, 
ideology, and distance, as well as capabilities.”63  Under conditions of anarchy, 
security is scarce and intentions are uncertain.  Consequently, states tend to balance 
one another based on the distribution of power in the system.  Unfortunately, a 
number of scholars have taken issue with the lack of precision to the terms “balance 
of power” as conceptual tools of analysis.64  According to George, “the few structural 
variables encompassed by the theory operate not as determinants of statesmen’s 
choices of policy, but merely as constraints, though certainly important constraints, 
on those choices.”65  George goes on to question the term “power” as a concept, both 
in its ambiguity in definitional terms but also as a heuristic device.  As he writes, 
60 Robert A. Isaak, International Political Economy: Managing World Economic Change (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1991), 66.
61 Ibid.
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“The emphasis on the importance of the differences in power among states fails to 
take into account that not all capabilities a state possesses come into play and 
influence outcome of its interactions with other states.  The theory fails to distinguish 
– and cannot distinguish – between what might be called the totality of gross 
capabilities a state possesses and the often much more limited usable options that its 
leaders can employ or wish to employ in particular situations.”  By focusing almost 
exclusively on the totality of a state’s power and resources, important aspects related 
to international relations may be missed.  Raw power capabilities may overlook the 
intensity of the weaker state’s preference in a particular dispute.  Thus, “asymmetry 
of motivation” may work against the stronger state, as its strategic outlook is broader 
and encompasses multiple interests across an array of issue areas.  In other words, 
“the more powerful state may not attach enough importance to these particular 
interests to warrant a heavy expenditure of resources to achieve a maximum payoff in 
the dispute with a weaker but highly motivated adversary.”66
A major criticism is that because neorealists focus almost exclusively at the 
system level, they neglect the structure of the units themselves and the role that might 
play on the behavior of the units.  A number of analysts fault neorealists for not
considering domestic sources and influences on international relations.67  The 
65
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approach these critics take is to reject or minimize the role of the system.  According 
to Kapstein: 
Critics argue either that there is no objective international system with 
an independent existence or that systemic pressures are so weak and 
uncertain that they are indeterminate with respect to the foreign policy 
choices that states make and the outcomes of their international 
interactions.  In order to understand state behavior, therefore, scholars 
must reject the “billiard ball” model of structural realism and begin 
their exploration inside the “black box” of domestic politics.  The 
causal logic of this explanation thus begins with what is happening 
inside a particular unit.68
Kapstein proceeds to demonstrate that, according to the latest proponents of 
democratic peace, a multipolar world of liberal states would likely be more stable 
than a multipolar world with various regimes.69  In Kapstein’s words, “[R]egime type 
is a more significant determinant of international relations than polarity, or the 
distribution of power.”70  Others reject the entire relevance of unipolarity, bipolarity, 
balance of power, and structural realism.71
A second major criticism of structural realism is that it does not account for 
transnational actors.  Because the units in the system are only states, it cannot respond 
to what may be a growing influence in the world -- non-state actors such as terrorist 
groups, organized crime syndicates, multinational corporations, non-governmental 
organizations, international organizations, etc.  For example, neorealists tend to 
68
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ignore the development of the European Union as a global actor since the EU is not a 
nation-state.
A third critique is that neorealism fails to adequately explain cooperation 
among states and the influence of governing norms, principles, and rules in 
constraining state behavior.72  This is made even more pronounced by the implicitly 
pessimistic neorealist view of a world where states are seen as automatically at odds 
with one another.  Whereas realists have no difficulties assuming the development of 
a collective, national interest, they believe it stops there without recognizing that there 
may be common interests beyond the state or domestic level.  Neorealists have 
responded that alliances and hegemonic stability account for cooperation, but claim 
that the distribution of power and states’ threat perceptions – not norms – are the 
driving forces.73  Some scholars propose that besides power as a variable, “rules, 
regimes, and international institutions need to be brought into the definition of 
international political structure.”74
A fourth criticism is that neorealism does not conform to history.  If structural 
realism has strong explanatory power, it should be testable, and history should 
substantiate the theory.  However, Paul Schroeder has taken structural realists to task, 
stating that their “view of the unchanging, repetitive nature of balance-of-power 
politics and outcomes throughout the ages, may make the theory of international 
politics simple, parsimonious, and elegant; they also make it...unhistorical, unusable, 
72
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and wrong.”75  Schroeder discovered that states tended to behave in ways other than 
neorealist theory would predict, including bandwagoning instead of balancing, or 
remaining neutral altogether.  More recently, structural realism has been criticized for 
its inability to predict the peaceful end of the Cold War.76
In conjunction with Schroeder’s critique, neorealist theory is faulted for not 
addressing cultural influences and social contexts.  Numerous postmodern theorists, 
social constructivists, and others argue that culture and identity are important 
explicators of international behavior and that anarchy and the state are created 
concepts that reflect normative thought. 77
Finally, the terms used by neorealists (e.g., national interest, power, etc.) are 
difficult to operationalize in that concepts such as national interest may be 
tautological and, in any event, are open to interpretation.  The notion that policy is in 
the “national interest” has posed dilemmas for scholars seeking precision in concepts.  
Such a collective interest is often assumed to be clear and definable.  In reality, 
though, finding meaning in the term “national interest” is difficult.  If it were not, the 
foreign policy advocates would find it easy to implement a certain policy because it 
would be obvious that it was in the national interest to do so.  After all, no one 
75
 Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” International Security 19 (Summer 
1994): 148.  See also Joe Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter?” International Studies Review 3 
(Summer): 5-46. Hagan analyzes state behavior in the run-up to the twentieth century’s great conflicts 
– World War I, World War II, and the Cold War – to demonstrate anomalies in neo-realist 
expectations.  
76
 See John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” in Sean 
Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds) The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1993): 323-388.  Also, see Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold 
War, and the Failure of Realism,” International Organization 48 (1994): 249-277.
77
 See N.J. Rennger and Mark Hoffman, “Modernity, Postmodernity and International Relations,” in 
John Doherty et. al. (eds) Postmodernism and the Social Sciences (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1992): 127-147; C. Hall, “Gender, Nationalisms and National Identities,” Feminist Review 44 (1993): 
97-104; Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory
31
advocates a particular foreign policy on the grounds that it is not in the national 
interest.  That would be absurd.  Thus, meaning of the term “national interest” reflects 
the views of leaders in power at a given point in time.  It also suggests that national 
interests are not fixed, but rather may fluctuate over time depending on the leadership 
structure.
As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff point out, however, “Among the focal points of 
neorealist analysis is an effort to reformulate and refine the national-interest concept 
to encompass a perceived calculus of benefits and losses, in accordance with 
alternative posited goals for the state.”78
Although on the defensive, structural realists continue to push back.79  Despite 
its numerous critics, structural realism still “ranks as the most important attempt thus
far to isolate and focus on a key variable in political behavior -- namely, power -- and 
to develop a theory of international relations.”80  Kapstein adds, “[N]eorealism 
provides a useful starting point for understanding outcomes in the international 
system.”81
Not long after the end of the Cold War, leading structural realists such as John 
Mearsheimer, Christopher Layne and Kenneth Waltz argued that the American 
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“unipolar moment” would be fleeting.82  Drawing on balance-of-power theory, they 
argued that major states and/or regional groupings (e.g., China, EU-Europe, Japan, 
India, and Russia) would soon counter-balance the US hegemonic position, leading 
the world system to become multipolar and inherently less stable.  Structural realists 
also argued that the US would strategically disengage from the international scene, as 
it became only one of many voices on the world scene.83  However, to date, those 
predictions have not borne out.  As several scholars have noted, the US position in the 
world has remained uniquely pre-eminent and arguably stronger since the end of the 
Cold War.84
Neoliberalism: Suitable Replacement?
A second approach to international relations is drawn from the liberal or 
idealist school and emphasizes the cooperative nature of states.  Neoliberals tend to 
focus on interdependence and emphasize the common interests of states.85  According 
to Joseph Nye, a defining characteristic of liberalism in international relations is the 
stress placed on the impact of domestic and international society, interdependence, 
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and international institutions.86 Nye describes three major causal strands of classical 
liberal theory.  One of them, democratic liberalism, asserts the pacific effects of 
republican government.87  One definition of Liberalism is the belief that democracy 
can solve international conflict and a correct domestic society (namely, America’s) 
leads to peace.
Francis Fukuyama argued in the early 1990’s that the grand philosophical 
dialectic of ideas had ended.  Emerged was a new synthesis: the decisive victory of 
liberalism over communism.88  Adopting evolutionary theories of modern natural 
science to what he termed the modern rational social world, Fukuyama believed that 
“History” was linear, moving in a direction that could not be reversed.89  Thus, events 
would lead to the evolutionary creation of a universal consumer culture based on 
liberal economic principles and technology.  Linked with technology are education, 
economic development, and democracy. 90   Consequently, the historical process, by 
what Hegel viewed as the struggle for recognition, could only move forward to its 
natural conclusion – democracy.  Only liberal democracy, according to Fukuyama, is 
characterized by universal and reciprocal recognition.  Thus, the end of history occurs 
because “no other arrangement of human social institutions is better able to satisfy 
this longing, and hence no further progressive historical change is possible.”91
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He optimistically likens the process to a wagon train, where, although some 
may get lost or temporarily off track, the vast majority makes it to the new town at the 
end of the journey called “History.”  Although subsequent events (e.g., the wars in the 
Balkans and terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001) made his ideas appear naïve, 
nonetheless the basic tenets of liberalism remain popular, especially with respect to 
democratization. 
Incorporating the strength of Fukuyama’s liberal democracy with the 
significance of transnational interdependence, Joseph Nye argues that, although 
America’s relative position may have decreased since World War II, the United 
States will remain the dominant world power into the 21st century.  For myriad 
reasons, according to Nye, neither communist challengers such as the former Soviet 
Union and China nor Allied challengers such as the European Union and Japan will 
be able to supersede the United States.  Only the United States can – and must – lead.     
In Nye’s view, “If the largest country in a world of nation-states abdicates 
leadership... the results can be disastrous for all.”92
Nye differentiates between two types of decline: 1) a decrease in external 
power and 2) internal deterioration or decay.  Rejecting naysayers’ claims that 
America is on a downward spiral, Nye asserts that the US has merely returned to its 
natural position following the unnatural dominance caused by World War II.   
Arguing against traditional approaches to contemporary international politics, 
Nye warns that the focus should not be on other state actors that might threaten US 
power, but on the process itself.  The author writes: 
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The traditional models of power transition and hegemonic change may 
be profoundly misleading,...possibly leading to self-defeating 
American policy responses.  The problem is not that one or the other 
of America’s postwar allies will challenge the United States for 
hegemony, but that the United States will have to adapt to new 
patterns of interdependence and new political agendas in the twenty-
first century.93
Nye argues against isolationism, claiming that withdrawing from international 
commitments would “reduce US influence without necessarily strengthening the 
domestic economy.”94  He reassures the reader that the United States has sufficient 
wealth to handle both international commitments and domestic needs.  
Nye concludes by stating that, although the US has both the “traditional hard 
power resources and the new soft power resources to meet the challenges of 
transnational interdependence,” the real question is whether America “will have the 
political leadership and strategic vision to convert these power resources into real 
influence in a transitional period of world politics.”95  Nye warns of the dangers of 
complacency and irrational withdrawal from international leadership.96
In response to neorealist theory, a number of scholars began to reinvigorate 
various strands of Liberal theory, including those that stressed the growing 
importance of institutions and regimes to mitigate aggressive tendencies.97
Multilateral institutions form a foundation of stability within the world system.  Some 
accept the realist premise of states as primary actors in the world that seek to 
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maximize their power, but they conclude that cooperation occurs within an 
institutionalized framework that then constrains their behavior.98  One characteristic 
assumption underlying liberal institutionalism is that institutions provide information 
and transparency to other states and thus reduce the incentive for cheating.99
Emphasizing the importance of changeable political processes rather than 
simply immutable structures, Robert Keohane introduced what he terms “neoliberal 
institutionalism.”100  Keohane eschews determinism and emphasizes the pervasive 
significance of international institutions without denigrating the role of state power.  
He argues that “complex interdependence exemplifies the role of expectations and 
conventions in world politics.”101  These expectations become the driving force for 
cooperation rather than confrontation in international relations.  For example, the 
complex interdependence of transnational monetary regimes can lead to cooperation.  
Unlike an economic liberal point of view, however, Keohane states that it does not 
ensure harmony.  According to Keohane, “An open international economic 
environment, characterized by opportunities for mutually rewarding exchange under 
orderly sets of rules, provides incentives for peaceful behavior....Cooperation is not 
automatic, but requires planning and negotiation.”102
98
 For example, see Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1989); Andrew Moravcsik, Choice for Europe and “Taking Preferences Seriously;” 
and Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “Institutional Theory as a Research Program” in Colin and 
Miriam Elman (eds), Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2003): 71-108.   Keohane and Martin note that “institutional theory” is a better 
descriptor than “neoliberal institutionalism.” (p. 92)
99
 See Keohane, After Hegemony.
100 See Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, especially ch. 1.
101 Ibid., 9.
102 Ibid., 11.
37
This is similar to points John Ruggie makes in his article, “International 
Regimes, Transactions, and Change.”103   In the article, Ruggie examines how 
regimes for money and trade have influenced the international economic order since 
World War II.  Ruggie emphasizes the restraining influence of regimes on state 
behavior in order to maximize market forces.  “Specific regimes,” writes Ruggie, “in 
the areas of money and trade, for example, limit the discretion of states to intervene in 
the functioning of self-regulating currency and commodity markets.”104  He talks of 
“embedded liberalism.”  The essence of embedded liberalism is multilateralism that is 
compatible with ensuring domestic stability.105  As such, Ruggie argues that changes 
in the international monetary and trade regimes or “norm-governed change accounts 
for more of the variance than claims of fundamental discontinuity.”106   Ruggie 
suggests that stability can be maintained despite the decline of American hegemony 
(or any hegemony for that matter).  The past twenty years seem to support his 
argument.
Others posit that shared values create a mutual interdependence leading to 
cooperation.107  Ikenberry contends that America has maintained its hegemonic 
position after the Cold War through the wise use of self-restraint, multilateralism, and 
institutionalized diplomacy.108
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Joseph Nye writes: 
Sophisticated versions of Liberal theory address the manner in which 
interactions among states and the development of international norms 
interact with domestic politics of the states in an international system 
so as to transform the way in which states define their interests.  
Transnational and interstate interactions and norms lead to new 
definitions of interests, as well as to new coalition possibilities for 
different interests within states.109
  Pointing to several instances (e.g., dilemmas of common interest and 
common aversion) when independent, self-interested decision-making might actually 
be counterproductive or suboptimal, Arthur Stein argues that the existence of regimes 
is “fully consistent with a realist view of international politics, in which states are 
seen as sovereign and self-reliant.”110  Regimes circumscribe state behavior by 
encouraging alternative, cooperative actions that are in the state’s own interests.
Axelrod and Keohane too look at neoliberal ways of achieving cooperation 
under anarchy.  They define cooperation not as harmony but “when actors adjust their 
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others,” and anarchy as “a lack of 
common government in world politics.”111  They note the influence of mutuality of 
interests, shadow of the future, and number of players on the success or failure of 
cooperation attempts in both the military-security and political-economic fields.112
Other factors influencing cooperation include: issue linkage; connection between 
international and domestic politics; the institutionalization of reciprocity; and 
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perception.  The results are multi-level games with competing and cooperating and 
sometimes overlapping actors.  Reciprocity and regime formation can facilitate 
cooperation by delegitimizing defection and making its cost higher.
One method of fostering interdependence is to develop institutions.  Stanley 
Hoffmann discusses the role of institutions in present-day Europe.  The important 
fact, for Hoffmann, “is the role of a bewildering array of overlapping institutions, 
within and through which states seek altogether joint benefits, the balancing of 
partners who are also potential adversaries, national advantage..., and a variety of 
insurance and reassurance policies.”113  Hoffmann highlights a crucial function of 
these institutions in the security realm.  They “reassure their members or signatories 
against fears that could, if left untended, turn a generally cooperative Europe into, 
once more, a continent of mutual suspicions and antagonistic precautions....Thus, 
institutions can be life preservers that either save one from drowning or save one from 
having to drown others to survive.”114
Keohane agrees with Hoffmann and argues that the dense, interlocking array 
of institutions in Western Europe have constrained states and provided incentives for 
cooperation, contrary to realist theory expectations.  He emphasizes the conditionality 
of relative gains, noting that institutionalism does not predict universal cooperation.  
Keohane asserts that institutionalism and realism are not diametrically opposed, but 
diverge on emphasis.  Institutionalists believe realists are too pessimistic about 
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potential for cooperation and role of institutions, while realists think neoliberals 
exaggerate the value of institutions in fostering cooperation.
Robert Keohane welcomes the end of the Cold War because the structural 
changes provide an opportunity to test the quality of different interpretations offered 
by realism and institutionalism.  “Strict realism,” writes Keohane, “should lead one to 
expect a decline in the number and significance of international institutions; 
institutionalists such as myself expect no such decline.  Institutionalists expect 
existing international institutions to adapt and to persist more easily than new 
institutions, formed by states on the basis of changing interests, can be created.  
Realists make no such prediction.”115  As Keohane argues about the situation in 
Europe, “The continued salience of international institutions after the end of the Cold 
War is quite evident from an examination of state strategies.  All five major powers 
used international institutions in their strategies of adaptation to the structural changes 
of 1989-91.”116  Keohane adds, “Institutionalists argue that organizational inertia, 
considerations of reputation, and connections to domestic politics mean that 
institutions often persist even when the conditions for their creation have disappeared, 
and that institutions exert impacts on state policy when policies are not dictated by 
clear interests.”117  Realists such as Waltz respond that “NATO’s days are not 
numbered, but its years are.”  In his view, institutions may persist through 
bureaucratic inertia, but are ultimately undermined by structural change.118
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Joseph Grieco argues that cooperation can go only so far.  The big difference 
between realists and neoliberals in their regard for anarchy, according to Grieco, is 
that neoliberals stress the lack of a central agency to enforce promises, while for 
realists anarchy means “there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using 
violence, or threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them.”119  The issue for 
neorealists is not cheating, but survival.  The threat of extinction drives all states to a 
certain level of fear and mistrust.  Thus, as Grieco writes, “The fundamental goal of 
states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative 
capabilities.”120  Grieco argues that defensive state positionality affects the 
willingness of states to cooperate, not institutions.  Neoliberal institutionalism fails to 
overturn structural realism.
Social Constructivism: Newest Challenger
A relatively recent approach that has emerged since the end of the Cold War is 
that of social constructivism.  Constructivists discount the claims of neo-realists and 
neo-liberals that there is an objective reality and focus on identity development and 
discourse.  They argue that states create their own reality through symbols, 
declarations, and associations.121  Thus, the images of power and perception are more 
important than actual capability or “facts.”
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Unlike neorealists, constructivists do not have as unified a theoretical 
approach.  As one scholar notes, “Constructivism is the blanket term for a broad 
range of scholarship that, at its root, attempts to return human agency to the study of 
international relations by moving ideas, norms, culture, and language from the 
periphery of analysis to its center.”122  A diverse set of perspectives falls in this 
category: critical theorists, post-modernists, feminists, etc.  Thus, it is hard to 
categorize except for the common element that international relations – because 
human agency is involved – is much more complex, fluid, and unpredictable than 
neorealists and liberal institutionalists contend.123
In particular, since the end of the Cold War, interest in the role of political 
culture in international relations has grown. Numerous recent studies have focused on 
various aspects of culture as a critical variable in explaining world politics.124  What 
is political culture, and what has shaped its development as a concept in international 
politics?
Political culture originated from theories and concepts of culture itself, found 
in sociology, anthropology, small group studies, personality studies in psychology, 
and socialization.  For example, the anthropologist Frank Boas defines culture as “all 
the manifestations of social habits of a community, the reactions of the individual as 
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affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the products of human 
activities as determined by these habits.”125  Before the early 1960’s, the “dominant 
approaches to explanation in the social sciences were sociological theory, culture and 
personality theory, and social psychological theory.”126  For example, Benedict drew 
on anthropological theory, explaining various components of different societies in 
terms of “national character,” that is, those “cultural themes, modal personality, and 
the like – mixes of beliefs about authority and human relations – which result in part 
from the ways in which members of these societies were inducted into their adult 
roles.”127  According to Chilcote, “Dissatisfaction with efforts to characterize national 
character or national culture of various countries prompted a reformulation of 
concepts and a substantial effort in comparative politics to view culture in a political 
context.”128
While the concepts and categories used in the analysis of political culture 
(e.g., subculture, elite political culture, political socialization, and cultural change) 
can be seen in the texts of ancient and early modern philosophers, it was not until the 
late 19th and early 20th century that the study of political culture developed.129  Of 
particular influence were European sociologists such as Max Weber and Talcott 
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Parsons, and advances in the development of research methodologies, especially 
techniques used in survey research.130
The classic and seminal work on political culture was Almond and Verba’s 
Civic Culture.131  An empirical study of public attitudes toward political symbols and 
beliefs based on surveys in five nations, Almond and Verba outlined their views of 
political culture compared to general culture.  They defined political culture as 
“consisting of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations to political phenomena, 
distributed in national populations or in subgroups.”132  They concentrated on the 
political orientations of individuals in relation to the political system of those 
individuals.  In their words, “When we speak of the political culture of a society, we 
refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations 
of its population.  People are induced into it just as they are socialized into 
nonpolitical roles and social systems.”133  In other words, the beliefs, feelings, and 
values of individuals in society come to play an important part in the formation of 
political structures and institutions and influence political behavior that emanate 
therein.  
In an effort to link political attitudes with the formation of different regimes, 
they constructed a typology classifying the general distribution of political attitudes 
as either parochial (little or no awareness of national political systems), subject (those 
oriented toward the system and its outputs but not inclined to participate on the input 
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side), and participant (those oriented toward the input structures and decisionmaking 
processes of political systems).134
In a later study, Almond and Powell elaborate on how political culture may 
connect micro and macro levels of analysis between individual and the collective by 
revealing patterns of distribution of orientations to political action.135  They also 
stressed political culture’s empirical advantages, giving “a behavior form of analysis 
to such terms as ideology, national spirit, and values of people.”136
While it has been noted that the concept of political culture was regarded in 
many ways as a resurrection of the concept of “national character,” many scholars 
applied the new term almost entirely to the Third World, particularly toward the 
newly independent states in Africa and elsewhere.137
Near the end of the 1960’s, however, and coinciding with the behavioral 
revolution in political science, scholars increasingly challenged the role of culture as 
an explanatory variable.  Among the criticisms included allegations that the approach 
was classificatory and static; descriptive rather than analytic; scientifically inadequate 
and substantively irrelevant.138  Others claimed the concept itself was culture-bound 
and ethnocentric, lauding the Western model as superior to other cultures.139
Reflecting the turbulent world situation at the time, many scholars shifted 
their interests from the conservative and stable patterns represented by political 
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culture to the more radical approaches that emphasized upheaval, conflict, 
discontinuities, and change.  Increasingly, students of international politics turned 
toward rational choice theory.  They favored the elegant simplicity and parsimony of 
deductive reason, adopted from economics, which avoided the complexity of 
heterogeneous, cultural explanations, which seemed to be at odds with the drive for 
scientific generalization.  Rational choice theorists, adopting what they claimed to be 
a positivist perspective, criticized Almond and others for the subjectivity of their 
works.  Because these scholars desired a positive theory, where the “facts” spoke for 
themselves, the role of culture was minimized.  Instead, choice and expected utility 
functions supplanted subjective and fuzzy items such as “culture.”140  Some even 
dismissed the notion as being irrelevant.141
Consequently, there emerged a clear break of rational choice theorists from 
earlier traditions of social science to the “self-conscious adoption of the deductive 
strategy of economics in the analysis of political phenomena.”142  Eventually, rational 
choice analysis achieved prominence as a dominant approach for explaining social 
science phenomena.
Two main features of the deductive strategy form the core of rational choice: 
methodological individualism and maximization of material interest.  The first 
feature, methodological individualism, holds that all social and political phenomena 
can be derived from the properties and characteristics of individuals.  The second 
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tenet holds that the prime motivation of political actors is maximization of material 
interest – i.e., seeking “benefits in the form of votes, offices, power, at least cost.”143
The key advantage of this approach is its ability to facilitate analysis by 
relying on the simplicity and power of deduction.  Hypotheses generated are explicit 
and efficient.  Culture is not a concept rational choice theorists readily choose 
because it complicates.  According to Ross, “Culture violates canons of 
methodological individualism while raising serious unit of analysis problems for 
which there are no easy answers.”144
In their article, “Formal Rational Choice Theory: A Cumulative Science of 
Politics,” David Lalman, Joe Oppenheimer, and Piotr Swistak describe and defend the 
way rational choice theory has influenced thinking about politics and has grown as a 
major area of research.145  Using examples from voting theory, collective action, and 
coalition stability, the authors describe formal analysis’ major findings and successes.   
While admitting certain limitations – “predictions are often not to be expected” – they 
conclude that formal theory represents the best hope for a true “science of politics.”146
If “science is not an answer so much as it is a method of obtaining answers,...[it] has 
the power to change what we believe about the world.”147  For them, rational choice 
theory, whether one likes it or not, “has fundamentally changed how the discipline 
ought to proceed in studying politics and training students.”148
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Tracing the evolution of political science and its relationship to rational choice 
theory, Theodore Lowi argues that before big government and the New Deal, political 
science was atheoretical, empirical, and concerned with establishing the “facts.”149
This changed, however, with the rise of the bureaucracy as a social force and 
government’s strong commitment to science.  Consequently, economics replaced law 
as the language of the state.  By focusing on interests, preference orders, and expected 
utility, and the individual, regardless of cultural background, rational choice theorists 
have only recently revisited the cultural dimension in international politics.
However, with the rapid and unexpected changes in the world during the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s, punctuated by the collapse of the Soviet empire, 
democratization in Latin America, and the adoption of neoliberal economic policies 
by many governments, the role of culture staged a comeback.150  At the same time, 
the limits of rational choice theory were beginning to be noted with greater 
fervency.151  For example, Gabriel Almond argues that the metaphor of the market is 
merely one of several alternatives for explaining politics.  He points out that rational 
choice theorists tend to use unacknowledged side assumptions of doubtful validity 
upon which to base their inferences.152  Furthermore, he cautions that “rational choice 
analysis may lead to empirical and normative distortions, unless it is used in 
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combination with the historical, sociological, anthropological, and psychological 
sciences which deal with the values and utilities of people, cross-culturally, cross-
nationally, across the social strata, and over time.”153  Likening rational choice to the 
blank tile in Scrabble, Almond concludes, “This failure of rational choice theorists to 
confront these literatures directly...leaves them with theories that cannot travel very 
far in space and time, and cannot deal effectively with political change.”154  Similarly, 
Lowi chastises his colleagues for their fascination with economics.  In his words, “I 
must confess that both the Democratic and the Republican politicians were smarter 
than the political scientists because they took [economic analysis] as weaponry, while 
we took it as science.  We swallowed economics before subjecting it to a political 
analysis.”155
Thus, the role of rationality and individual maximization remains subject to 
debate.  Green and Shapiro note that many rational choice theorists “have left 
unexplained the extent to which a phenomenon is explained by individual 
maximization as opposed to habit, blunder, and the like.  Nor have they devoted much 
attention to how individual maximization interacts with other independent 
variables.”156  Ferejohn has argued that because of the possibility of multiple game-
theoretic equilibria, rational individual maximization can only explain a portion of 
political outcomes.  In his words, “unless we substantially enrich the concept of 
rationality itself, or supplement it with extra assumptions about human nature, 
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rationality by itself cannot fully account for the selection of one outcome rather than 
another.”157  He posits that rational choice theories might be more suited for some 
political phenomena, especially those that are more closely aligned to economics 
(such as budget or trade issues), while at times rational choice theories may need to 
be supplemented by cultural or other theories (e.g., ethnic conflict or other issues 
closely related to identity).
Consequently, the renaissance of political culture and rise of social 
constructivism may be attributed, in part, to the inability of economic variables alone 
to explain or predict rapid changes in the real world, and a growing acceptance of the 
limitations of reductionist rational choice models.  The diminution of ideological 
focus that was so prominent during the Cold War, likewise, may have influenced 
scholars to search for variables which, although always present (as attested by the 
work of some scholars whose research continued in this area even during the 
“dormant” decades of political culture), had been minimized, underemphasized, or 
altogether rejected.  A third possible factor is the more pluralistic and diverse views 
developing within American society in general and the social sciences in particular.
Those focused on political culture have developed a research school that joins 
ranks with the neorealists and liberal institutionalists to contend for a coherent 
theoretical and methodological approach to both international relations and 
comparative politics.  As Lichbach and Zuckerman note, “Rationalist, culturalist, and 
structuralist theories are embedded in strong research communities, scholarly 
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traditions, and analytical languages.  As they dominate comparative politics, they 
provide the locus for assessments of theory in this area of knowledge.”158
Recognizing the varying degrees of sophistication and nuance within the 
different schools, including differences over methodology, level of analysis, and 
assumption, nevertheless, it appears that the debate is clustering around three 
principal and very broad explanatory variables: economic (rational choice); cultural 
(political culture); and systemic (structuralist-institutionalist).
In addition to culture as a variable, social constructivists also focus on ideas, 
ideology, and discourse as they contribute to the perceptions of different actors in 
international politics.159  As Wiarda notes, “No one claims that political culture is the 
only variable in understanding other political systems; rather that in conjunction with 
other factors political culture can be a useful explanatory tool.”160  For example, 
several scholars studying the development of the European Union point to the 
building of a “European” mindset through the socialization from regular EU meetings 
and summits.161  It is through such informal norms, practices, and interactions that 
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government officials begin to identify themselves as part of a new group/entity.162  In 
other words, history is not dead, and ideas do matter.163
The emerging trend is for a combination of variables to be analyzed to explore 
relationships among and between diverse political systems.  Institutions, belief 
systems, values, interest, motives: these all have a part to play.  James Johnson 
encourages interpretive and rational choice theorists alike “to recognize the limits of 
their respective work and to consider potential links to other modes of inquiry with a 
greater sense of equanimity.”164  Thus, what is likely to occur is a gradual cross-
fertilization and perhaps overlapping or synthesis of various models, reflecting 
changes in the real world, and, possibly, a greater understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of embracing, rejecting, and revisiting intellectual approaches and 
explanatory variables in world politics.
As this overview reveals, although often portrayed as opposites, neorealism 
and neoliberalism have much more in common than other theories of IR, especially 
when compared with the latest challenger, social constructivism.165  There has been 
an effort to proceed toward synthesis and to develop theory in a manner that accounts 
for not only structure but also process and change as well.166
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Levels of Analysis and the Limits of Systemic IR Theories
An increasing number of scholars have become dissatisfied with broad 
systemic explanations.   They note that these theories require three main conditions: 
information certainty, goal maximization, and unitary decision-making.167  The 
assumption is that national leaders recognize the systemic pressures upon them and 
can respond quickly, efficiently, and effectively.  Rather, “complex decisions” often 
involve uncertainty, “value” trade-offs, and dispersion of authority.168
Despite their ability to describe the broad outlines of how states behave, 
systemic theories are not enough to explicate the nuances of inherently complex 
foreign policy problems.169   For example, several scholars have shown that often a 
basic dichotomy exists within domestic political systems between those that take a 
hard-line view toward a problem and those with more moderate positions.170  In other 
words, governments do not respond in a linear fashion to systemic pressures, but 
rather there is a range of policy options to a perceived threat and in some cases a time 
lag between awareness of a problem or threat and demonstrable response to that 
problem.   The point is not that governments do not respond to system pressure; only 
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that the discipline of policy formation and implementation is critical to the outcome –
and such discipline varies widely across time and regime.171  A policy area may drift 
according to the tides of the system, or government leaders may act as a rudder to 
steer the policy vessel toward the desired outcome.
How to respond to perceived threats depends on preferences of principal 
decision-makers within a political system.  Macro-level International Relations 
theories sometimes fall short in capturing how interests are formed in the first place. 
While the dissertation has begun with some overall comments related to the 
system-level of international relations and state behavior, its real focus will be to 
illuminate and draw insights from the micro-level for explanations into why 
individuals act in international relations and why certain foreign policies are chosen 
over alternatives that may serve the same end.  
Since the end of World War II, European governments have sought to 
contribute to their own defense.  For decades, though, this goal seemed unattainable.  
In particular, the economic capacity for defense was lacking, and the main emphasis 
was rebuilding broken societies after a devastating conflict.  Meanwhile, Soviet 
behavior became more menacing by the late 1940’s, as the Cold War dawned.  Thus, 
it became imperative for the United States to remain in Europe and provide the 
security umbrella that Europeans themselves could not provide.
By the end of the Cold War, European governments were in much better 
economic shape.  The freedom to pursue economic prosperity had born fruit; in many 
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ways, the Europeans were now in a position to provide for their own defense.  
However, the United States was no longer interested in European defense autonomy 
and, in fact, responded with great suspicion through much of the 1990’s.  The 
Americans sent contradictory messages: on the one hand, the Europeans needed to do 
more in terms of providing their own defense by improving their military capabilities.  
However, they needed to do it only through NATO, where American leadership was 
paramount.  Any alternative approach would be rejected.  Thus, American policy 
implicitly shifted from support for European integration and defense autonomy to 
opposition.  Why?  To gain better insight to this question, one needs to examine 
foreign policy decision-making.  As Hudson notes, “There were two complementary 
but distinct approaches to IR: ‘(1) the description and measurement of interactions; 
and (2) decision-making - the formulation and execution of policy.  Interaction 
patterns can be studied by themselves without reference to decision-making except 
that the “why” of the patterns cannot be answered.’”172
One of the difficulties with the explanatory power of rational choice theories 
and formal models has been that, although they contribute much through their 
parsimony and rigor, their reliance on assumptions of perfect and/or complete 
information, as well as actors responding rationally to the situations, might lead to 
false results when faced with the facts of real-world events.  However, much of the 
real world involves risk, uncertainty, and incomplete information, conditions much 
harder (though perhaps not impossible) to recreate in the laboratory of formal models.
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As Snyder and his colleagues note, “[W]e might summarize our comments on 
the nature of choice as follows: information is selectively perceived and evaluated in 
terms of the decision-maker’s frame of reference.  Choices are made on the basis of 
preferences which are in part situationally and in part biographically determined.”173
In other words, rational choice theory and decision-making analysis are not 
antithetical, but have the potential of being complementary.  As Hudson writes, 
“[T]he two traditions need each other: rational choice without the study of human 
decision-makers can only aspire to be vague and pray not to be inaccurate; yet, 
without rational choice, a conceptualization of the strategic elements of choice may 
not be realizable.”174 Thus, decision-makers tend to make policy choices in relation 
not only to the situation at hand, but their responses also tend to be animated by 
cultural, ideational, and even biological factors.   These responses may refer to the 
context of a situation.175  As Hulsman writes:
Schools-of-thought first principles influence decision-makers who 
create foreign policy outputs.  This process exists, whether admitted or 
not, and as all agree it is crucial to understand action (foreign policy 
outputs), so it is essential to comprehend sub-ideological motivations, 
a contributing variable to foreign policy inputs.176
In other words, such influences need to be inserted into the equation if there is 
to be any hope of gaining insight that approaches empirical reality.
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While neorealist theory may be able to say accurately that US interests were 
served by policy “x,” the theory cannot explain how policy “x” came to be.  There 
may have been several policy choices, and thus a model for interest formation and 
policy selection is required.  Such a model of decision-making draws on theories of 
bureaucratic politics, policy entrepreneurship and transnational networks, domestic 
politics, and identity politics to explain why certain policies were chosen.  
Traditionally, students of foreign policy have developed four basic approaches 
to explain and understand foreign policy behavior: the rational actor, groupthink, 
bureaucratic politics, and decision-making or organizational process.  The rational or 
strategic actor model is the traditional and ideal (where the President with centralized 
control formulates policy based on a value-maximizing strategic calculation, and the 
government apparatus implements that policy in accordance with the President’s 
wishes).  The second (groupthink) focuses on the consequences of a centralized 
Presidential policy-making environment, and the final two models concern the effects 
of a decentralized Presidential policy-making environment on policy outputs.177
Different models have been used to try to understand and explain the foreign 
policy process.  The dominant model used is the Strategic or Rational Actor model.  
Decision-makers (or states) are viewed as “solitary actors searching to maximize their 
goals in global politics.”178  Consequently, each action and reaction is considered part 
of a game where each action reflects a rational calculation to a move made by other 
actors.  Many scholars are drawn to the simplicity and elegance of the model.
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However, several criticisms have been noted of the rational actor approach.  
First, the rational actor model assumes that the state or decision-maker reacts only to 
the behavior of other external actors, and usually the focus is on one other actor only.  
While this may have been useful during the Cold War, the binary nature of the action-
reaction model does not account for domestic and/or other international influences.  
Rarely do decision-makers face a single move, but they must respond to multiple 
moves made by multiple actors.  Also, the model assumes that the President’s wishes 
are implemented as intended by the bureaucracy.
Second, the model assumes rationality but does not define what different 
leaders consider “rational.”  Rarely do decision-makers have complete information to 
make fully informed decisions or fully “rational” calculations.   Because the ideal 
situation upon which the rational actor approach depends is so rare, the model’s 
explanatory utility may suffer significantly.  Moreover, what is rational (in terms of 
benefit seeking and cost avoidance) for one actor may vary for another, thus requiring 
more input into the preferences and weighting of actors’ calculus.
Third, the rational actor approach often leads scholars and analysts to input 
motives from a sequential series of actions in order to explain foreign policy 
behavior.  As Jensen notes, “If State B responds in a hostile fashion, the researcher is 
likely to look for hostile actions committed by State A, which in turn are used to 
justify B’s response.  With such a focus, various conciliatory moves on the part of 
State A may be completely overlooked, given the researcher’s expectations.”179
While it is generally understood that decision-units do act rationally, in the 
sense that they seek to maximize their preferences for specific outcomes, the rational 
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or strategic actor model falls short because it does not account or identify those 
preferences.
Groupthink is an approach that was developed by Irving Janis, who drew upon 
insights from social psychology to explain why some administrations produce sub-
optimal outcomes.180  The process of conforming to one view is associated with a 
situation in which a President is surrounded by a small cluster of advisors with similar 
backgrounds who do not allow for an open flow of information.  The combination of 
centralized control and strong peer pressure to conform to a single view results in a 
policy direction that is far from “rational” and may not achieve expected maximized 
returns concerning a decision outcome.
Recognizing the limitations of the rational actor’s “black box” approach, 
scholars began to consider the impact of the domestic structure, in particular the 
degree to which bureaucracies compete with one another to maximize their personnel, 
budgets, and “power,” and in the process, shape foreign policy outputs.181  Because 
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bureaucrats are in the position of managing information flows, implementing policy, 
and institutional longevity, they arguably are able to influence the timing and 
outcomes of foreign policy.  Often key decision-makers (especially in a democracy 
such as the United States) are transitory (moving every 2-8 years), and they must rely 
on their bureaucratic subordinates to execute and implement policy choices.
The size of bureaucracy has increased substantially since the end of World 
War II.  As the needs of the US to respond to the Soviet threat and remain engaged in 
the world grew, so too did corresponding diplomatic and military establishments.182
As Jensen notes, “Foreign-policy personnel now number in the thousands and are 
located not only in the State Department but also in the Departments of Defense, 
Agriculture, Treasury, Labor, and so forth.”183  One might also add the Energy 
Department, Commerce Department, the US Trade Representative’s office (USTR), 
Justice Department, and Department of Homeland Security – in other words, almost 
every Cabinet agency now has a foreign policy component – adding to the challenge 
of government leaders.
One of the major criticisms of the bureaucratic politics model is that it 
conflates individual mind-sets, preferences, and general dispositions with the offices 
and bureaucracies those individuals represent.184  In other words, is it the office that 
determines the positions of the players or the players themselves that determine their 
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positions?  Proponents provide no clear answer.  As Art notes, “We must qualify 
[bureaucratic politics paradigm] with so many amendments before it begins to work 
that when it does, we may not be left with a bureaucratic paradigm, but may in reality 
be using another one quite different.”185  As Welch underscores, “If the idiosyncrasies 
of particular individuals determined these important actions and policies, specifically 
bureaucratic determinants can hardly have played an important role.”186  Perhaps 
more important than bureaucratic routines as an indicator of constraints on decision-
making are the predispositions and attitudes associated with organizational 
affiliation.187
Decision-Unit as a Framework for Analysis
As a growing number of scholars have pointed out, decision-making 
structures vary not only among states but also within states and across time.188
Consequently, understanding the importance of such variability across time is one of 
the key goals of this dissertation.  What I will argue is that, while systemic conditions 
no doubt change, so too does the composition of decision-units within a state, and this 
also will affect the foreign policy outcome.
Domestic structures vary among states and are independent of the 
international systemic conditions.  At the same time, decision units, as Hagan argues, 
“are a theoretically fluid phenomenon that cannot be inferred directly from either 
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systemic or domestic structures.”189 Variation in decision-units is not to be 
considered the same as or even a direct correlation of the domestic regime type.  For 
example, there can be loose as well as concentrated authority within different 
democratic regimes, and even within different authoritarian regimes (although less 
likely in the latter).  Moreover, within a single state, constraints can vary over time.  
For example, in the United States, the tension between the Executive and Congress 
has fluctuated despite the intensity of the external threat.190
An essential component of decision units is the policy entrepreneur.  Policy 
entrepreneurs possess certain key characteristics: they have extensive networks and 
solid relationships with and access to key decision makers.  They are essentially 
transnational actors because they have to be in order to understand and bridge state 
interests.  They also are able to identify preference convergence and exploit them.  
They act as change agents and can tip the balance in favor of a policy position that 
has not yet become fixed or implemented.
The balance of influence among bureaucratic leaders can shape the range of 
policy options facing the President.  In other words, decision units operate as 
important intervening (and fluid) variables, contributing to the dynamic propelled by 
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domestic and international political constraints.  As Hagan concludes, “decision units 
appear to operate in a way that is often independent of the otherwise compelling 
constraints of both international and domestic politics.”191
The policymaking structure in the United States, especially as it pertains to 
foreign policy, also reflects the decision-making style of the President.192  Presidential 
decision-making style can be analyzed from two dimensions: how open is the style 
with respect to access and information flow, and at what level are decisions made?  
Regarding the first dimension, there are two main options: 1) closed or centralized 
decision-making; or 2) open or decentralized decision-making.  All of these aspects 
must be considered.
One of the problems with many decision-making studies is that they tend to 
focus almost exclusively on crisis situations.  The rationale is that, since crises could 
lead to the direst of consequences, they are the most important phenomena to 
understand and resolve.  While perhaps true, one can also argue that crises are rare, 
and most international relations happen short of crisis.  Therefore, it is useful to 
examine policy-making and interaction in non-crisis situations, since that is the 
setting and context where most activity occurs.  Moreover, with a better 
understanding of non-crisis dynamics, there may be an opportunity to recognize the 
elements and indicators at the pre-crisis stage.
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Chapter 3: Case One – The US and EDC
Introduction
Out of the ashes of World War II, the United States emerged as a superpower 
and eventual hegemon in the West.  The decade from 1945-1955 represented a fluid 
period in international relations, much more uncertain and ambiguous than is often 
portrayed today.  The cement of that historical period had not dried, and the US had 
not yet identified its national interests, even as the Iron Curtain drew across Europe.
What was the international framework of the time?  How did the United States 
view the situation in Europe?  Who were the lead actors?  How did the Europeans 
view the US?  Were they willing to accept US leadership, or was there a competition?  
This chapter aims to lay the empirical ground outlining US action with respect to 
European defense autonomy during the first decade after World War II.  Chapter five 
will analyze the contending theoretical explanations and variables influencing such 
behavior.
The strategic context during the first decade can be divided into three phases: 
Postwar/early Cold War (1945-1949); Korean War to the death of Stalin (1950-1953); 
and death of Stalin to defeat of the EDC (1953-1954).  Policy choices and influences 
will be considered during each phase in turn.
Phase One: 1945-1949
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Strategic Context and Distribution of Power
The period 1945-1949 reflected a critical transitional period, as the 
international system witnessed a remarkable transformation.  There was the creation 
of various international institutions – the UN, IMF and World Bank, the Council of 
Europe, the OECD, and eventually, NATO in 1949.  On the European continent, 
events leading to what became known as the Cold War – unrecognized at the time –
occurred.  Four Power relations broke down resulting in the division of Germany into 
the Federal Republic in the West and the Democratic Republic in the East in 1949.  
The Berlin airlift and Soviet testing of an atomic weapon confirmed the shift toward 
bipolar confrontation.  The economic struggle in Western Europe, as well as the 
threat of communist takeovers in France and Italy, also reflected important variables, 
in the sense that their flirtation with communism left officials in Washington 
nervous.193
At the end of World War II, the United States had developed a vast global 
network of bases and basing relationships connected with defense.  While American 
officials accepted that the current network could not be sustained indefinitely at 
current levels because of pressures for returning to a peacetime stance, “a complete 
return to the status quo ante of 1940 also seemed unlikely in view of America’s now 
virtually unavoidable role as global power and guarantor of the peace.”194  By 1945, 
the United States possessed or used 434 bases of different size: 228 were in the 
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Atlantic area, including 63 in the UK, France, and Germany.195  What to do with 
these bases and to what extent should the United States maintain a global presence 
became a item for debate within the government.  Basing issues became a part of a 
larger debate over America’s role in the world, how it should interact with the Soviet 
Union, the collective security and Wilsonian norms advocated by the newly created 
United Nations, and postwar reconstruction.  There was a split between “hawks” and 
“doves” that was not exactly the same as between internationalists and isolationists.  
Such a distinction should be made between those that advocated keeping a global 
international presence diplomatically on the one hand, and those who pushed for an 
aggressive forward-based defense strategy.  Those promoting the latter often referred 
to the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and easy captures of America’s weak 
Pacific perimeter defense to buttress their case.
Others, more sensitive to the impact such a move might have on the Soviet 
Union, believed nuclear technology and strategic air power would suffice in 
defending the United States without provoking the Soviets into an unnecessary arms 
race.196    While the political debate continued, the Joint Staff quietly conducted 
numerous plans and reports over how best to adapt US military forces to the new 
postwar environment.197  What is striking about these military plans and requirements 
is the continued emphasis on hemispheric defense, as well as the anticipated use of air 
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and naval bases on islands in the Pacific and off North Africa and the Middle East.  
Very little attention is devoted to the European continent.  As Harkavy observes:
A large land army presence on the European continent was not 
anticipated nor was…the magnitude of the accompanying large-scale 
presence of forward air and naval bases.  It appears that US planners 
either underestimated the forthcoming Soviet threat, or, somehow 
assumed that forward defense in Europe could be handled by Britain 
and France.198
Policymaking Structure
With respect to the Truman Administration, the Presidential decision-making 
style may be considered as relatively loose, but with clear guidance.  As Hilsman 
notes, “President Truman had no chief of staff, but he tended to give his staff 
permanent assignments and to divide responsibility along clear lines of authority and 
jurisdiction.”199
During the early months of the Truman Administration, the equivalent of the 
inter-agency coordination process for foreign policy was handled by an ad-hoc State-
War-Navy Coordinating Committee.  There was no National Security Advisor 
(Admiral William Leahy came closest at the time as White House chief of staff), no 
Department of Defense (only the Departments of War and Navy), and no Central 
Intelligence Agency.  These domestic structures would not be created until 1947.200
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For example, with the crisis over the Turkish Straits in August 1946, Acting 
Secretary of State Acheson (Secretary of State Byrnes was out of town) hosted a 
series of meetings with representatives from State, War, and Navy, plus the service 
chiefs, to coordinate a policy recommendation to President Truman.  Once the policy 
recommendation was decided (in this case to show resolve to the point of arms), it 
was Acheson who made the recommendation to Truman (although Secretary of Navy 
Forrestal and the service chiefs were also present).  At that point, Truman gave the 
nod, and the decision was implemented.201
The National Security Act of 1947 created, among other things, the National 
Security Council (NSC).  Composed of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, 
and Commerce, as well as the Director of the newly-created CIA and often the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the NSC served as an interagency focal point to help 
the President make decisions.  Also, a national security advisor job was created to 
referee and manage the NSC agenda.  Under President Truman, the National Security 
Advisor (Special Assistant to the President for national security affairs) served more 
as an executive secretary, managing and coordinating the President’s agenda.
Policy Evolution and Implementation
Before World War II, American foreign policy fluctuated between 
isolationism and Wilsonian activism.202  Those tendencies existed even during the 
immediate postwar period.  At the same time, American officials realized the need to 
reorganize government agencies and establish institutions to shape the new world 
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order and prevent future European wars.  The twin goals of maintaining economic 
prosperity and security at home while promoting stability and peace in the world 
would serve as the underpinnings for US policy toward Europe.
There were two schools of thought in American thinking toward how to bring 
this about.  As Winand writes, “By the end of the Roosevelt administration, the 
supporters of European integration had been overruled by their opponents, who much 
preferred worldwide arrangements to a European union, which, both for security and 
economic reasons, they viewed as a potentially dangerous regional organization.”203
Others, such as John Foster Dulles and George Kennan, believed that 
integrating Germany into a “federalized” Europe would be the best option.  For 
example, in September 1941, Dulles suggested that the solution for eliminating 
Europe’s “war-breeding divisions” was to be found in “the political reorganization of 
continental Europe as a federated commonwealth.”204  Likewise, Kennan, then a  
junior foreign service officer, believed that integrating Germany whole into a greater 
Europe would be preferable to partition.205
A second cluster of policy-makers, led by Treasury Secretary Morgenthau and 
Secretary of State Hull, advocated gutting or emasculating the war-making potential 
of Germany by de-industrializing the Ruhr and Saar regions.  Such “punishment 
economics” was considered by John Foster Dulles and Secretary of War Stimson 
(who happened to be a friend of Jean Monnet) as a recipe for fostering long-term 
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resentment in Germany, and would be almost certain to create a negative backlash 
and be counterproductive for the United States and Western Europe.206
Certainly, there were concerns of a “Fortress Europe,” even as far back as 
1942.  As one historian notes, “As a sense of ‘European nationhood’ developed, the 
government of a European union might then consider using ‘the economic weapon as 
a means of furthering continental policy.’”207  Secretary of State Hull worried that, if 
a European union developed, “such a union might lead to the formation of other 
economic power blocs and undermine prospects for a liberal trade policy and the 
formation of an international organization after the war.”208
During World War II and even in the immediate aftermath, there was no clear 
indication that the United States desired European defense autonomy.  In fact, the 
first years after hostilities witnessed a policy that implicitly assumed that the UK and 
France would resume their natural independence in world affairs, although they 
would also likely lead or represent Europe on the world stage.  For example, 
American policy promoted Britain and France to individual seats on the UN Security 
Council and other global agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank.209
In the end, the question revolved around how best to prevent a resurgence of 
European economic nationalism (the high tariffs and rampant competitive 
protectionism), open the door for American goods, channel European economic 
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potential positively, while at the same time encouraging Europeans to develop their 
militaries strong enough to defend against the Soviets but not in a way that would 
threaten intra-European actors, such as France.  A large problem, indeed.  Economic 
prosperity, political stability, and strong defense against the Soviet Union: all without 
resurrecting internecine strife on the European continent.  A long term consideration 
at the same time was: how to build up Europe into an organized union of sorts 
without it becoming dominated by a single European hegemon, or eventually turning 
against the United States in the global order?   Such long views often are subsumed 
by the immediate challenges of the day.
An examination of State Department records reveals the gradual shift of 
support for European political and/or economic “unification” in 1943 to the more 
guarded and ambiguous wording in early 1944 of “closer economic and political 
collaboration” in Europe.210
One possible reason for this shift might be that President Roosevelt did not 
want the creation of a European federation to alienate the Soviets, whom he regarded 
as a partner in the post-war peace process.  As Winand observes:
The possibility of alienating Soviet Russia probably is what convinced 
Roosevelt to put the creation of some sort of European federation on 
the back burner.  The president perceived the Russians as a friendly 
people, whose hostility sprang from a sense of insecurity vis-à-vis 
Japan and Germany, and the West’s aversion to bolshevism.  He 
accordingly envisioned a postwar world order designed by wartime 
allies, in which the Soviet Union would be granted a prominent place.  
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In order to enlist the cooperation of the Russians to help to rebuild the 
Continent in a way acceptable to all Allies, Roosevelt hoped to make 
them partners in the peace, side by side with the United States.211
Reinforcing this notion, Donald Cook writes, “While maneuvering and 
compromising at Yalta to build his peacekeeping machinery, Roosevelt displayed an 
almost total indifference to problems of postwar Western security in Europe.”212  His 
main concern was to keep an eye on the latent forces of isolationism.  As Cook 
writes, “Roosevelt had shown this concern at Yalta when he told Stalin and Churchill 
that he did not believe American troops could be kept in Europe for more than two 
years or so.”213
At first, the Truman Administration sought to continue working with the 
Russians in trying to reach a pan-European settlement.  The concept of defending 
Europe militarily had not gelled.  The emphasis was on avoiding economic and 
political instability.  There was an explicit need to revive the sluggish European 
economy.  Even though the influence on American foreign policy at that time 
remained that of the late President Roosevelt, during the winter of 1946-47, it became 
increasingly clear that the Soviet Union’s negative actions limited the chances of pan-
European approaches.  As Cook writes, “Although illusions about the Soviet Union 
were fading fast, it nevertheless was still the first goal of American policy to seek 
Great Power understanding and accord to maintain peace in the world.”214
In March 1947, President Truman addressed Congress promising economic 
and financial help to those defending communism.   Still, planners in Washington at 
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that time did not envision a direct Soviet attack.  The scenario that concerned them 
was one of “European economic disintegration, social demoralization, and political 
upheaval.”215  Undersecretary of State Clayton worried that, unless the US intervened 
financially, “there will be revolution.”216
By spring 1947, the realization began to dawn that the emphasis should switch 
from seeking German unification (fear that it would fall under Soviet domination) to 
promoting European integration, even if it focused only on the western part.  This 
way, Germany’s industrial strength would be channeled peacefully and contribute to 
the economic prosperity of its neighbors while also limiting the risk of a return of a 
new Reich seeking military conquest of the Continent.217  It would also put the United 
States in a better position to deal with the Soviets.  For example, George Kennan, 
head of Policy Planning at the State Department, “calculated that a prosperous 
Europe, with Germany’s industrial potential anchored firmly to the West, would give 
the United States and its allies a much more secure economic and political base from 
which to negotiate and overall European peace settlement with the Soviet Union in 
the future.”218
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Following various recommendations from Kennan and Undersecretaries 
Acheson and Clayton, in June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall delivered his 
famous Harvard speech announcing what has become known as the “Marshall Plan.”  
Marshall’s speech emphasized the Europeans working together amongst themselves 
(but with American financial support and advice) to develop greater political and 
economic cohesion.  There was no mention urging the Europeans to increase their 
own defense or military cooperation.   As one biographer noted:
The creators of the Marshall Plan devised it out of a sense of self-
confidence about America’s place in the world.  They had fought 
isolationists before the war; victory proved them right.  After the war 
they fended off those same isolationists on the right and idealists on 
the left who thought they could reason with the tsar of the Gulag 
[Stalin].219
By 1948, many in Washington circles noted the continued hardening of Soviet 
positions toward the West.  In February, Moscow orchestrated a coup in Prague, 
raising alarm bells across Europe and the Atlantic of possible takeovers in Norway 
and Italy.  While those in Europe feared the prelude to a Soviet attack, most 
Washington policymakers considered the threat to be more political than military.  
Nevertheless, European threat perceptions fostered anxiety, and such fears could not 
be overlooked.  To help alleviate European fears, the State Department proposed an 
explicit commitment to defend Western Europe, but with caveats.  John Hickerson, 
chief of the State Department’s Office of European Affairs, and his colleagues sought 
to assuage Congress that such a commitment would not include additional American 
troops on the Continent.  Instead, “Europeans would provide the manpower 
75
themselves.”220  Thus, what the US was promising with the signing of the North 
Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 was the psychological reassurance the Europeans 
needed that American military might would be there if necessary.  
However, Kennan now worried that, with a treaty signing and legal 
commitment, the United States had now formally conceded the division of Europe 
and had abandoned any hopes of fostering unity on the Continent and “the 
development of a real federal structure in Europe which would aim to embrace all 
free European countries, which would be a political force in its own right.”  Instead of 
making Europe self-sufficient, allowing the United States to gradually withdraw from 
the responsibility of defending Europe, Kennan now saw the US forced into the “legal 
perpetuation of that responsibility.”  According to Kennan, “In the long-run, such a
legalistic structure must crack up on the rocks of reality; for a divided Europe is not 
permanently viable, and the political will of the US people is not sufficient to enable 
us to support western Europe indefinitely as a military appendage.”221
There were certainly influences in the State Department promoting European 
unity, even to the point of making it an independent (or at least, semi-independent) 
power center.  In the summer of 1949, Kennan believed that without Europe the 
United States “would be a lonely nation in the world in the sense that we would be on 
the minority side not only in the sense of world resources but also in the sense of 
philosophy and outlook on the world.”222  A year earlier, Hickerson had argued for 
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the establishment of “a third force which was not merely the extension of US 
influence but a real European organization strong enough to say ‘no’ both to the 
Soviet Union and to the United States, if our actions should so require.”223
There was a view that the Europeans needed to rationalize their state system, 
which had developed based on the concept of nationalism.  It was the division of 
Europe and balance of power politics, in John Foster Dulles’ view, which had led to 
the disastrous wars of the first half of the twentieth century, and Europeans had “an 
obligation to tie themselves together” to eliminate such nationalist tendencies.224
Encouraging European defense autonomy also was supposed to allow the 
Europeans to graduate from dependence on American military and economic 
assistance.  In the words of one historian:
Effective integration would enable the Europeans to stand on their own 
feet and allow the United States to reduce the scale of its aid to 
Europe, begun with the Marshall Plan and continued through military 
assistance to the NATO powers.  There was a danger, of course, that a 
United Europe might, over time, prove to be a rival to America, but 
Washington tended to see the perpetuation of European dependency as 
a greater long-term problem.   Partnership, not American dominion, 
was the objective.225
Others disagreed, arguing that, although Washington’s promotion of 
integration of Western Europe was different from behavior by previous Great Powers, 
it still “wanted to exercise some form of control over Western Europe.”226  In effect, 
the United States acted like a “loose empire,” but an empire nonetheless.  
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Consequently, American action and reaction to European defense autonomy should 
reflect the degree of control and domination that Washington had in order to 
influence European governments.  However, was it the case?
Washington faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the growing Soviet hostility 
and disintegration of the Four Power postwar arrangement in Germany between 1945 
and 1950 required a united front by the Western powers.  On the other hand, the US 
was aware of French sensitivities to German irredentism.  Still, a united Western front 
without Germany was impossible.
Some scholars suggest that the US response was a dual-Containment one 
toward the existing threat from the Soviet Union and a potential one from a fully 
independent and rearmed Germany. 227   While this may be true, the response was 
more nuanced than that.  The manifestation of such containment was different.  The 
United States sought to contain the Soviets through blocking and counter-blocking 
moves and isolation.  With Germany, though, the Americans sought to contain 
through integration.  In other words, the US employed a containment-by- isolation 
strategy with the Soviets and a containment-by- engagement strategy with the 
Germans.
In the American view, if the Germans gained full independence, there was a 
fear that Germany would be vulnerable to irredentism.   But, as some would argue, 
the greater fear was that Germany might either side with the Soviet Union or try to 
play the East off the West, thus aggrandizing itself while sapping Western efforts to 
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confront the Soviets.228  In a conversation with Churchill in June 1954 before the fate 
of the EDC had been decided, Eisenhower told the British leader that “we could not 
afford to lose Germany even though we were to lose France.”229  The essential 
question was how to leverage German resources and strength without them posing a 
threat to the Alliance or Germany’s neighbors.
Phase Two: 1950-1953
Strategic Context and Distribution of Power
The situation reached a crescendo in 1950, ironically, on the other side of the 
world from Europe – on the Korean peninsula.  Following the North Korean invasion 
of South Korea, the United States and its European allies feared that this might be the 
opening gambit of a global Soviet strategy to distract the US and conquer the 
European continent.  It was imperative to buttress the weak military forces in Europe, 
which were still recovering from the end of World War II.
The fledgling North Atlantic Alliance – only in existence for a year – was 
primarily a paper organization. The “O” in NATO had not yet been institutionalized 
in any meaningful way.  Nevertheless, NATO represented a forum for consultation 
among the defense ministers, and the skeleton of a structure for distribution of 
military forces.
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At the end of June 1950, the US had 122,158 troops in Europe.230  Only two 
years earlier, in 1948, there had been about 140,000 military personnel.231  The big 
question in the minds of many was what to do about Germany.  Resolving the 
“German question” was key to organizing a credible defense against a conventional 
Soviet threat.  Only Germany had the requisite troop numbers to add real teeth to the 
forces on the ground.  However, valid fears about German irredentism (above all in 
France) required a delicate handling of the situation.  So, the question was: how best 
to integrate Germany into the West without provoking potential negative responses in 
communist-laden countries such as France and Italy?  The psychological 
considerations had to be addressed.  Surveys revealed that, in some quarters, French 
respondents were more fearful of Germany than they were of the Soviet Union.  After 
all, the Germans had ravaged France three times within the living memory of some 
French.  Such trauma is not easily forgotten – or forgiven.
Churchill, who was in opposition at the time, took up the baton of a European 
army.  Some suspected that French federalists had outmaneuvered him, but, according 
to Walton, “Churchill himself viewed his approach not as a wedge toward federalism 
but as a lever to pry open American commitments for Europe by demonstrating 
Europe’s readiness to help itself.”232  This was evident when Churchill, speaking in 
the House of Commons in September 1950, included in his discussion of the 
requirements for a European army a request for an American contribution amounting 
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to about 20 percent of the total forces.233  As Cook keenly observes, “The primary of 
British postwar policy, therefore, had to be to ensure that American power was not 
withdrawn from Europe.  America would have to take up in Europe a role that Britain 
had played for nearly two centuries.”234
Some in Europe reacted suspiciously to the idea, suggesting that a European 
army would not contribute to western defense and might actually distance the 
continent from the United States.  For example, in August 1950, Norwegian Finn 
Moe asked of his fellow colleagues in the Council of Europe:
Is the idea behind all this talk about European defense and a European 
Army the creation of the famous Third Force which might be 
independent in the world-wide struggle between democracy and 
totalitarianism…?  We should take care that European unity does not 
lead to European isolation.235
Advances in military technology allowed for a reduction in the need for 
numerous air bases in Western Europe.  As Harkavy notes, “By 1952, for instance, 
the US had seven main air bases in the UK, four in France, six in Germany, and a few 
others in French Morocco.”236  With more advance aircraft armed with more lethal 
weapons, the US required fewer numbers to achieve the same level of military 
capability as only seven years earlier. 
Policymaking Structure
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With the National Security Act of 1947, the policymaking structure changed.  
New agencies were established, including the National Security Council and the 
Central Intelligence Agency.  The Departments of War and Navy were consolidated 
to form the Department of Defense. However, it took time for these new 
bureaucracies and structures to develop.
Policy Evolution and Implementation
For the United States, the perceived threat was real (especially after the US 
had lost its nuclear monopoly with the Soviet testing of an atom bomb in August 
1949), and the response was clear: rearm Germany or risk losing the European 
continent to Stalin less than a decade after having lost the continent to Hitler.
A solution was found in NATO.  The United States proposed the creation of 
an integrated military command in the Alliance, which would include a West German 
contribution.237  In September 1950, at the Foreign Ministers meeting in New York, 
Secretary of State Acheson announced a revamping of NATO to include both an 
integrated military command and the introduction of German divisions within a 
unified NATO structure, subordinate to an American Supreme Allied Commander 
(SACEUR).
The proposal represented the optimal short-term solution to the “German 
problem” and most efficient from a military perspective.  Even the French military 
agreed that the NATO solution was best.  The nuclear guarantee was not nearly as 
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established as many would believe, especially around 1950.238  The advantage of the 
NATO plan (Petersberg Conference and later Spofford Plan) was it would account for 
the French fear because the German contribution would be subsumed under the 
NATO integrated command, under the leadership of the American SACEUR.  Unlike 
the EDC, the NATO plan would include the US and UK, which would ensure that 
Germany would not be in a position to threaten France.
However, France was the only ally that did not approve the NATO solution at 
the time. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, who were 
trying to implement the Schuman Plan creating a European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), worried that Acheson’s NATO proposal might jeopardize their 
European project.  If Germany regained its full sovereignty – including rearmament –
then German enthusiasm for ECSC might wane.  
Faced in September 1950 by the united Anglo-American front, Schuman 
insisted that the proposal needed to be vetted by the French Cabinet and brought 
before the entire Assembly as well.
The resulting debate created a clash between logic and emotion, a distinction 
not always appreciated in the rational theories of international relations.  For the 
Americans, the argument was straightforward: the Pentagon had calculated that 
NATO needed an additional twelve divisions (Congress had already agreed to the 
presence of four US divisions) to defend against a potential Soviet attack in central 
Europe.  Because of overseas obligations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the French 
238
 See Ernest May, “The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on European Security 1945-1957,” in Rolf 
Ahmann et. al. (eds.) The Quest for Stability (London: Oxford University Press, 1993).
83
physically did not have the forces to fulfill that requirement.  Thus, the American 
perspective was that the US should be allowed to look to Germany.239
The French also had a logical response, though it was a cover for the 
emotional trauma stemming from three German onslaughts in just over a generation.  
The French response was as follows: Of course, German troops could be used to 
defend against a Soviet invasion, but the Americans were proposing the impossible –
“a one-way army, a German legion built to march only East, never West.”240  This 
would be historically unprecedented, and there was no guarantee that Germany could 
or would remain a pliant tool of Western policy.  The French reminded Americans 
that Germany’s rise to power came from its ability to toggle back and forth between 
Russia and Western Europe.  The fear was that Germany, after a few years, might 
outgrow the bounds imposed by the US and invade East Germany to try to unite 
Germany by force, sparking the very war with Russia that the West so fervently 
sought to avoid.241  Therefore, the perfect French response to a question that could not 
be answered by either a “yes” or a “no” was “Europe.”242  The French responded, one 
month later in October 1950, with the Pleven Plan – the concept for what later would 
become known as the European Defense Community.
The Pleven Plan attempted to solve two separate problems of Germany at 
once by infusing them into one grand bargain solution.  The first was political, and 
the second was military.  Whereas the Americans treated them as distinct issues, the 
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French managed to integrate them into the EDC concept.  The Pleven Plan was 
named after René Pleven, who had made his name originally as a Gaullist.243
Ironically, the proposed ESDP fifty years later would also spring from Gaullist 
heritage.  However, the strongest resistance to the EDC had come from the 
communists on the left and the Gaullists on the right.
The American government’s initial reaction was considerable skepticism 
toward the project.244  After all, NATO had just been formed only a few years earlier 
in 1949 and, while there was a certain logic to the integration of European coal and 
steel sectors, the same logic was questioned when applied to European military 
integration.  American political officials in particular questioned the efficiency and 
nature of establishing a European army that would be answerable to a common 
assembly, akin to the European Coal and Steel Community proposed only months 
before.  As one commentator noted, “By the time Jules Moch, the Defense Minister 
of France, had finished explaining the Pleven Plan to the NATO Council it was 
evident that Washington’s second thoughts more accurately mirrored American 
official policy.”245
According to Secretary of State Acheson, both he and President Truman 
reacted with “consternation and dismay” to the proposal.  They concluded that the 
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Pleven Plan was “hastily conceived without serious military advice and…unrealistic 
and undesirable.”246  As Walton describes:
Washington blew hot and cold. Secretary of State Acheson first 
welcomed the Pleven Plan as a means of lessening differences between 
the United States and France but on second thought recognized that 
acceptance of the French proposal meant an indefinite postponement 
in building the effective fighting force that America felt was 
necessary.247
Not just political officials were doubtful.  US military planners also were 
skeptical of the practical defense implications of a European army where German 
units were integrated below the division level.  General Eisenhower initially hated the 
project, believing that it would actually produce disharmony and friction rather than 
unity, not to mention the plan being “militarily unsound and ineffective.” He 
suspected that the French had introduced the plan hoping it would be rejected and 
thus either delay or prevent German rearmament.248
From the French perspective, the British position was key to getting the 
Americans on board.  As Walton notes, “If the United Kingdom could be persuaded 
to cooperate in the venture the chances of softening American opposition were 
excellent.”249  However, the initial British response under the Labor government was 
not promising.  According to Walton, “The first hint to England’s official policy 
toward the Pleven Plan came during the speech from the throne on October 31, 1950 
when the government pledged full support toward building Europe’s defenses within 
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the Brussels Pact and NATO.”250  There was no mention of a European army or the 
need for one per se.  In fact, a House of Commons report in November 1950 was even 
more explicit when it reported that the “government ‘was unable to accept the 
proposals put forward for a European Army and a European Minister of Defense’ 
since NATO already covered the field and the European army plan would only result 
in ‘duplication, confusion and divided responsibility.’”251
French Foreign Minister Schuman also noted the gap between France and the 
United States over European defense when he told the National Assembly on 
November 24, 1950 that the Americans wanted “direct participation of autonomous 
German military units in Atlantic defenses.”252  However, he made the rather clever 
distinction between a joint European army and a political union that European 
federalists had been pushing.  By stating that the EDC would not be “rearming 
Germany” because the Germans participating in the EDC would not be under the 
German government’s full control, while at the same time not committing France to 
any supranational political structure for Europe, Schuman managed to open up some 
doubt among the British.  According to Walton: 
By divorcing the army plan from political federation, Schuman drove a 
sharp wedge into British opinion which, up to this point, had 
maintained a fairly solid opposition.  Ernest Bevin continued to find 
Europe’s salvation only in the framework of [NATO] but Anthony 
Eden now saw no incompatibility between the two concepts.253
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What was interesting was how Eden viewed the permanence of NATO 
compared to a possible EDC.  Eden considered the Atlantic Alliance to be a 
“temporary” coalition and had no assurance that the Americans would remain 
committed to Europe’s defense.  Meanwhile, he viewed a European army as a 
“permanent” force.  This reversal was revealed when Ernest Davies (the author of the 
earlier House of Commons report denouncing the European Army concept) 
announced that the “Government did not rule out altogether the possibility of a 
European Army being fitted into the pattern of the Atlantic defenses provided that 
there was no delay in building up Western defenses and no danger of weakening the 
security of the Atlantic Powers.”254
Despite reservations – especially with respect to fusing the political and 
military problems – the United States agreed to allow the French to explore their 
proposal.  However, the Americans continued to seek a NATO solution.  Thus, for 
about 18 months, there were two sets of discussions on how to rearm Germany, the 
Pleven Plan in Paris and the NATO plan at the Petersburger Hof in Germany.  As one 
observer notes, “[T]hese discussions went their separate ways, like a two-ring circus, 
with spectators bobbing their heads back and forth to find out what was going on.”255
The discussions reflected different views of how to incorporate the German 
military potential.  In Paris, the French framed the desired outcome as one that 
essentially brought the Germans in almost as legionnaires, in small units of 3,000-
4,000 and under an international flag.  Their potency as a massed force would be 
almost completely subsumed under the EDC rubric.  The French contribution, 
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however, would remain unified as France’s army in Europe until the very last 
moment, thus allowing Paris to maintain its dominance both in force terms as well as 
its control of the EDC military staff, comprised mostly of French officers.256
Meanwhile, the talks in the Petersberg were much more focused on speed and 
military capacity.  This was much more in line with German and US Army desires.  
As White notes, “The United States Army wanted German troops, flesh and blood 
soldiers, quickly, not a long philosophical discussion about the creation of a new 
superstate.  Philosophers might talk at Paris, but soldiers talked at the Petersberger 
Hof.”257  Moreover, military specialists remained skeptical that a multilingual fighting 
force was possible.258
The contrast was stark. Whereas in Paris, the Germans would provide forces 
in 3,000-4,000 person increments, in the Petersberg talks, Germany would contribute 
250,000 troops, twelve heavily armored divisions, complete with its own General 
staff and War Minister.  The equipment would be provided by the United States, until 
the Germans could resume its own armaments production.259
The composition of the EDC was forty standing divisions.  Of those, 14 would 
be French; 12 German; 11 Italian; and 3 from the Benelux countries.  Soldiers would 
be led by their own nationality up to the division level.  After that, the nationalities 
would be mixed.260
Be that as it may, Acheson concluded that the United States might be able to 
accept the EDC, but only if it “did not detract from NATO’s strength and did not 
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delay Germany’s contribution to the defense forces of Western Europe….The 
European army and its command structure had to be strictly integrated within 
NATO.”261  In other words, there would be no autonomous European command.  The 
EDC would be a pillar within the Atlantic Alliance – but not separate from it.
Some observers noted the consequences of promoting a new institution, even 
if that were to be an internal institution within NATO. The fact that the UK and the 
United States were excluded from the institution suggested the seeds of NATO’s own 
potential demise, since there was no guarantee that the continental Europeans would 
maintain similar interests as those in London or Washington. 262
Radical revision of the Pleven Plan made the EDC more palatable to the 
Americans.  Taking advantage of the transition following the June 1951 French 
elections, the Americans persuaded the French to accept a shift in the Plan.  The 
German units would be the same size as the French, and they would all be brought 
under control of the supranational authority at the same time.  With the 
encouragement of Monnet, Eisenhower, and Bruce, the Americans moved the plan 
forward and made it possible.  Eisenhower’s staff at SHAPE formed the military 
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structures, while Bruce’s staff outlined the civilian, budget, and political organization 
of the EDC.263
Enthusiasm for the Pleven Plan waned as early as a year later, even in France.  
The very reason that the Pleven Plan was considered the superior route was that it 
would “solve” the German problem by incorporating German forces (and thus 
diluting their power) it into a larger European force.  Yet, even as early as December 
1951, French Defense Minister Jules Moch worried that the EDC concept had merely 
become “a camouflage for a revived Wehrmacht.” 264  Thus, even at that stage, there 
were continued doubts about the EDC’s ability to assuage French fears and fulfill 
American military goals.  Yet, the American position remained in favor of the Pleven 
Plan and EDC.
In October 1951, the Conservatives regained power, which seemed to 
heighten French hopes that the British would join the EDC.  However, those hopes 
were soon crushed when, on November 28, 1951, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe told the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg that “England could 
never participate in a Defense Community built on federalist principles.”265  As 
Walton notes: 
France and England seemed astonished at the other’s action and in a 
real sense both camps had a measure of reason on their side.  The 
Conservatives had never once intimated that they would actually join a 
supranational authority and resented what they felt was a 
misrepresentation of their position.  On the other hand, the French had 
never made any attempt to conceal their interpretation of the Churchill 
motion as a supranational project and felt incensed that Churchill, the 
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Prime Minister, was unwilling to support Churchill, the 
parliamentarian.266
Some of the questions that lingered in 1952 after the EDC Treaty had been 
signed reflected fundamental concerns over the practical nature of a supranational 
armed force operating during crisis.  For example, would the decision-making 
structure, which required unanimity, prove to be too slow and bulky to be effective?  
Would linguistic challenges create misunderstanding in the transmission of orders 
through the chain of command, with costly and catastrophic results?  Would the 
military formation of groupements, untested in war or peace, stand up to a potential 
invasion by seasoned Soviet troops?  Would national troops be willing to cede 
homeland territory for tactical advantage?267  All of these questions remained 
unanswered as the United States considered its policy position toward the EDC.
The debate continued in Washington over how to view the EDC proposal.  
Ambassador to France David K.E. Bruce, an ardent Europhile and close confidant of 
Jean Monnet, favored it strongly, arguing that a European army would expedite the 
rearming of the Continent through European rather than national channels, thus 
fostering economies of scale and eliminating unnecessary duplication of limited 
resources.  Such an effort would meet US short-term needs and speed up the process 
of strengthening NATO by “reducing [the] number of is major elements to three: 
United States, Brit[ain], and Europe.”268
Once it was clear that France would not accept the NATO plan, others –
including the US and UK turned their attention to the EDC, despite the obvious 
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drawbacks.  Even after the agreement for EDC, it was an uphill battle for Americans 
promoting it.  According to Lankford: 
At a high-level NATO meeting, Bruce found himself “almost its sole 
upholder” when the subject of EDC came up within the American 
delegation.  He urged State to forget about alternatives and to pressure 
“participants to bring matter to conclusion as rapidly as possible.”  He 
called the NATO Council’s ratification of EDC “the most significant 
political action (outside of war) taken in Europe for centuries.”  He 
knew the critical point would come later when individual parliaments 
voted on the plan, and he anguished over what he called Washington’s 
insensitivity to French concerns and the Pentagon’s pro-German 
attitudes.269
After receiving instructions from Washington to force the French to accept the 
Petersberg Plan to integrate German units directly into NATO, Bruce wrote his own 
“long telegram” on July 3, 1951, where he responded to the EDC critics.  In it, Bruce 
outlined why the Pleven Plan (in addition to the Schuman Plan for the European Coal 
and Steel Community) actually would lead the French to accept German parity with 
France.  According to Bruce, the “French must recognize that German integration 
with European community through Schuman Plan and European Army must be their 
main safeguards.”  Bruce went on to argue that US leverage with the French would be 
lost if Washington rejected the Pleven Plan, thus causing a huge break in the 
relationship with France.  In Bruce’s words, “Such rift in Atlantic community would 
be most damaging and great opportunity would have been missed to create real 
situation of strength in Europe, perhaps for period far into future.”270  The cable from 
Bruce, along with an endorsement from SACEUR Eisenhower and backing from 
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McCloy in Germany, seemed to work, because a month later, Acheson reversed his 
position. 271
According to one biographer, “The decision to back the EDC happened 
because American Europeanists, mainly Bruce, Eisenhower, and McCloy, saw a 
vision of long-term benefit in the military as well as the economic integration of 
Europe.”272
Phase Three: 1953-1954
Strategic Context and Distribution of Power
Following a bogged down, drawn out negotiating and ratification process 
(delayed most conspicuously in the French assembly), the future of the EDC 
languished as world events changed.  The Korean War ended in a stalemate and 
cease-fire.  Soviet leader Stalin died in March 1953, resulting in a slight thaw in US-
Soviet relations.  New governments existed in both Washington and London.
The distribution of power was such that the United States remained the most powerful 
country in the West.  
The changing international circumstances had an impact on French and 
German views of EDC, most notably in terms of diminishing the sense of urgency for 
incorporating German troops into Western defense.  The Korean War ended in 
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armistice, Stalin died, and no assault came in Europe from Russia.  The French were 
growing weary of their military efforts in Southeast Asia and increasingly felt the 
weight of their overseas commitment in Africa.  Some in Paris also feared that, 
because of these overseas military obligations, the Germans might come to dominate 
the EDC over time.  Such a prospect worried many swing voters in the French 
Assembly.
Policymaking Structure
While the structure of policymaking did not change during this phase, the 
nature did because of a new Administration.  The Republican Dwight Eisenhower 
was now President.  In contrast to Truman, the decision-making style of President 
Eisenhower was considered open but much more centralized.  As a former 
commanding army general, Eisenhower tended to build his presidency around the 
military headquarters model.273  This meant having a strong chief of staff to keep 
things in order.  The main exception was in foreign policy.  According to Hilsman, 
“In the first part of the Eisenhower administration, this chief of staff was Sherman 
Adams, through whom everything had to flow.  The single exception was foreign 
policy, over which John Foster Dulles, the secretary of state, kept tight control.”274
Under President Eisenhower, the NSC met weekly, and he established an 
interagency coordinating committee to draft decision recommendations, which was 
managed by the National Security Advisor.  According to Hilsman: 
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The Eisenhower system was heavily criticized by both Congress and 
the press on the grounds that the committee system tended to paper 
over differences between the contending departments.  The president, 
critics argued, ended up rubber stamping compromises that were often 
internally consistent rather than actually choosing between true policy 
alternatives.  The result, they felt, was that the government tended to 
drift along until an international crisis finally forced the departments 
and the president to face up to the problems that had caused the 
crisis.275
Policy Evolution and Implementation
There was a marked contrast between the Truman Administration and that of 
the Eisenhower Administration toward the EDC.  Chief of Staff Bradley had thought 
the EDC was impractical and militarily inoperable.  Acheson had allowed for 
grudging support, primarily based on the benefits to US-French relations.  
Eisenhower, on the other hand, recognized the political and economic benefits from 
favoring the EDC.  Here was a chance for the Administration to scale back its 
resource commitments, develop geo-political flexibility, all at the marginal relative 
cost of power.276  In fact, the Eisenhower Administration took the original French-
inspired Pleven Plan and turned it into an American one, becoming essentially more 
converted than the original creators themselves.277
By the summer of 1953 – the critical run-up to the now famous rejection by 
the French Assembly in 1954 – US agitation over the EDC situation was making 
European allies nervous.  There were rumors that the US was considering a 
275
 Ibid., 130.
276
 For more on Eisenhower’s thinking, see Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower the President (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1984). Also, see Louis Glambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. 
NATO and the Campaign of 1952: XII (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
277
 For more on this point, see Hulsman, “The Guns of Brussels,” 36-38.
96
redeployment of US forces in Europe.  Admiral Arthur Radford, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, was considered to be one of the leading figures to be “beating the tom-
toms” on redeployment.278
The other element was the reconsideration of the use of nuclear weapons to 
defend Europe.  Three factors influenced Eisenhower’s thinking in this regard.  First, 
he sought to reduce the high defense budget he inherited from the previous 
administration.  Second, he believed that, from a military standpoint, the US should 
rely less on quantity (hundreds of aircraft employing conventional munitions) and 
more on quality (i.e., tactical nuclear weapons).  Finally, it was important for 
Eisenhower to avoid making the impression that the United States planned a fixed 
and permanent presence in Europe.  He continued to stress that Europe should be 
primarily responsible for its own security.  From his perspective, it was not “possible 
– and most certainly not desirable – that Europe should be an occupied territory 
defended by legions brought in from abroad, somewhat in the fashion that Rome’s 
territory vainly sought security many hundreds of years ago.”279  Although 
redeployment of US forces in Europe was a long-term US government goal, 
Eisenhower wanted to keep it quiet lest such a move create anxiety among the 
European allies, reduce NATO cohesion, and kill the concept of the EDC (and thus 
force the Americans to remain on the Continent).280
In other words, the United States did not want European dependence, but at 
the same time, Washington did not want an independent Europe to be opposed to the 
US either.  The foundations of American ambivalence were being set.  As Lundestad 
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writes, “It is easy to go against dependence as such; it is more difficult to do so when 
independence actually leads to opposition.”281  This put Europe in a difficult position.  
In the best of all possible worlds for the Americans, “Europe was to be both 
independent of and dependent on the United States at the same time.”282  The issues 
of an “Atlantic Community” only emerged later in the Kennedy Administration.283
Before that time, the explicit support was directed toward building up Western 
European economic structures, as well as the defense components (until the collapse 
of EDC in 1954), and American leadership therefore was naturally assumed.
Dulles’ initial effort as Secretary of State was to project an image of a strong 
America prepared to defend itself and its allies against Soviet aggression by any 
means, including and especially nuclear weapons.  However, this strategy ironically 
had the unintended consequence of creating fear and anxiety among European allies 
regarding US intentions. 
Differences between American and European perceptions over the value of 
using nuclear weapons to deter all war (not just general) became clear and divisive.  
In January 1954, the Eisenhower administration unveiled its new national security 
strategy.  This strategy promoted “more security at less cost,” which meant a greater 
reliance on deterrence (and nuclear weapons) than ever before.  Yet, to the 
Europeans, it looked like a withdrawal and provoked new anxieties.  According to 
one historian, “America’s nuclear weaponry, for all its sheer destructiveness, did not 
possess anything like the psychological and symbolic value of large manpower 
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deployments.”284  Unlike today, it was the mass army that instilled fear and respect in 
the minds of the enemy and comfort and security for allies, not the atomic bomb.  The 
Administration’s “New Look” was scary to the Europeans, who feared that the 
Americans would remove the comfort of troops for the bulls-eye of nuclear weapons.  
As Dulles acknowledged at an NSC meeting on 10 December 1953, “While we 
regarded atomic weapons as one of the great new sources of defensive strength, many 
of our allies regarded atomic capability as the gateway to annihilation.”285
The consequence of this situation was that American statements designed to 
encourage the Europeans had the boomerang effect of creating additional fear of US 
intentions and apathy about contributing to European defense among the very 
governments the US had sought to reassure.  As Dockrill notes, “[A]lthough Dulles 
and [SACEUR] Gruenther had hoped to strengthen European morale by emphasizing 
the importance of the contribution of American nuclear weapons to European 
security, this emphasis was, in fact, likely to have the opposite effect.”286
The latter half of 1953 proved a difficult time, even for Anglo-American 
relations.  Secretary of State Dulles issued his famous “agonizing reappraisal” 
message in Paris in December 1953, a statement that reverberated throughout 
Europe.287  President Eisenhower was upset because it went contrary to a National 
Security Council meeting earlier that month, where it was agreed that only the 
President would speak publicly to US troop considerations.288  The first order was to 
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ensure the establishment of the EDC.  Any hint of a change in US policy towards 
Europe would have the potential of “important psychological implications” in 
Europe.289  Therefore, was this a failure of diplomacy?  Or was it a calculated 
political risk, designed to exert leverage on a divided French Assembly?  If it was a 
deliberate effort on Dulles’ part to sway the French, it seems to have backfired.  The 
initial response in France was to galvanize the anti-EDC lobby.
The difference between selling the Schuman Plan and selling the Pleven Plan 
of EDC rested in persuading the French.  However, unlike the European Coal and 
Steel Community, the EDC concept was much more complex.  As one observer at the 
time noted, “It has become too complex in detail for ordinary people to understand its 
critical essence, and thus the politicians who support it have difficulty rallying 
popular support.”290  Moreover, while the institutional structures and logic of the 
ECSC and EDC were comparable, they led to different implications.   According to 
the same observer: 
The Schuman Plan could be explained to Frenchmen as an act of 
common sense, for one could bring the delinquent back to decency 
only by giving him a decent opportunity to earn a decent living.  But it 
was something else to give a delinquent Germany arms again so 
swiftly after she had so shockingly abused them.291
In the end, what it proved was the limit of executive influence by one 
government on the legislative assembly of another.  The United States had a goal of 
the EDC; yet, it failed to persuade the French Assembly – the one legislature yet to 
have ratified – to confirm the project.  Thus, American government policy was 
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blunted, and Washington – as well as the West – needed to find an alternative.  As the 
French government continued to delay the debate and vote on the EDC Treaty, 
American and British frustration grew.  For example, in March 1954, after Prime 
Minister Laniel once more put off the EDC debate, Dulles was “deeply disturbed,” 
and the British foreign minister was “furious.”292  There was increasing concern that 
such delay would spillover into US congressional views toward troops and money in 
Europe, as well as fostering pressure on Germany and in the Alliance as a whole.
The response to that frustration was to move as close as possible to reassure 
the French of US and British commitment to the defense of Western Europe.  Thus, 
virtually the entire defense of the West was held hostage to the whims of the French 
Assembly.  For its part, London beefed up its commitment to associate with the EDC, 
including the promise to put a British division under an EDC commander.  
Washington agreed to keep American troops in Europe, reinforcing its commitment to 
NATO and calling for a close relationship between NATO and the EDC.293  It seemed 
that the French held all the cards.  If France did not agree, there was greater fear that 
Germany would be lost to the Soviets (or neutralism), and Germany was the key for 
defending the West.
Thus, with so much at stake, it seemed remarkable that the United States was 
unable to exert greater pressure on Paris to follow through.  It was as if the US could 
go only so far, just as Washington had failed to persuade London to take the lead in 
European integration a few years earlier.
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What were the domestic constraints on the major powers in play?  One needs 
to examine the constraints on France (especially from the framework of the Fourth 
Republic’s constitution), Germany (divided into two states; worried about other 
divisions), and the US (isolationism, peripheral defense, resource and burden sharing 
issues).  For the UK, the major domestic constraint at the time centered on the debate 
over how entangled to be on the European continent, given its commitments to the 
Commonwealth and relationship with the United States.
As David Bruce advised his superiors in Washington in March 1954 that “the 
constitutional defects of the Fourth Republic rendered decisive government almost 
impossible, particularly in relation to controversial issues like the EDC.”294
For the British, there remained a lingering doubt about US staying power and 
commitment to Western Europe.  According to Ruane, “Even US participation in the 
Second World War had not wholly dissipated the suspicion in London and other 
European capitals that, beneath the surface of Washington’s newly-acquired 
internationalism, old isolationist instincts still lurked.”295  Eden, whose political life 
included the decade of the 1930’s American isolationism, worried that the US would 
get fed up with the Europeans and withdraw back to its shores.  The British Foreign 
Minister’s main concern was the “haunting possibility that [America] may slip back 
into a new form of isolationism…and try to ‘go it alone,’ or, alternatively, be tempted 
to ‘do a deal’ with the other great Power in the world.”296
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In the United States, the domestic constraints were considerable.  While the 
hardening of the US position toward France in the spring of 1954 reflected frustration 
from French vacillation on EDC over the previous two years, it also stemmed from 
the situation in Congress, specifically the approaching consideration of the Mutual 
Security Budget for Fiscal Year 1955.  As Ruane notes, “If France had not ratified the 
EDC by April [1954], when hearings on the Budget would begin, State Department 
officials predicted that ‘our “agonizing reappraisal” will occur but in the most 
explosive place – the floor of the Congress.’” 297  What was at stake was the Richards 
Amendment, which specifically prohibited military assistance to those EDC countries 
that had not ratified the treaty (e.g., France), while giving full assistance to non-EDC 
NATO countries such as the UK.  Thus, to add pressure to French ratification, as well 
as stave off Congressional action, the State Department recommended “shock 
treatment” for the French by having the administration support the Richards 
Amendment. 298
Just as the situation with the EDC appeared to reach a climax in the spring of 
1954, events in Asia once more provided a critical external factor into the equation.  
This time, it was Vietnam, as the French were seeking to withdraw honorably after 
the loss at Dien Bien Phu in May.  The Americans were not happy, interpreting the 
French administration’s preoccupation with Geneva peace negotiations yet again as 
another delaying tactic.   According to one historian: 
The Americans were frustrated by this latest source of delay and some 
in Washington thought the French might be “deliberately stalling” on 
the EDC in order to improve their negotiating hand at Geneva….But 
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the French, concluding that their negotiating hand with the Soviets vis-
à-vis Indochina would be stronger if they appeared to retain the power 
to veto German rearmament, seemed ready to risk arousing 
Washington’s displeasure.299
The Americans were worried that if there was too much pressure on the Laniel 
government, his coalition might fall, and the consequent government might not be so 
pro-EDC as Laniel’s was.   The domino theory was not limited to the spread of 
communism in Indochina.  As Dulles warned, “We must be on our guard lest 
Indochina also carry [the] European Defense Community down the drain.”300
It seemed that the issue of national identity was preoccupying France just as 
everyone else needed the French to sacrifice some of their sovereignty for the sake of 
the EDC.  The collapse of Vietnam and the pooling of forces for the EDC would be 
too much.  Dulles remarked, “France seems to be deteriorating as a great power and 
losing capacity to govern itself or to deal with its problems.”301  Dien Bien Phu in 
particular symbolized the shattered image of a France having totally lost all 
confidence.  According to Ruane, “The fortress had become a ‘symbol out of all 
proportion to its military importance,’ and its fall portended a ‘collapse of French 
will, in relation both to Indochina and EDC.’”302  The irony was that France seemed 
to be the pivotal player in those decisions affecting US national security strategy not 
just in Europe but also in Asia.  Washington was dependent on France, despite the 
prominence of American military and economic power.  American leverage seemed 
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to be insufficient to move the French Assembly.  For example, by the spring of 1954, 
the United States “was underwriting around 75 percent of the total financial cost of 
the French war effort” and did not want to squander that investment.303
There was a spillover effect from Indochina on Anglo-American relations as 
well.  The two countries differed fundamentally on how to respond to the Dien Bien 
Phu siege.  Washington believed that there needed to be a military intervention to 
prevent Vietnam from communism, while London feared that such an aggressive 
move would almost certainly result in Chinese intervention, the possibility of another 
Korea or worse, the opening gambit of another global conflict.  After the US 
administration called for “united action” by the US and a coalition of “like-minded 
powers,” the British refused support.  According to one historian, “Denied British 
support – the key to wider allied and international approval – and unwilling to 
intervene on its own, the Eisenhower administration had no alternative but to await 
the outcome at Geneva.”304  The American reaction to this refusal was sharp and 
deep.  As Ruane notes, “[I]t was clear that the Americans felt they had been badly let 
down during the crisis by their closest ally.  London’s rejection of ‘united action’ had 
exposed Anglo-American relations to ‘the gravest strain,’ and generated a 
‘smoldering resentment’ among many senior policymakers.”305  Dulles in particular 
felt that he had been double-crossed and lied to by Eden, and agreement on other 
issues at that time was difficult to contemplate.
From his perspective, Eden accused the United States of unilateralism and 
believed that the Americans were trying to steamroll the British into doing something 
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they did not believe was in their best interest.  He “accused Dulles of trying to 
‘bulldoze’ him into supporting military intervention and charged the US government 
in general with unilateral decisionmaking on matters that vitally affected the interests 
of Britain.”  According to Eden,  “Americans may think the time past when they need 
to consider the feelings or difficulties of their allies.”306
On July 13, 1954, as the pressure built on France to move on EDC, Dulles met 
with Mendès-France.  Dulles implied that if France did not support EDC – and soon –
“it might perhaps be better for the United States to ‘write off what we have tried to do 
to build up the defensive strength of Western Europe as a noble but unproductive 
experiment,’ and in line with Congressional preferences, opt for a ‘peripheral form of 
defense involving the UK, Spain, Greece, Turkey and other peripheral countries.”307
Mendès-France found himself in a corner.  In order to relieve domestic pressure and 
external pressure from the US, he tried to foist the eventual blame for any failure of 
EDC onto his European partners.  On August 19, 1954, all the EDC powers met in 
Brussels.  At that gathering, the French proposed major modifications, changes they 
knew the other powers would almost certainly reject. In essence, France was asking 
everyone to alter the very nature of the EDC in both form and content.
The level of frustration in Washington continued to build.  According to 
Ruane:
Ultimately, what probably irritated the Eisenhower administration 
most was the new French Premier’s determination to put his country’s 
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interests before those of the United States….In many ways, therefore, 
1954 was the year that “France finally declared its independence of 
Washington,” with Mendès-France sowing the seeds that de Gaulle 
would later reap.308
What probably made matters worse was that the United States had committed 
all its energies into the EDC, with no fallback position.  In other words, Eisenhower 
had no contingency plan to France and the EDC.309  Churchill criticized the 
Americans for their “obstinate adherence” to EDC and “natural reluctance to 
countenance any competitive idea.”310
In the end, the Americans in effect have relied on the British – from 1950’s to 
the present – to influence and shape US policy toward European security and in 
particular, European defense autonomy.  At first, the US focused on the French, 
hoping they would deliver on the Continent.  However, with French vacillation in the 
1950’s culminating with their ultimate rejection of the EDC, American confidence in 
French leadership was permanently lost.  A plan conceived in peace for an imminent 
war that never came, the EDC fell victim to French domestic politics too powerful for 
the United States to overcome.
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Chapter 4: Case Two – The US and ESDP
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the empirical conditions for the 
second case study, the period after the end of the Cold War leading to the 
development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).  Although there 
were obvious differences (the kind that one should expect from the passage of years), 
this time frame does share many of the same characteristics as that following the end 
of World War II.  Consequently, the context and structure related to the foundation of 
the European effort once again to develop an autonomous security and defense entity 
bear mention.
As with the first case with the EDC, the strategic context of case two can be 
broken down into three distinct phases: 1) end of the Cold War (1989-1993); 2) 
Berlin Plus and NATO’s engagement in the Balkans (1994-1998); and 3) St. Malo 
and ESDP (1998-2003). 
The first was from 1989-1993, highlighted by the Maastricht Treaty creating 
the European Union, and the infamous 1991 declaration by Luxembourg Prime 
Minister Jacques Poos, who declared, “This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the 
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Americans.”311  The European failure in Yugoslavia showed the gap between rhetoric 
and reality.
The second phase was 1994-1998, when it appeared that the issues causing 
tension and anxiety within the US toward what the EU wanted to do subsided.  The 
CJTF concept was introduced in 1994, France rejoined the NATO Military 
Committee in 1995, and “Berlin Plus” was agreed to in 1996.  NATO operations 
(both IFOR and SFOR) and the Dayton Accords in Bosnia seemed to reestablish 
American and NATO dominance in European security.  The WEU languished, soon 
to be subsumed for good in the EU.  Although France and Germany succeeded in 
establishing and operationalizing the Eurocorps, the center of gravity in security 
moved back towards NATO.  From an American perspective, it seemed that the 
transatlantic security crisis had passed.312  At the same time, as Guay notes, “NATO 
members finally grasped the notion that there may be crises in Europe in which the 
US does not want to intervene, and which it makes the most sense for only Europe to 
address.”313
The third phase occurred between 1998 and 2003.  There was a renewal of 
tension between the US and the Europeans, starting with the St. Malo declaration in 
December 1998 and its consequences.  Transatlantic tensions increased with a new 
Republican Administration in 2001 and accusations of American unilateralism.
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Each one of these phases will be described in more detail below, along with a 
portrait of the power distribution of the US presence in Europe (in terms of relative 
economic and military strength), policymaking structure, and evolution of US policy.
Phase One: 1989-1993
Strategic Context and Distribution of Power
The period 1989-1993 represented a watershed transition, characterized by 
democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, the first Gulf War, dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, and disintegration of Yugoslavia leading to conflict in the Balkans.   
These changes in the international system affected relations between the US and 
European allies, but also altered the dynamics within the European Community.  All 
of these events reinforced the general trend of transformation underway and with it, 
new views of how to interact.
On November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall fell.  Although it was widely 
recognized that something had changed, few realized the magnitude and long-term 
consequences of “the end of history.”314  The atmosphere was euphoric – there had 
been no nuclear holocaust.  The end of the Cold War meant the end of “terror” (from 
a possible Soviet- US nuclear exchange).  Only later would analysts and observers 
begin to comprehend the paradigm shift that had occurred.  One of the earliest was 
John Mearsheimer, who actually saw the end of the Cold War as a bad thing, making 
the world more dangerous and less predictable.315   Charles Krauthammer also was 
one of the early ones to characterize the post-Cold War era.  His essay coining the 
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term “unipolar moment” became a lighting rod and began a debate on the changing 
nature of the international system.316
A central event - German unification - produced ripple effects throughout 
Europe and beyond.  The two Germanys - caught in the middle of the bi-polar 
confrontation that had characterized the Cold War - united faster than most (even the 
optimists) had anticipated.  The bold political decision (though foolish economically) 
by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to adopt parity for the West and East 
German deutsche marks produced a drag on the German economy, which had been 
the engine for the entire West European economy.  Unification also renewed a fear in 
France against the Germans that the French had not known since the 1950’s.  
Suddenly, Germany again was the largest nation in Europe, and France was no longer 
equal or superior.
French President Mitterand sought to bind Germany in Europe through 
European institutions, especially the European Community.  His main goal was to 
ensure that what emerged was a “European Germany” rather than a “German 
Europe.”  The German problem, which had been put on hold for forty years, had now 
returned.
Events began to unfold in rapid succession.  In 1990, communist rule 
dissolved in Central and Eastern Europe, even as the situation in the Middle East 
became worse.  In August, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.  In November, as the 
US was leading the coalition in the UN to repel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, a 
“Transatlantic Declaration” was signed.  Its main components were to reaffirm 
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commitment to the Alliance and a determination to modify NATO in accordance with 
new security realities.  
Just as the shift in US global strategy following the important developments 
between 1945-1950 had led to changes in the US global basing policy, so its 
significance was reinforced in 1989-1991.   According to Harkavy, “By the early 
1950’s, [the 1945] emphasis had shifted to an emphasis on a rimland defense 
perimeter all around Eurasia, but with a strong concentration on Europe from Norway 
to Turkey and on Northeast Asia.”317  Only later did the US bases and depots in 
Europe become springboards or points of departure for US “power projection” either 
into Africa or the Middle East.  Consequently, the importance of these bases to the 
United States, which originally had been intended to defend Western Europe against a 
possible Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack, took on new meaning.  For example, some have 
suggested that the US staging and prosecution of the first Gulf War in 1991 would not 
have been possible without the elaborate NATO structures and basing that had been 
established during the Cold War.318  Moreover, the repeated patterns of behavior and 
institutionalized norms developed and practiced over the years in the military sphere 
heightened NATO’s importance for American interaction with the Europeans.  The 
rise of an alternative institutionalized European-only framework might be perceived 
by some in the American government as a threat to this instrument.
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In the event, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent first Gulf War 
revealed the limits of European Political Cooperation (EPC).  European leaders 
renewed efforts to cooperate more fully in foreign and security policy arena.319
In April 1990, Mitterand and Kohl called for a “European Union.”  An 
intergovernmental conference among the twelve members of the European 
Community began in December, culminating in the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union in December 1991.320    In the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, 
there were many behind-the-scenes expressions of concern from US officials, 
including a “full campaign of aggressive diplomacy and backchannel pressure.”321
The Bush Administration was clear that any move in the EC should not threaten or 
rival NATO.322
In the end, EC member states agreed to a “constructively ambiguous” notion 
about a common defense in the explicitly intergovernmental second pillar of the EU.  
A component of the Maastricht Treaty was the inclusion of a desire to establish a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).   Specifically, Article J.4 of the treaty 
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stated that “the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including 
the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a 
common defense.”323  Thus, one saw the first mention of a European Security and 
Defense Identity (ESDI) that, in principle, could lead the EU to provide for a common 
defense.  However, such language masked the major disagreements over how far to 
cooperate in foreign and defense.324
In 1991, Yugoslavia crumbled, with Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina all declaring their independence from Belgrade.  This development 
echoed the general dissolution of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact.
However, not all of these political transformations were as peaceful as the 
“velvet revolutions” in Germany and other parts of Central Europe.  Conflict broke 
out in the former Yugoslavia, forcing both NATO and the Europeans to re-examine 
crisis and security management.
In 1989, the US had 341,278 military forces in Europe.  Only a year later, that 
number had dropped to 309,827.325  In 1990, the US share of world economic output 
was 25 percent.  By contrast, the Soviet Union/Russia’s share of world output was 2 
percent, about the same as for the Benelux countries.326  Clearly, in economic terms, 
there was no bipolar world, at least at the end of the Cold War.
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Policymaking Structure
The next step in the empirical process is to establish the principal actors in 
making decisions regarding American policy towards European defense.  Was the 
locus of decision at the same level through each of the three phases?  Or, did 
Administration priorities and attention shift to other arenas, thereby lowering the level 
of decision-making?
The structure between the G.H.W. Bush Administration and the Clinton 
Administration remained basically the same.  Under George HW Bush, the 
Presidential decision-making style was considered closed but informal.  President 
Bush chose Brent Scrowcroft, who followed Kissinger’s philosophy of realism, as his 
national security advisor.  James Baker III, long-time Bush friend and trusted ally, 
became the Secretary of State.  After a failed effort to appoint John Tower as 
Secretary of Defense, Bush chose Richard Cheney to serve in that capacity.  Cheney 
was very conservative, from his time in the Ford Administration and during his days 
in Congress.  Cheney chose as Paul Wolfowitz to be his Undersecretary of Defense 
for Policy.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was General Colin Powell.
Policy Evolution and Implementation
Early during this phase, there was a debate over the US role in Europe and the 
world.  The question became even more pronounced following fiascoes in Somalia, 
Haiti, and early part of Bosnia.  With the Cold War won, would the US withdraw 
back into a neo-isolationism?  The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, the first one 
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, would set the framework for defense 
budgets beginning in 1994.  It also posited a vision of US military power after the end 
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of the Cold War.  An early draft, leaked to the press in March 1992, called for the US 
to prevent any potential power from emerging as a global competitor or military rival 
to the US.  This included language that implied that the United States should make 
sure that even allies – “advanced industrial nations” would be kept from “challenging 
America’s leadership.”327  After a flurry of criticism, the strategy paper was rewritten, 
but its emphasis on unmatched military strength remained.
A second policy question that needed to be asked was: what was the value of 
international institutions?  During the Cold War, NATO was viewed as the policy 
instrument of choice in American relations in Europe.  While the United States 
maintained numerous bilateral relations with individual European countries, the 
official American foreign policy position was that NATO would be the central forum 
for transatlantic security relations.  Would that change after the Cold War, and if so, 
how?
A third question that affected US policy selection was: what was the definition 
of the threat?  The Soviet threat no longer existed, but was there a new threat that 
would concentrate minds on both sides of the Atlantic?  How the threat was perceived 
and defined would affect the range of policy responses and instruments used.
A final question that affected US policy selection was: what were the links 
between the security and economic dimensions of transatlantic relations, and how 
would they impact on American policy towards European defense autonomy?
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A general period of restructuring occurred, at a much faster pace than many 
had expected.  France and Germany called for the establishment of a “Eurocorps” in 
October 1991.  Earlier in June, the US was not pleased with developments and 
threatened to pull out of its role in contributing to European security if the European 
Community took matters into its own hands.328  Thus, as the Europeans, led by Paris, 
were finally beginning to do what Washington had wanted back in 1951-54, the US 
administration now had second thoughts and viewed with increasing suspicion.329
Meanwhile, an American-led effort pushed NATO strategy at its November 
1991 Rome summit to adopt a “New Strategic Concept,” replacing the former 
“Flexible Response.” The new strategy moved NATO's military emphasis away from 
massive mobilization toward enhanced crisis management capabilities and 
peacekeeping operations. 330   It also established the framework for an Allied 
Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force (ARRC).  However, some observers 
considered this “a ‘coup’ against the Europeanists’ plans for the Euro-Corps.”331
Only a month earlier, the US and Germany had proposed that NATO establish the 
“North Atlantic Cooperation Council” (NACC) to engage the former Warsaw Pact 
countries.332
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In a paper on NATO expansion Jeffrey Simon called the Alliance's response 
both extraordinary and yet insufficient.   “NATO’s institutional responses have been 
extraordinary, wrote Simon, “in that so many new initiatives have been taken in such 
a short period of time.  Yet they have been insufficient in that events have moved at 
such a fast pace that NATO’s responses have not kept up with expectations in the 
region.”333  The Alliance reached out to former enemies at its Rome Summit in 
November 1991 by creating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NAAC).  The 
purpose of the NAAC was to strengthen security and defense ties among members.  
There were annual meetings at the ministerial level and working groups on diverse 
security issues such as peacekeeping and defense conversion.334  Unfortunately, with 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, membership (not counting NATO) in the 
NAAC mushroomed to more than twenty (from the original five non-Soviet Warsaw 
Pact members plus the USSR).  Moreover, the diversity of the new members 
(Hungary or Poland compared to Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan) essentially limited the 
effectiveness of the organization.335
As the events in the Balkans continued to erode, the roles of the WEU and the 
EC took on new urgency.  On September 7, 1991, the European Community 
convened a peace conference on ex-Yugoslavia.  France and Germany wanted to 
place a WEU peacekeeping force between the warring parties in Croatia, but the UK 
blocked such a move.   The peace conference did not go well, and in October 1991 
333
 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion, McNair Paper 39 
(Washington DC: National Defense University/Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 3.
334
 Peter van Ham, “Can Institutions Hold Europe Together?” in Hugh Miall (ed) Redefining Europe: 
New Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation (London: Pinter Publishers/Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1994), 198.  Also see NAAC Workplan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 1994, 
NATO Press Service, Brussels, 3 December 1993.
335
 Simon, 6.
118
the EC and WEU acknowledged their failure by accepting the primacy of the UN in 
the crisis.
During 1992, events within NATO and the WEU followed parallel tracks, as 
questions began to surface on the long-term health and purpose of the Alliance.336  In 
June 1992, leaders of the WEU held a summit at the Petersberg in Germany.  The 
now-famous “Petersberg Declaration” announced that WEU forces would be 
available undertake a variety of tasks, including “humanitarian missions, rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks, and task of combat forces in crisis management (including 
peacemaking).”337   Even as press coverage of the escalating Yugoslav conflict (with 
reports on the siege of Sarajevo and death camps) increased, European leaders sought 
a response.  On July 1, 1992, Eurocorps established an interim staff in Strasbourg, 
and by the end of August, the WEU agreed to send a humanitarian intervention force 
of 5,000 into the former Yugoslavia.
In October 1992, ARRC headquarters was officially stood up, led by British 
Lieutenant-General Jeremy McKenzie.  However, with US elections only a month 
away, the issue of NATO intervention, especially involving US troops, was off the 
table.
For the next several years, an institutional competition ensued, as Western 
security institutions sought to exploit the terrible events in the Balkans to enhance 
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their own credibility and legitimacy. France promoted the EC/WEU because of these 
institutions’ independence from the United States-dominated NATO.338  Tensions 
continued between NATO and EU/WEU officials that stemmed from American 
efforts to avoid getting the Alliance entangled in the region, and from the EU/WEU’s 
inability to stop the violence.
In 1992, with Congress wanting a peace dividend, the US economy slumped 
and went into recession.  Increasingly, it appeared that the United States was turning 
inwards, with attention devoted to domestic issues.  The election of Bill Clinton, with 
his focus on the US economy, created concerns in Europe regarding US foreign 
policy, in particular continued American commitment to European security.  
Ironically, many in Europe were worried about the President-elect, believing that 
European interests would have been better served had George HW Bush been re-
elected.  In any case, the time seemed ripe for the Europeans to do more in the field of 
security.339
In early 1993, newly-elected President Clinton decided to reexamine US 
military forces deployed.  Instituting a bottom-up review, Clinton sought to reap a 
peace dividend from the end of the Cold War.  His interest in domestic policy –
health care, education, and the environment – led some to believe that he was looking 
for an excuse to downsize the armed forces.  Whatever the motivation, the result of 
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the bottom-up review was a reorganization of US forces, including base closures and 
realignment.  This affected the plans underway at NATO.  A debate began in the 
Alliance on revamping NATO forces from static defense to more mobile units that 
would be able to respond to crises, such as that developing in Bosnia.
Henry Kissinger urged policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic not to allow 
security organizations such as NATO to whither lest there be a resurgence of
nationalism (especially in Germany).  In one editorial, Kissinger wrote of America’s 
presence in Europe through NATO, “It gives France a safety net against German 
hegemony and Germany an emotional harbor as European unification slows down, as 
well as protection against outside dangers and excessive European nationalism.”340
Phase Two: 1994-1998
Strategic Context and Distribution of Power
The January 1994 NATO Summit launched the introduction of the Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) program, designed to reach out to former Warsaw Pact countries that 
increasingly desired a relationship with NATO.  It was also at this summit that 
members sought to develop closer ties between NATO and the WEU in order to 
strengthen a European Defense Identity (EDI).  Members agreed that NATO and the 
WEU would consult one another in future contingencies “through Joint Council 
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340
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meetings [and]...stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available...for 
WEU operations.” 341  In line with this, NATO agreed to the Combined Joint Task 
Force (CJTF) concept.  This concept was developed to “facilitate contingency 
operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.”342
This would allow NATO to pursue non-Article 5 operations with non-NATO 
members, including those in the WEU.  It seemed to be a way of strengthening the 
European pillar of NATO and to prevent the Europeans from developing their own 
autonomous defense framework.343
However, the CJTF concept did not stop the Europeans from pursuing their 
own efforts under the auspices of the WEU.344  At its May 9th summit, the WEU 
issued the “Kirchenberg Declaration” where the Council of Ministers authorized the 
WEU to begin working on a “Common European Defense Policy.”345
In August and September (respectively) of 1994, the final Russian and Allied 
troops departed from Berlin, marking the return of full sovereignty to a united 
Germany.  Earlier, in July, the German Constitutional Court ruled that German troops 
could participate - with a simple majority in the Bundestag - in UN or NATO 
operations ranging from peacekeeping to combat missions.  At the same time, the 
reorganization of NATO under its new “Strategic Concept” proceeded.
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Tensions between the US and European governments continued, especially 
over how to stop the fighting in Bosnia.  The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 into 
competing factions highlighted many of the difficulties associated with ethnic conflict 
and the limits of intervention.346  The situation deteriorated most dramatically in 
March 1992, when Bosnia-Herzegovina formally declared its independence, 
unleashing a civil war among three ethnic and religious groups -- the Serbs, Croats, 
and Bosnian Muslims.  In June 1992, the UN Security Council extended its mandate 
of UNPROFOR to include Bosnia.  By August, there were 7,500 European 
peacekeepers in the region maintaining a fragile cease-fire.
By the end of the year, the international community had implemented other 
measures including a no-fly zone (Operation Deny Flight), an arms embargo (which 
favored the Serbs because they had alternative sources of arms), economic sanctions 
against the former Yugoslavia (now composed of Serbia and Montenegro), as well as 
several unsuccessful diplomatic initiatives to partition Bosnia peacefully (most 
notably the Vance-Owen Plan, which, according to critics, rewarded aggression).347
The Americans wanted to conduct military air strikes on the Bosnian Serbs, 
but the Europeans opposed this idea.  According to Guay, there were three reasons: 1) 
fear that the air strikes might endanger humanitarian relief operations in the area; 2) 
345
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disrupt peace negotiations; and 3) expose British and French troops on the ground 
protecting Bosnian “safe havens.”348 The lack of consensus led to further institutional 
tension between NATO and the EU/WEU on next steps.
The year 1995 served as a watershed for NATO.  After NATO-led airstrikes 
on Bosnian Serb military targets beginning in September (Operation Deliberate 
Force), political negotiations resumed with new intensity.349  The Dayton Peace 
Accords led to the introduction of a NATO-commanded Implementation Force 
(IFOR) into Bosnia to enforce the peace agreement.  The force would consist of 
60,000 troops, composed of 15 NATO nations and at least 15 non-members.350
By intervening in Bosnia, the Alliance conducted its first military mission 
“out-of-area” reflecting a new dimension for European defense.  No longer was it a 
defense of “territory” but defense of “principle.”  For some critics, it was a defense of 
NATO as an organization.351  In his column, Charles Krauthammer, for example, 
wrote, “We have staked both American credibility and the future of NATO.  These 
are no small things.  Were we to leave and have the war resume and the Bosnians 
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crushed behind us, it would rightly be seen as an enormous failure for America and 
NATO.”352
Policymaking Structure
The structure during the Clinton Administration remained similar to that of 
the Bush Administration.  There were two main differences: the players in key 
cabinet positions and the presidential leadership style of Clinton compared to that of 
Bush.  For his national security team, Clinton chose William Christopher to be his 
Secretary of State, Les Aspin to be Secretary of Defense, Anthony Lake to be 
National Security Advisor, and James Woolsey to head the CIA.  Vice President Al 
Gore tended to limit his participation in foreign policy to environmental matters.
President Clinton’s leadership style initially could be considered loose and 
open.  The new president gained a reputation for poor time-management skills, with 
foreign dignitaries often having to wait 30-60 minutes for meetings.  It took about one 
year and a new chief of staff before the Clinton White House was considered 
organized and on-track.  According to one Democratic appointee, any meeting that 
dragged on without apparent purpose was nicked-named as being on “Clinton 
time.”353  Clinton’s leadership style evolved, however, as he became more familiar 
with foreign policy issues.  He was considered sensitive to the political context and 
adroit at “triangulation.”  For the most part, the President was open to argument and 
debate, and the access was minimally constrained.  
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Policy Evolution and Implementation
There was a shift in domestic politics with the 1994 Republican “revolution” 
in Congress.  Newt Gingrich became Speaker of the House and brought with him a 
distinctly more conservative group of Republicans to Capitol Hill.  By 1996, their 
impact on foreign policy issues became apparent, especially their contempt for 
President Clinton’s internationalist-oriented policies.  The shift was more than just 
partisan politics.  While Republican Presidential nominee Bob Dole tended to side 
with President Clinton on issues such as intervention in Bosnia and NATO 
enlargement, the new generation of Republican lawmakers were much more 
skeptical.  The split was less between parties as within the GOP itself.  The rift was 
most stark when it came to the value of NATO.   For example, during the debate over 
whether NATO should intervene in Bosnia, Representative John Linder (R-Ga) stated 
bluntly, “I’m not the least bit interested in the prestige of NATO.”354  Of the 74 
freshman Republicans, only eight voted against a House proposal to cut funding for 
deployment of US troops as part of a NATO intervention force to Bosnia.  One of the 
veteran members of the House International Relations Committee, Representative 
Doug Bereuter (R-Neb) observed, “I think time will show the newer members have 
less confidence in the foreign policy establishment…to reach right decisions.  They’re 
more skeptical about use of force.”  He added, “There’s a different test about what’s 
in our vital national interest.”355
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Thus, during this period the Clinton Administration needed to tread lightly on 
how best to implement its Europe policy, especially in response to European calls for 
greater defense autonomy.  In June 1996, American officials persuaded NATO 
members to agree on a framework for using NATO assets in European-only 
operations, known as “Berlin Plus.”356 As part of the bargain, NATO foreign 
ministers agreed to strengthen the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) 
within NATO as part of the Alliance’s internal adaptation.   This would result in the 
use of CJTFs in cooperation with the WEU for the European members of NATO to 
conduct humanitarian operations without the US.
This was a welcome development for those seeking a compromise between 
the two organizations, and it appeared that France was turning toward rejoining the 
integrated military command of NATO.  After the initial flurry of Europeanist-only 
activity (e.g., the Maastricht Treaty, promotion of Eurocorps, etc.), French leaders 
had become pragmatic.  The experiences of the Gulf War and the Balkans conflict 
appeared to have sunk in.  As one report noted, “French leaders began to see that in 
some ways their global outlook brought them closer to the United States than their 
would-be partners in European defense identity.”357  The manifestation of these 
changes included greater French participation related to peacekeeping operations in 
NATO’s Military Committee; an agreement on the relationship between NATO and 
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Eurocorps; and placement of French aircraft under NATO operational control as part 
of Operation Deny Flight in the former Yugoslavia.358
However, at the September NATO defense ministerial, the price for full 
French reintegration into NATO’s military command was too high.  The US balked at 
French demands for command of AFSOUTH.  The meeting deteriorated, and Paris 
reneged on its intention, causing suspicion and hostility within US circles at French 
motives in European defense.359  Consequently, in practice, CJTF fell far short of its 
potential, playing no role in the Bosnia or Kosovo conflicts.360   As the situation in 
Kosovo deteriorated, it became clear that the fragile peace between the US and 
France over how to organize European security also would not last.
Phase Three: 1998-2003
Strategic Context and Distribution of Power
During this period, central and eastern European countries were vying to join 
both NATO and the EU.  In 1997, NATO (after a behind-the-scenes contentious 
dispute between the Americans and French over the invitees) agreed at a Madrid 
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Summit to invite three former Warsaw Pact countries – Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary – to join the Alliance.361  In EU circles, the Union had enlarged in 1995 
with three wealthy, developed new members: Austria, Finland, and Sweden.  In 1997, 
the EU had agreed to the Amsterdam Treaty, designed to streamline the institutions 
and allow for additional members.  Included in the Treaty was provision for a High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.  This person would help 
coordinate the EU’s foreign policy in an attempt to provide more coherence as the EU 
expanded further.  Commentators noticed, however, the slow process of bringing the 
numerous (and relatively poor) candidates from central Europe, the Baltics, and 
Mediterranean into the Union.362
Turning to developments beyond Europe, support for maintaining Iraq 
sanctions was eroding in the UN, as France and Russia (and, to a lesser extent, China) 
sought to relax or even lift the sanctions regime against Baghdad.  On June 25, 1996, 
the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia was bombed, killing 19 
American servicemen and wounding scores others.363  The terrorist attack provided 
one of several subsequent warning signs of the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and 
his Al Qaeda network.  Two years later, on August 7, 1998, the American embassies 
in Nairobi and Dar el Salaam were bombed, killing 213 people in Nairobi and a dozen 
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in Dar el Salaam, most of them African bystanders.  Several thousand were injured.  
Only twelve Americans died in the nearly simultaneous blasts.364  Retaliatory missile 
strikes by the Clinton Administration were considered ineffective and perhaps even 
an attempt to divert attention from the Monica Lewinsky scandal.
In 1990, the United States had 309,827 military forces stationed in Europe.  A 
decade later, in 2000, that number had decreased to 117,089.365  The US’s share of 
world economic output in 1990 was 25 percent.  By 2000, that share had increased to 
26 percent.366
By comparison, the Soviet Union in 1990 had only 2 percent of world output.  
In 2000, Russia’s share was 1 percent.  In Western Europe, Germany had the largest 
economy and one of the largest military forces.  In 1990, West Germany had 545,000 
troops and 8 percent of the world’s economic output.  In 2000, German forces had 
shrunk to 319,000 and its share of world output remained at 8 percent (even taking 
into account unification).
No individual European nation could come close to matching US economic 
power or military capability.  Collectively, however, the Europeans (as the EU) could 
“compete” with US in economic terms.  In 2000, the EU’s share of world output was 
about 24 percent.367
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In 2000 the combined total of military forces of France, Germany, Italy, the 
Benelux countries, and the UK equaled 1.4 million.  By contrast, as mentioned above, 
US forces in Europe totaled 117,089.  Many of America’s military forces were 
elsewhere around the globe, especially in the Middle East and Asia.  Despite the 
manpower disparity, most European forces lacked mobility, deployability, and 
sustainability.  Although the combined defense spending of European NATO was 
about two-thirds that of the United States, deployable forces were less than a quarter 
compared with those of the Americans.368
Two years after events in Bosnia led to SFOR and NATO involvement there, 
ethnic tensions in neighboring Kosovo increased, spurring calls for renewed action on 
the part of Europeans to solve a new Balkan problem.  Would this be another Bosnia?  
Would Europeans witness another Sarajevo massacre, but this time, however, 
involving Albanian Kosovars against ethnic Serbs?369
The British held the EU presidency in the first half of 1998.  On March 2, 
London called for mutual restraint by the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.  On March 
31, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1160 imposing an arms embargo 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
For the next several months, into the summer of 1998, Europeans discussed 
(along with the Contact Group, which included the Americans and Russians) what to 
do to stem the escalating violence.  On June 12, the Contact Group called for an 
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immediate ceasefire, and for all Yugoslav and Serbian security forces to withdraw 
from Kosovo.  It also called for the introduction of international monitors and for a 
new round of talks between Belgrade and ethnic Albanian Kosovars.  Three days 
later, at the European Council Summit in Cardiff, the EU endorsed the demand to halt 
military operations against civilians in Kosovo.370
The deteriorating situation in Kosovo increasingly frustrated British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair.  On June 24, Blair warned that NATO reserved the right to use 
air strikes and ground forces against Yugoslavia.  In reality, though, what Blair 
needed was a more robust European military capability.
Blair saw the convergence of two sets of interests: first, because the UK was 
not part of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), London could not 
be a full partner in the EU.  The UK, therefore, needed to establish its EU credentials 
in some other way.  The second was the widening gap in military capabilities between 
the US and the other NATO allies.371  The only way for the Europeans to play an 
important role in their own backyard was to develop true military capabilities.
The NATO campaign in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force) began March 24, 
1999, only days before the 50th anniversary of the Alliance’s founding.  It also served 
as a strange introduction to NATO’s newest members, the former Warsaw Pact 
countries: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.372
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The operation proved to be strange in more ways than just timing.  It was a 
78-day air campaign, with no ground assault.  Pundits called it “Operation Partial 
Force” or the 10,000-meter war.373  Americans, using stealth bombers and long-range 
missiles from the continental US, swept in unnoticed by European NATO radars, 
dropped their payload, and returned to the US.  It was as if the US no longer needed 
the Alliance.374  Although the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
and Canada also flew sorties, the ratios of US sorties and use of smart munitions to 
those of the other Allies were stark.375
Despite changes in institutional structures, including the creation of an EU 
Military Staff; Military Committee; and Political-Security Committee to deal with 
European Security and Defense Policy issues, European military capabilities by 2003 
had changed little.  For example, while there were 1.7 million Europeans in uniform, 
only 170,000 were considered ready for combat.  Of those, only between 40,000 and 
50,000 could be deployed for a Kosovo-like operation at any one time.  In other 
words, five years after the St. Malo declaration, less than three percent of European 
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military forces were deployable for high-intensity conflict (as opposed to UN-style 
peacekeeping).376
Policymaking Structure
The policymaking structure did not change part way through this phase, but 
the key actors did, with the start of a new Administration in 2001.  From 1998-2001, 
the principal Cabinet-level players were Secretary of State Madeline Albright, 
Secretary of Defense William Perry (and then William Cohen), National Security 
Advisor Sandy Berger, and CIA Director George Tenet.  
The key players in foreign and security policy during the Bush Administration 
were: Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice.   Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz, also had supporting roles.377
Beginning in 2001, the role of the Vice President’s office (OVP) became more 
prominent with respect to national security and transatlantic relations than during the 
Clinton years.  This is attributed in part to the fact that Vice President Al Gore did not 
particularly care about ESDP, but Vice President Cheney, on the other hand, did 
(along with almost all aspects of national security policy).378    Cheney significantly 
increased his staff, which allowed for OVP representation in almost every White 
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House meeting, as well as many other policy-making meetings related to national 
security.   According to one account, “Rarely in history, possibly never, has the vice-
presidential staff been so ubiquitous.”379
The Presidential leadership style also was considered more disciplined, 
focused, and tightly controlled.  The Administration gained a reputation for its ability 
to stay “on message” while minimizing leaks or unauthorized disclosures.380
Policy Evolution and Implementation
The shift in British policy became most apparent by the St. Malo Declaration 
on December 4, 1998.  In it, the UK and France agreed to the EU developing an 
“autonomous military capability” and the start of a new European defense project.381
The St. Malo declaration injected new life into the ESDI/ESDP debate and 
opened the door again to American concern.  It occurred as the situation in Kosovo 
was deteriorating and just one month before the introduction of the euro, the single 
European currency.
According to one Pentagon official, the US had felt “betrayed” by the British 
for having “broken” the 1994-1998 promise regarding Berlin Plus.  This same official 
noted that there was no “heads-up” by the British, and that the surprise reflected not 
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only the substance of the St. Malo proposal but also the process of notification as 
well.382
In many ways, the Clinton administration echoed some of the concerns and 
warnings that had been expressed by the G.H.W. Bush administration.  For example, 
the US supported ESDI within NATO, but made it emphatically clear its strong 
reservations for the Europeans to develop “autonomy” in defense outside the NATO 
framework.  Washington stated that St. Malo’s declaration could be “misconceived, 
misunderstood, or mishandled” so giving the impression that the Europeans sought to 
replace the Atlantic Alliance with a European-only accommodation.383  Secretary of 
State Madeline Albright announced her famous “three D’s” - no decoupling, no 
duplication, and no discrimination.384  Other arguments made by the US 
Administration included the cost issue: if Europeans are spending money to develop 
their own military institutions, they may not be able to assist central and eastern 
Europeans wanting to join the EU.  Or, if Europeans spent their scarce resources on 
developing new institutional structures (which they eventually did), they would not be 
devoting them to improving military capabilities.385
Throughout the fall of 1999 and into 2000, a number of articles came out 
expressing concerns that the EU’s security ambitions would come at the expense of 
NATO’s own transformation.386  According to one Defense Department official, there 
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was paranoia in the Pentagon that the EU was “bad.”  There was a general ignorance 
of the EU and how it operated, but the gut reaction was a uniform dislike and distrust 
of ESDP.387  This same official, who served at the US Mission to NATO from 1998 
until 2002, noted that there was little communication between the US Mission to 
NATO and US Mission to the EU.  Only later were better channels developed to the 
point where now USNATO and USEU even send joint cables on occasion.388  Also, 
after 2000, recognition increased on the part of Pentagon officials on the need to 
understand the EU better.389
Also during this period, there was great attention in Washington to ensuring 
that ratification of NATO enlargement in the Senate succeeded.  Senator Warner (R-
Va), who, in the words of one DoD official, was a “big fan of NATO,” expressed 
concerns about how this new move toward greater European defense autonomy 
would impact NATO.390
The contrast between the communiqués from the April 1999 NATO Summit 
in Washington and the June 1999 European Council Summit in Cologne exacerbated 
the situation and revealed the underlying tension that existed.  As was noted, the 
European Councils in 1999 and 2000 fleshed out the St. Malo declarations in ways 
that did not always seem aligned with US interests.  The Cologne Summit in 
particular showed French desire to pursue a “counterweight” strategy by “toying with 
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the idea of using the new force for (really) autonomous actions.”391  In the words of 
one observer, “the ritual words that would implicitly or explicitly acknowledge 
NATO’s primacy were noticeably absent.”392
The timbre of warnings rose considerably during 1999.  For example, then-US 
Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow delivered a speech questioning the 
motives of developing ESDP: 
Is ESDP primarily a political exercise, the latest stage in the process of 
European construction, or is ESDP’s main goal to solve real-world 
security problems in Europe?  If ESDP is mostly about European 
construction, then it will focus more on institution-building than on 
building new capabilities, and there will be a tendency to oppose the 
‘interference’ of NATO and to minimize the participation of non-EU 
Allies.  The danger here is that, if autonomy becomes an end in itself, 
ESDP will be an ineffective tool for managing crises, and transatlantic 
tensions will increase.393
In October 1999, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott delivered a speech 
in London, where he warned:
[The United States] would not want to see an ESDI that comes into 
being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally 
grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that 
initially duplicates but that could eventually compete with NATO.394
Increased US pressure from the summer into the fall resulted in the December 
1999 European Council in Helsinki moderating its declaration by reiterating explicitly 
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that the European force would be used “where NATO as a whole is not engaged.”395
As some European observers noted, this would lead in effect to an American veto on 
any European desire to develop security independence from the US.396  Lest there be 
any misunderstanding, the NATO Summit a few days after the Helsinki Summit 
repeated the notion expressed in Helsinki that a European Security and Defense 
Policy “does not imply the creation of a European army.”397
Some Europeans, especially in Paris, felt that US insistence at managing 
ESDP at the NATO-EU level (rather than US-EU) was a means of propping up 
NATO as well as maintaining US control of European security leadership through the 
Alliance.398   As Frellesen  noted, “The EU and the US have in many ways been in a 
learning phase since the end of the Cold War in terms of managing their relations and 
finding new ways of cooperating to meet a new range of common challenges.”399
Early during this phase, there was a debate over the US role in Europe and the 
world.  With the Cold War won, would the US withdraw back into a neo-
isolationism?  The question seemed even more pronounced following fiascoes in 
Somalia, Haiti, and early part of Bosnia.
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In 2001, the new Bush Administration did not view the EU as a security actor 
and had not appreciated the changes within the EU since 1993.  Thus, there was a 
learning curve.  As one former State Department official noted, “The Republicans had 
missed nearly a decade of thinking in EU and conflict prevention.”400  A Defense 
Department official echoed this characterization, observing that the Bush 
Administration needed time to “adjust” to the new NATO/EU environment.401
However, much of the tension appeared to lose steam with the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001.  Suddenly, the issue of ESDP seemed somewhat trivial 
compared to the new threat and vulnerability presented by transnational terrorism.
James Mann notes how the new policy traced its evolution from earlier 
debates dating back to Woodrow Wilson to a shift during the Reagan years.  
According to Mann:
Until the late 1980s the causes of democracy and self-determination 
overseas had been espoused mostly by liberals and Democrats; 
Woodrow Wilson, America’s most ardent proponent of an idealistic 
foreign policy, had been a liberal Democrat.  After the Philippines, 
promoting democracy abroad gradually turned into a cause of the 
political right more than of the left.  When in 2002 and 2003 the 
George W. Bush administration began to call for democratic 
government for the Palestinians, in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle 
East, it was following a line of policy and doctrine that first took root 
when the Reagan administration dealt with the Philippines.402
Along with the new emphasis on the “war against terror” was a diminished 
focus at the highest levels on transatlantic security relations.  Instead, responsibility 
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for managing US policy toward ESDP was pushed down several layers.  
Consequently, what emerged was what one State Department official called “a battle 
of skirmishes.”  The goal was to get the President or Secretary of State on the record 
for taking certain public positions.  If one could get a policy statement into a public 
speech, that was considered a success.403  In this case, as Henry Kissinger observed, 
“[M]odern decision-makers often find themselves the prisoners of their advisors.”404
By the time of the Bush Administration, and especially after the September 11 
attacks, interest in the debate over ESDP and European defense autonomy seemed to 
wane within Administration circles.  To the extent that Republican officials paid 
attention, it centered primarily on how the Europeans could contribute militarily (and 
otherwise) to the “war on terrorism.” 405
Even before September 11, 2001, Europeans had worried over the new 
Administration’s apparent “unilateralist” bent.  After several high-profile moves on 
the part of the Bush Administration – e.g., dismissing the Kyoto Protocol on climate 
change, not participating in the International Criminal Court, withdrawing from the 
ABM and other international treaties, and pursuing national missile defense –
Europeans became convinced that the US had made a strategic decision to ignore its 
allies and international institutions such as NATO.  As one commentator noted, “The 
actions of the Bush Administration, almost 100 days into office, suggest it is 
philosophically further from European ideals than perhaps any US administration in 
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the last 50 years.”406  The comment came on the same day as the EU and NATO 
agreed to move forward on consultations related to military planning.  Before then, 
Turkey had blocked NATO from discussing NATO-EU military issues with the EU 
because the Turks had wanted a greater say in ESDP operations even though Turkey 
was not a member of the EU.407
After the military invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, but especially 
after the US-led military invasion of Iraq in March 2003, there were numerous 
outcries that the transatlantic relationship was over, and that the US no longer cared 
about NATO.408
The situation was not helped by the Turkish resistance within NATO to allow 
the EU access to NATO assets as agreed by Berlin Plus.  Officials at the US Mission 
to NATO felt that the Alliance was being torn apart by the ESDP debate.409  The 
issue, conflated with Turkish EU membership desires and coupled with suspicions 
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over impending Cypriot EU accession, became quite a problem.  France and Turkey 
engaged in numerous debates over ESDP and EU access to NATO.  What to US 
officials were confusing, arcane discussions reflecting internecine EU battles drifted 
into NATO channels to the point that it became quite difficult to agree on NATO 
communiqués. The US could not form a position.  Consequently, there was little 
guidance from Washington.   According to one US official at NATO, “it was hell.”410
Nevertheless, the EU continued to develop its ESDP institutional structures, in 
particular, the EU Military Staff, Military Committee, the PSC, and support elements 
within the Council Secretariat, and to work on its Headline Goal for the European 
Rapid Reaction Force.411  In March 2002, EU leaders at the Barcelona European 
Council Summit declared its “availability” to take over NATO’s operation in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), under the condition that final 
agreement on Berlin Plus was achieved.412
At the November 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, Alliance leaders introduced 
the NATO Response Force (NRF) and Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), a 
more focused version of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which was 
considered overtaken by the September 11 terrorist attacks.  A new round of NATO 
enlargement also was announced.  At the same time, tension was building over Iraq 
and potential for military intervention.413
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Finally, in December 2002, NATO and EU governments reached a framework 
agreement on the consultation mechanisms and conditions for implementing Berlin 
Plus (especially concerning the transfer and use of NATO assets for EU operations).  
Officials from NATO and the EU began to meet on a regular basis, including at the 
ambassador and foreign minister level.  Meetings between the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) and Political-Security Committee (PSC) were generally superficial, but the 
symbolism of working together seemed to matter most.414
At the end of March 2003, the EU conducted its first military mission, 
Operation Concordia, in FYROM, employing “Berlin Plus” mechanisms.  While 
minimal in terms of force projection (350 personnel), it marked a symbolic watershed 
for the EU’s military aspirations.  It also coincided with the US- led military invasion 
of Iraq.415
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Chapter 5: Theoretical Considerations for Case One (US-
EDC)
Introduction
This chapter posits how different International Relations theories or 
conceptual models would explain American foreign policy behavior toward the 
European Defense Community (EDC).  In particular, it discusses what one should 
expect from neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism.  The 
chapter then moves down one level of analysis to examine other possible explanations 
at the domestic level, including presidential decision-making and bureaucratic politics 
models.  It also examines the role of policy entrepreneurs and transnational networks 
as potential contributing variables in explaining American support for the EDC.
Neorealist Explanation
Neorealists would focus on the systemic constraints stemming from the 
distribution of power in the international system.  The external environment would 
dominate over internal or domestic considerations.  Thus, it would be for all practical 
purposes irrelevant whether there were a Republican or Democrat in the White 
House, and the personalities and leadership styles, not to mention the institutional and 
alliance arrangements would be of little value.
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Neorealists would argue that American foreign policy was conditioned on the 
Soviet threat and the need to unify Western Europe in order to balance and counter 
the emerging threat.   With Western Europe in economic ruins and political disarray, 
the logical solution would be to prop up the continental Europeans through political, 
economic, and security integration.  Such a neorealist argument would explain how 
the United States might seek alliances with the West Europeans.  However, it would 
not explain why the initial reaction to the continuing massive Soviet presence in the 
aftermath of World War II was to demobilize and reduce the American counter-
balancing presence in Europe.  Judging from the international distribution of power, 
neorealists would find it difficult to explain why the US demobilized from 1945-
1947.  As a utility-maximizing unitary actor, the United States should have been 
expected to lock-in its relative gains at the end of the War.  If one used balance-of-
power theory, the US would have stayed in order to balance the Soviet presence, 
which did not recede after the end of hostilities in 1945.  If one applied hegemonic 
stability theory, the US would have stayed in order to preserve its advantage as a 
regional hegemon.  In fact, the opposite occurred.  The United States rapidly 
demobilized.  Even when it became abundantly clear that Soviet intentions were 
hostile to the Western democracies, the Americans vacillated before finally pushing 
through the Marshall Plan for economic assistance.  It was not until the summer of
1950 and the shock of the Korean invasion (i.e., open hostilities) that the Americans 
began building up its military forces in Europe.  Even then, there was a substantial 
debate within Washington – especially between the Administration and Congress –
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over the scope and scale of an American military contribution to the defense of 
Europe.416
Neorealists might respond by arguing that the United States was slow to 
recognize the emerging threat, but once American policymakers did, they counter-
balanced as expected.  The United States increased its military contribution, returned 
troops to Europe, and increased defense expenditures accordingly.  The Americans 
took the lead in the creation of NATO in 1949, as well as consolidating the Western 
sectors into the Federal Republic of Germany in the same year.
As the Korean War wound down in the summer of 1953 and after Stalin’s 
death in March 1953, neorealists would expect the United States to take 
commensurate measures to lessen the tension.  They would expect greater 
transatlantic tensions in NATO and diminished American support for the EDC, since 
a unified European political community with its own army might begin to pose a 
significant challenge to the Americans should Europe continue to gain economic 
strength, especially with the Germans at the center.  And yet, the opposite occurred.  
In early 1953, Secretary of State Dulles made his famous “agonizing reappraisal” 
speech, where he intimated that the United States would reconsider its entire 
approach to European security if the EDC failed to be ratified.  Neorealists would 
discount any efforts to form a supranational community as “false promises” and 
therefore of little consequence.417  Since the EDC would be more than an alliance 
(from a realist perspective) as a fully-fledged entity – but also a caucus in NATO –
which could potentially slow down decision-making in a time of crisis, neorealists 
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would have to adjust their predictions by adding numerous qualifiers and other 
corollaries.   Such qualifiers might include a contention that European integration was 
welcomed as a means of providing stability and harmony on the continent, reducing 
costs to the United States.  However, this would imply that the continental Europeans 
would find it in their self-interest to abandon their state sovereignty for the sake of 
American national interests.  Consequently, supporting such a position would require 
neorealists to set aside their logic for the Europeans while maintaining their logic in 
the bipolar confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union.
Neoliberal Institutionalist Explanation
For neoliberals, the explanation of US foreign policy towards European 
defense autonomy in the 1950’s would focus on three strands: the role of democratic 
peace; the role of political economy and institutional influences; and the role of 
domestic political variables.  Because neoliberals focus on the potential for progress 
and cooperation in international relations, they would not feel threatened by the 
development of a European Defense Community.
Many scholars have observed the link between domestic politics and foreign 
policy, but most have focused on the economic and trade benefits of such policies.418
Scholars have focused less on the ideational and security aspects.  Wilsonian ideas 
stressed the long-term benefits and expectations of political cooperation rather than 
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the short-term gains and strategic calculations traditionally seen in military 
alliances.419
First, neoliberals might suggest that the US supported the EDC because 
democracies tend not to fight one another.  Such a position would be consistent with a 
Wilsonian concept of foreign policy.  Wilson endorsed the notion of collective 
security built around shared values rather than just a common threat.  It was Wilson’s 
belief that shared values and a “sense of community” would be more lasting and 
durable over time than narrowly defined self-interests.420  As Deutsch and others have 
argued, the North Atlantic Area was a pluralistic community that shared values and 
allowed for a security community to develop.421  Consequently, the development of 
the EDC might be welcomed as a step toward the future, where the rule of law 
governed the behavior of nation states.  In conjunction with the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) and European Political Community (EPC), the 
development of the defense component would be viewed as natural and desirable.  
Since the EDC would be associated with NATO, neoliberals would accept the 
institutional constraints of the EDC as a positive element of additional 
interdependence among the members and encouraging positive economic and trade 
benefits.
However, both Hampton and Deutsch stressed the collective security and 
plurastic elements of shared values within a NATO context.  Thus, the idea of 
creating an additional institution – the EDC – cannot be derived directly from their 
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argumentation.  Neoliberalism does not account for circumstances where states would 
embed institutions rather than incorporate new members into existing institutional 
structures.  In fact, neoliberals would argue that the US should have pushed France to 
accept the NATO proposal of binding Germany into NATO.  Otherwise, they would 
have to concede to neorealism’s argument that institutions and economic 
interdependence are in fact “false promises.”  The neoliberal argument that respect 
for the rule of law, and budding economic interdependence would be sufficient to 
allay French fears of Germany does not seem to match the historical record. 
Neoliberals also would have difficulty explaining fears over the loss of French 
sovereignty. 422
Thus, neoliberal arguments do not differentiate between allowing for either 
the US supporting the EDC or supporting German rearmament through NATO.  Both 
avenues would provide for greater interdependence as well as economic and trade 
benefits.  However, there appears to be no decisive factor from neoliberalism that 
guides an observer in either direction.
Social Constructivist Explanation
Social constructivists would focus on the cultural contexts in which policy 
was formulated.  They would argue that the threat perception from the Korean War 
created an atmosphere of fear in Washington.  They would contend that cultural 
factors in US foreign policy, such as reproducing the American federalist model, 
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would have strongly influenced US behavior toward European defense autonomy.  
Ideological traditions would have played a major force in policy formation.
Social constructivists would argue that American policymakers conducted 
coordinative discourse among themselves on the best option to pursue.  Once 
consensus was reached, American policymakers then began a communicative 
discourse, in which they explained their policy preferences to the Europeans and 
Soviets, as well as to the American public and Congress.
The difficulty here is that coordinative discourse can easily be confused with 
discussion over the interagency process.  Is coordinative discourse merely a means 
for policy formation or is it an identifiable explanatory variable in its own right?  
How else can policy be made and implemented without discussion?  Once a policy is 
agreed, the output is reflected in communication, declaration, or other such action.  
Thus, what is the difference between communicative discourse and policy 
implementation?
Ideological traditions may play a role here.  After 1950 and the Korean 
invasion, the United States experienced a wave of tension over Communism known 
as the “Red Scare.”  Numerous concerns were expressed that sympathizers within the 
State Department were somehow “soft” on Communism.  This perception heightened 
following the loss of China to the Communists and the North Korean invasion.  
Somehow, the State Department was suspect.
One could argue that the US Administration felt it necessary to remain tough 
on Communism in Western Europe, felt constrained that any show of weakness in 
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Europe might cement the perception that the Communists were winning the Cold 
War.  Moreover, by the early 1950’s, there was a small group of Republicans in the 
Congress (led by Senator McCarthy) adding pressure not soften on Communism in 
any way.  However, if this argument is adopted, then one might question the support 
and enthusiasm within the Eisenhower Administration for the European Defense 
Community.  After all, the EDC might weaken NATO, as an institution within an 
institution.  The Soviets would see that the EDC did not strengthen European defense 
and might interpret American support as a sign of weakness and desperation.  The 
only way around this view is to consider the EDC as a glue for binding France and 
Italy into the West and thus diminish the threat from Communism.  In other words, 
because France and Italy possessed the highest percentage of Communists in Western 
Europe, the real American motive would be not to preserve NATO per se, or just to 
rearm Germany, but to keep France and Italy within the fold.  If the main American 
motive had been to prevent the Germans from accepting Soviet overtures of 
reunification in exchange for German neutrality, then trying to subvert German 
sovereignty by promoting the supranational EDC would have killed German 
reunification permanently.  Germany would have lost most – if not all – of the 
trappings of sovereignty.  The NATO solution would have preserved German hopes 
of eventual reunification because rearmament would have been channeled through 
national means.  Also, at least in France, but also in Italy, the Communists were 
among the most outspoken critics against the EDC.  In fact, the EDC galvanized 
Communist opposition, mobilizing a strange alliance with the right-of-center 
Gaullists to help reject the EDC in the National Assembly.423
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Domestic Level Explanation
Bureaucratic Politics
Some scholars have argued that American foreign policy can be explained 
best by adopting a bureaucratic politics model.424  From this model, one would expect 
the State Department to promote a diplomatic solution, the Defense Department to 
promote NATO and SHAPE (with suitable support from the Joint Chiefs), with other 
bureaucratic agents playing lesser roles.
However, is this what occurred? On a superficial level, this approach may 
seem attractive and hold some promise.  The State Department, in fact, did support 
the EDC over the NATO solution, but not immediately.  What would be the material 
or bureaucratic benefits for the State Department to promote the EDC over the NATO 
alternative?  Additionally, why was the Defense Department surprisingly silent in the 
debate over German rearmament?  There did not seem to be the level of discord as 
one might have expected.  The strongest opponent of the policy tended to come from 
the Treasury and Commerce Departments, which worried about the longer-term 
economic implications of a European economic cartel.  Rather, the Senate had firm 
views as will be described below, but these views were not uniform strictly along 
institutional lines.  Moreover, the bureaucratic politics model generally does not 
emphasize the role of Congress or similar non-Executive branch actors.425
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In addition, the bureaucratic politics model would have difficulty explaining 
how General Eisenhower, both in his capacity as SACEUR and later as President, 
would support a militarily-unsound plan for the defense of Europe.
As Art and others have noted, the bureaucratic politics model focuses on the 
organization as the central determinant, rather than the mindset or “school of thought” 
perspective on international affairs of the participants.426  Thus, a policy is promoted 
for its ability to become endorsed and accepted by other power centers.
Domestic Politics
Other domestic variables include the relationships between the Congress and 
Executive and between the Democrats and Republicans.  First, with respect to 
Congress, the focus will be the Senate, since the upper house – with its ability to 
approve treaties and fund armies – is more relevant than the lower house in terms of 
American foreign policy.  Thus, how did the Senate view the EDC?  Was there a 
difference between Congressional-Executive relations during the Truman 
Administration and during the Eisenhower Administration?
American foreign policy was not as unified as often portrayed.  During the 
Truman Administration, the foreign policy objectives were supported by Congress 
through the 1948 Presidential election.  The radical changes – the Marshall Plan, 
creation of NATO, etc. – reflected the need to respond to a rapidly new international 
environment.  However, the Korean invasion of 1950 and Truman’s response to it, 
allowed the Senate to play a bigger role in American foreign policy.  First, the 
decision on 9 September 1950 to send more US troops to Europe was momentous but 
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received scant attention by the Senate until January 1951.  Initially, the Senate 
considered the troop announcement as part of a larger, tougher policy against 
communism.427  Also part of the reason can be attributed to the November 1950 mid-
term election and the changing political party balance in the Senate.  Republicans 
gained seats in November and, although they were still a minority, the gap had been 
closed from twelve to two.  This permitted more freedom for criticism.
In particular, the mid-term election allowed for a more conservative and 
partisan group of Senators to gain influence within the Republican party.  Senator 
Taft, for one, represented a challenge, after he delivered a speech stating that 
isolationism was dead, but American policy towards Western Europe needed to be re-
examined.428  Secretary of State Acheson delivered a forceful rebuttal in a speech 
thereafter, leading to a general decline in bipartisan relations.  As Williams notes, 
If, on the one hand, important segments of the GOP, fortified by 
electoral success, were looking for a confrontation with the 
Democratic Administration over foreign policy, it appears, on the 
other hand, that the Administration itself was prepared to countenance 
such a challenge with equanimity.  Thus, the breakdown of 
bipartisanship was the result of suspicion and intransigence on both 
sides.  The careful efforts to build a bipartisan coalition that had 
characterized the discussions over the North Atlantic Treaty had not 
been paralleled by similarly extensive efforts in the military assistance 
program.429
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The connection between events in Korea and Europe was evident by both the 
Truman Administration and Republican opponents in the Senate.  However, the two 
sides – while agreeing on the basic facts of the situation – came to opposite 
conclusions, with telling implications for American foreign policy.  Whereas Truman 
saw the need to augment vulnerable European defenses with US troops, Republican 
Senators viewed Truman’s actions as adventurous and reckless, with no guarantee 
that a land war in Europe would succeed any better than in Korea.  As Williams 
describes:
Truman had committed American forces to Korea without formal 
congressional approval (let alone a declaration of war).  The 
consequences, it now appeared, were disastrous.  He had done the 
same in Europe - but there was little reason to believe that a land war 
strategy would fare any better there than in Asia.  Certainly, Congress 
should have had an opportunity to discuss the matter prior to the actual 
dispatch of American forces.  As events had demonstrated, the 
Executive, far from having a monopoly of wisdom in foreign affairs, 
appeared at the very minimum to be inept.  And for those who went 
further than this and suggested that traitors and Communist 
sympathizers were in charge of United States foreign policy, the 
setbacks in Korea were seen merely as further confirmations of their 
suspicions.430
For many US senators, the main concern revolved around the sending of US 
troops and the costs imposed.  Senators such as Connally and Vandenberg worried 
that the US would be stuck footing the bill for European free-riding.  First, a treaty, 
then military aid, and finally, troops all added up to a bill that the Congress was not 
willing in paying.  For this reason, US State Department and other Administration 
officials focused on the European self-help components.431  The main thing for 
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Senator Vandenberg was the North Atlantic Treaty that had shifted the United States 
from an isolationist, neutral country to one willing to associate itself (and its massive 
war making capacity) with Europe.  It was the public notice to the Soviet Union – not 
the build-up of forces – that Vandenberg wanted to convey.432
Consequently, for cost reasons, the State Department in its testimony stressed 
the minimal costs associated with American security aid and troop deployment.  
NSC-68, which was completed in April 1950, two months before the North Korean 
invasion, called for substantial increase in European rearmament through greater 
American assistance and participation than heretofore expected, foreshadowing a 
potential conflict between the Administration and the Congress.  As Williams notes, 
“The Secretary of State and his department were in favor of further involvement in 
European affairs whereas the sentiment in the Senate was that the limits of 
participation had already been reached.”433
Indicative of the climate of tension and suspicion between the Republicans 
and the Truman Administration, former President Hoover delivered a radio broadcast 
on December 20, 1950 not only critiquing the Administration’s proposed troop 
deployment to Europe but also positing an alternative strategy to combat 
Communism, one that did not require the costly commitment to the Europeans.  In his 
speech, Hoover argued that to try to defend the European continent against the 
Communists would be futile and doomed to failure.  Instead, the US should adopt a 
perimeter strategy in concert with the island nations of Great Britain on the Atlantic 
side and Japan, Taiwan (Formosa), and the Philippines on the Pacific in order to 
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“preserve for the world this Western Hemisphere, Gibraltar of Western 
Civilization.”434  Hoover’s proposal differed from classic isolationism.  What it 
emphasized was the use of strategic, air, and naval power over ground and land forces 
to contain Communism.  In the meantime, the Europeans would have to fend for 
themselves, according to Hoover’s strategy.
The response to Hoover’s broadcast was strong, although there were splits 
even within the GOP, so it would be a mistake to claim that the controversy was 
merely one of Republican opposition attacking a Democratic Administration.
Nevertheless, the Administration’s attempt to refute Hoover only made 
matters worse because of a lack of coordination among government officials.  
Truman took a defensive stance by invoking presidential prerogatives in a manner 
viewed as crude and arrogant.  As Williams notes, “The Administration’s stance 
succeeded only in arousing the institutional pride of the Senate.”435
The debate fell along numerous fault lines: isolationism vs. internationalism; 
Asia-firsters vs. Atlantic-firsters; Executive vs. Legislative; Democrat vs. Republican 
– in other words, the issue revealed the core question of America’s role in world 
affairs.  As Williams aptly explains:
The question of whether or not United States troops should be sent to 
Western Europe was, of course, the kernel of the dispute; but the 
Senate deliberations quickly revealed a more fundamental and far-
reaching divergence among several competing philosophies of foreign 
affairs.  Such a divergence was not new, but, for the most part, had 
been subdued through the late 1940s, partly by the attempts to build a 
bipartisan consensus and, more importantly, by the limited sacrifices 
apparently required for America to fulfill its new role as guardian of 
Atlantic security.  The fear that the United States would send a vast 
land army to Western Europe, by challenging the comfortable and 
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somewhat complacent assumptions about the limited costs of 
American involvement, brought the different perspectives into sharp 
relief, highlighting a lack of consensus on the purpose, scope and 
instruments of United States foreign policy.436
More than a few Senators began to conclude that the Administration was 
taking the Atlantic Alliance down a “mission creep” path that would bleed American 
resources and personnel at a critical period in domestic politics.  The debate over 
troops to Europe was yet another in a series of debates at critical junctures over the 
future direction of American foreign policy.  That other issues were conflated or 
exaggerated to score tactical points might be considered incidental.
Although former President Hoover’s broadcast brought attention to the troop 
issue, the real battle began in the Senate in January 1951.  On January 5, Senator Taft, 
who more than most Republicans, had a definitive alternative to the Truman/Acheson 
foreign policy, delivered a speech on the Senate floor that emphasized his view of 
American foreign policy.  The Ohio Republican’s position was that the priority for 
American foreign policy should be its internal effect on America rather than the 
external impact on other nations.  As Williams describes: 
Taft’s starting point for thinking about foreign policy was not the kind 
of world he would like to see, but the kind of America he wanted.  The 
Truman Administration, in contrast, began from the premise that the 
freedom of the United States was inseparable from that of its European 
allies, that security was indivisible for the members of the Atlantic 
Pact, and that the obligations and responsibilities shouldered by the 
United States from 1947 onwards had to be fulfilled regardless of how 
costly and burdensome this proved.437
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Taft was not unaware of the Communist threat.  In fact, he considered the 
threat to be of a long-term nature.  Thus, he feared that the surge in cost to support 
Western Europe would be too high price that in the end would drain American 
resources and reduce liberty by promoting big government and a large armed 
forces.438  Again, compared to traditional isolationists, Taft would refrain from that 
association.  Rather, he argued that the United States should be a “good citizen” of 
the world, no more, no less.  He was one of the first to warn against the dangers of 
overstretch and even the possible development of a “national security state” or what 
Eisenhower later referred to as the “military-industrial complex.”  As Williams 
describes, the strategy proposed by Taft was this: 
Priority was to be given to the defense and protection of America, the 
“Citadel” of the free world.  This entailed an American attempt to 
obtain control of both sea and air.  Taft was a strong advocate, 
therefore, of an expanded air force and argued that the strategic 
capabilities of the United States had been allowed to deteriorate as a 
result of the Administration’s short-sightedness….439
Taft believed that building up the air force would prove a greater deterrent and 
more successful than a ground force build-up, which might actually have a counter-
productive effect, even to the point of possibly provoking the Soviets to conduct a 
pre-emptive war before Western forces were prepared.440
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Policy Entrepreneurs and Transnational Networks
A final set of domestic variables that might account for the US decision to 
support European defense autonomy through the EDC is what might be termed policy 
entrepreneurship and transnational networks.  The fragmented political systems 
within the United States and Europe allow for policy entrepreneurs and transnational 
networks to play an influential role in policy formation and implementation. 
Consequently, what emerges within the Administration are various power centers or 
decision units.  These are locuses of policy influence and may be either individuals or 
organizations.  Such power centers or decision units are shaped by a core set of 
beliefs that “at a given social moment…acquire a compelling importance.”441  For 
example, a strong Secretary of State may represent a power center.  So too could a 
group of elites that share similar beliefs.442  Individual actors can become influential 
power centers even if they move from one job to another.   These individuals bring 
into their new job goals and beliefs stemming from their own ideological mind-sets or 
perspectives.443  In Hilsman’s words, “[N]ot only does each power center…have 
different motives and goals, but…each may have a different view about means, about 
how to achieve a particular goal.  Historically, in fact, it seems that policy 
disagreements are more frequently over means than goals.”444  Thus, not only is there 
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a question about competing and multiple goals, but also a choice must be made over 
specific means for achieving certain goals.
This framework differs from the bureaucratic politics model advocated by 
Allison, Destler, Halperin, and others.  According to Hilsman: 
The bureaucratic-politics model implies that the organization is the 
single most important determinant of the policy the different 
participants espouse and that the large and powerful bureaucracies are 
the most important determinant of the policy outcome.  The political-
process model regards the organization as only one determinant of 
what the participants espouse and the great bureaucracies are 
important, but not nearly the most important, determinant of the policy 
outcome.445
Here, individual actors may cut across organizations and even states to push a 
particular policy.  Thus, the role of Jean Monnet and his American network becomes 
vital.  Initial American reaction to the EDC, as has been mentioned before, was 
ambivalent, even dismissive.  However, Monnet’s constant meetings and interactions 
with key American policy makers, from David Bruce to Dwight Eisenhower, allowed 
for other avenues to be pursued and helped to sell the policy approach to Secretary 
Acheson and skeptics in Congress.  As Monnet himself recalls in his memoirs, the 
“network of contacts” he developed in the United States was essential to his success.  
According to Monnet, “That network, small and more or less invisible to the public 
eye, did not correspond to any permanent administrative structure.  It was made up of 
men in whom the President had confidence, and who were wholly devoted to him.”446
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The network of contacts and relationships was an important factor.  
Individuals were able to persuade others to adopt their positions or make them their 
own.  Consequently, these transnational coalitions were able to work both domestic 
audiences to accomplish their common goal.  As Lankford notes of Monnet’s 
influence on David Bruce:
Through his friendship with Monnet, Bruce became intimately 
involved with the men and the institutions conjured by the Frenchman.  
Their partnership illustrates the complexity of the Marshall Plan.  It 
was not just imposed on an unwilling France but was an intricate 
collaboration between like-minded factions within the ruling elites of 
both countries who were opposed by powerful skeptics in America and 
in France.447
Another important individual to produce a tipping-point difference was 
Dwight Eisenhower.  Whereas the United States had vacillated between the desire for 
European integration (as reflected by the ECSC and EDC/EPC) and a reconstituted 
German army to support collective defense, Eisenhower chose the former as a means 
to the latter.  As one observer writes, Eisenhower “affirmed that European Union and 
German rearmament were, as the French suggested, equally and inseparably 
interwoven in the need of American security….The intervention of General 
Eisenhower in the making of Europe was the climax of an American attitude which 
had been slowly forming since the war.”448
The major concern in Western Europe following the 1950 North Korean 
invasion of South Korea was over command and control of NATO forces.  Up to that 
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time, NATO’s orientation had been toward planning, not commanding.  There was no 
unified way to conduct a Western defense given multiple armed forces under diverse 
command arrangements.  As Field Marshall Montgomery warned, “As things stand 
today, and in any foreseeable future, there would be scenes of appalling and 
indescribable confusion in Western Europe if we were ever attacked by the 
Russians.”449
Field Marshall Montgomery was not the only one to recognize the need for a 
more integrated defense.  As Pedlow writes:
Many European leaders believed that NATO needed a true command 
structure, but such a move was being resisted by the United States, 
which did not want to become more deeply involved in the defense of 
Europe.  Thus at the beginning of June 1950, the U.S. delegation to the 
Standing Group informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the growing 
pressure by the European members of NATO for the creation of a 
command structure and ventured the opinion that “we can no longer 
completely avoid approaching the question of a command organization 
under the North Atlantic Treaty.”450
The Korean War changed the US Administration’s reluctance almost 
overnight.451  As NATO’s first SACEUR, Eisenhower soon came to realize the role 
of national prestige and the sensitivities of positions in choosing his command 
structure.  In particular, there was quite a dispute between the US and the UK over 
naval positions, most famously the command of SACLANT, but also over which 
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admiral commanded the Mediterranean.452  While the Anglo-American sides were 
haggling with one another over various NATO commands, other allies felt ignored.  
This was particularly difficult for the French, which still considered themselves to be 
active players, especially in the Mediterranean.453  Thus, the strategic imperative of 
rapidly responding to a looming Soviet threat obviously was not sufficiently strong 
enough to prevent political delays over command structures in both the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean.
Given the initial hesitancy of the US role in developing an integrated 
command within NATO, the enthusiasm the Americans displayed toward its 
implementation may seem odd.  As Pedlow writes:
Once the US position had swung over to strong advocacy, the United 
States seemed overly conscious of its new, postwar strength and at 
times showed little tolerance for the sensitivities of the other NATO 
members, as was clearly demonstrated in the handling of the 
SACLANT appointment and in the complicated naval command 
relationships that had to be developed in the Mediterranean because 
the United States was not willing to place the Sixth Fleet under a 
NATO command that was not headed by an American.  This stand was 
strongly influenced by American insistence on maintaining a direct 
chain of command over forces equipped with atomic weapons, but a 
belief that the United States’ military strength entitled it to fill the key 
command positions also played a role.454
However, to suggest that the United States promoted the increase of American 
military troops to reinforce its hegemony over Western Europe is to misread the 
elements of the debate.  Not all wanted to commit to such a step, even after the 
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Korean War highlighted the Communist threat.  Others were equally or more 
concerned over the burden that such a move would have on the United States, both in 
terms of domestic freedom and economic prosperity.  According to Williams:
Taft was firm in his belief…that the United States should not assume 
the leadership in the “formation of a great international army” or 
appoint an American Commander in Chief as this would only 
encourage European pressures on Washington to enlarge its presence.  
Commitments, he felt, could develop a life of their own - and it was 
essential to prevent this happening.455
Taft’s view though was not purely isolationist.  As mentioned earlier, his 
concern focused primarily on the trade-off between short-term exigencies and long-
term principles.  For Taft, it was essential to set strict limits on the parameters of a US 
troop deployment to Europe.  Without such “safeguards,” Taft believed that the 
American commitment could quite easily escalate, resulting in an American military 
presence “more enduring and substantial than was either desirable or necessary.”456
These concerns went beyond simple partisan politics but rather reflected his core 
beliefs about America’s place in the world.  He was not alone.  Many senators viewed 
the situation in Europe from the perspective of the Korean War, where the United 
States had carried 90 percent of the burden.457  These senators wanted to make sure 
that the Administration did not do the same in Europe.
Consequently, as one can see, while no one disputed the Soviet threat, what 
was disputed was how to respond.  In other words, the preference ordering for 
responding to the Soviet threat was more subtle and even ambiguous than neorealist 
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scholars would expect.  Moreover, Taft’s national interests differed from those of 
Truman and Acheson, reflecting different philosophical views of foreign affairs.
At the same time, Taft recognized that the Administration’s announcement of 
sending more US troops to Europe had to be honored, since the Allies’ expectations 
had been raised.  So, there is a discourse element involved, as some social 
constructivists would posit.  Since it was too late to withdraw the offer, the next best 
step would be to tone down and limit the numbers, with more a token show of support 
in “the spirit of the Atlantic Pact” than actual major substantive increases.458
In the end, by raising numerous questions over the role and limits of the 
Executive branch to deploy troops overseas, as well as the terms of the American 
security commitment to the defense of Europe, Taft introduced into the discourse 
many of the issues (most notably, the burden-sharing debate) that continue to this 
day.  It was in the context of debate over how high a price should the United States be 
willing to pay for its security and the role that Western Europe played in that security 
policy that the idea of the Europeans establishing their own defense force evolved.  It 
became a suitable political response, even if not an optimal military one.  Several 
prominent Republican congressmen were in the lead in suggesting that the Europeans 
should be pressured into providing more of their own defense, especially in terms of 
ground forces.  After all, the United States, according to these Republicans, was 
already providing the overwhelming bulk of naval and air forces in the defense of 
Europe.  Other, more internationalist Republicans, such as Senator Lodge of 
Massachusetts, felt that it should not be an either/or proposition.  Consequently, 
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various formulas and ratios were argued, but what came out was that there should be 
a link between an American military contribution and the European one.  How much 
more the Europeans would do was left open.459
The other issue that becomes conflated with the strategic response to the 
Soviet threat was the role of the Congress in US foreign policy, especially the 
institutional pride of the Senate to be adequately consulted and approached on the 
matter of US troops.  However, to portray the issue of a unified Congress against a 
unified Executive is to oversimplify and mislead.  The institutional cleavages were 
more subtle and cross-cutting.  This is particularly true on the Congressional side, 
where the Administration could turn to pockets of support to counter the pockets (or 
coalitions) of opposition.
Convincing the Europeans to rearm for their own defense was another issue.  
As Ambrose aptly describes, “To the Europeans, NATO meant a guarantee that the 
United States would not desert them, that they could count on the atomic bomb to 
deter the Red Army.  They could see little reason to rearm themselves.  Rearmament 
would merely provoke the Russians, they reasoned, without creating sufficient 
strength to repel them - at least without using atomic bombs - and if they were going 
to use atomic bombs, why rearm?”460  The danger at the time was not of an 
immediate nuclear holocaust, but that the building up of conventional forces in 
Western Europe might tempt the Soviets into launching a pre-emptive war against the 
West.  With 175 armed divisions, this would be a war the Soviets would not lose on 
the ground.  NATO had only twelve divisions.  Eisenhower argued that the Alliance 
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could defend Western Europe with forty (later the number would be boosted to 96), 
only six of which needed to come from the United States.461  Eisenhower considered 
himself to be a “Moses” that would inspire and cajole and buck up the low morale of 
defeated and fatalistic Europeans.  He spent much of his time as SACEUR traveling 
through Europe and the United States “selling NATO.”  He held press conferences 
and consulted frequently - not just with government officials but also with public 
audiences and opposition leaders doing what he called “selling and inspiring.”462
To skeptics in the American Congress, he emphasized the short-term nature of 
American participation in building up NATO.  As he bluntly stated: “If in ten years, 
all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been 
returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed.”463  In February 
1951, Eisenhower reaffirmed his position in hearings before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee that he believed the American troop commitment would be an 
interim confidence-building measure to the Europeans that would supply “the needed 
mobile active strength pending the time that the European nations can build up their 
own defense forces.”464
However, not everyone was convinced.  In fact, some remained quite hostile 
to the Administration’s policy.  For example, Senator Malone of Nevada considered 
Eisenhower’s testimony to be “propaganda for the preconceived decision of the State 
Department to send our boys to make up a Maginot Line in Europe.”465  Still others 
were worried that political considerations were taking precedence over national 
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security and military concerns.  Rhetorical reassurances from Eisenhower also were 
not enough to convince Senator Taft, who had presidential aspirations in addition to 
substantive doubts over the exact nature, magnitude, and duration of a potential 
American troop commitment to the defense of Europe.  As mentioned earlier, while 
Taft had no objections to sending arms and materiel to Europe (he even was not 
opposed to a minor and very temporary troop deployment), he wanted to do 
everything he could to prevent an incremental and irreversible process.466
At the same time, Taft was not the only senator who worried about the 
European reliability to contribute to its defense.  Others expressed unease and 
continued skepticism that the Europeans could ever unite in sufficient fashion to 
achieve a common defense.  It was in the course of debating the American 
commitment to Europe that several conservative Republican Senators (e.g., Senators 
McCarthy of Wisconsin and Case of South Dakota) began discussing bringing in the 
full military potential of non-NATO Europeans, including Germany and Spain.  
According to Williams, “As well as the original language in the resolution concerning 
European self-help, there were now recommendations that the resources and 
manpower of Italy, West Germany and Spain be mobilized for the defense of Western 
Europe.”467
Despite these misgivings, the Administration’s case was strong, in part 
because of a publicly unified position, but also because of the backing from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  Indeed, according to Williams, “The testimony of the members 
of the JCS had an impact beyond the substantive arguments they deployed: with the 
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prestige and popularity of both the President and the Secretary of State at a low ebb, 
they gave the decision a certain authoritativeness, legitimacy and non-partisan 
character which would otherwise have been lacking.”468
The influence of Monnet’s relationship with Eisenhower was indispensable.   
Eisenhower’s position as soldier and NATO commander made his view on European 
defense credible – and critical.  It would be only a slight exaggeration to say that 
Eisenhower, therefore, could have blocked or changed American policy.  Monnet 
recognized this and went to work to persuade the General to favor European 
integration over a purely NATO solution.  At a meeting with Eisenhower and his 
Chief of Staff General Gruenther (who, later would become SACEUR himself), 
Monnet made the case that Europeans responsibly providing for their own defense 
could occur only from unification.  According to Monnet, “The strength of the West 
does not depend on how many divisions it has, but on its unity and common will.  To 
rush into raising a few German divisions on a national basis, at the cost of reviving 
enmity between our peoples, would be catastrophic for the very security of Europe 
that such a step would be intended to ensure.”469
Eisenhower came to believe that European unification would solve many of 
the problems facing him, both in terms of alleviating the drain on American 
resources, promoting the security of Western Europe in the long-term, and facing up 
to the Soviet threat.  As he told Averell Harriman, “Every day brings new evidence 
that Western Europe must coalesce both politically and economically, or things will 
get worse instead of better.  It seems remarkable that all European political leaders 
467
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recognize the truth of this statement but just sit down and do absolutely nothing about 
it.”470
Once he had decided, Eisenhower proceeded to tout the European army idea, 
from public speeches to Senate testimony.471  For example, testifying before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee in July 1951, Eisenhower argued:
I believe in it this much – when I came over here [to Europe] I disliked 
the whole idea of a European Army, and I had enough troubles without 
it.  However,…I made up my mind to go into the thing with both 
feet…and I realize that a lot of my professional associates are going to 
think I am crazy.  But I tell you that joining Europe together is the key 
to the whole question!472
Thus, the role of policy entrepreneurs – who act based on their formative 
beliefs and in conjunction with transnational networks built on relationships of trust –
appears to represent a significant determinant in American policy towards the 
European Defense Community.
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Chapter 6: Theoretical Considerations for Case Two (US-
ESDP)
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze various theoretical explanations for 
US policy towards European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).  The analysis will 
begin at the systemic level with an examination of how different International 
Relations theories would explain case two.  Then, I will analyze how the state level of 
analysis influences the potential outcome, demonstrating the need to link the state 
level with the system level in order to gain a more thorough understanding of foreign 
policy outputs, especially with regard to the interaction between the US and Europe. 
Does the absence of a consensus regarding the role of the US in the world increase 
the likelihood for institutional rivalries and domestic interests to influence foreign 
policy outcomes?  The role of policy entrepreneurs, bureaucratic politics, 
transnational networks, and political discourse will be addressed.  Finally, a word will 
be said in conjunction with the individual-level factors, such as worldviews, core 
beliefs, and management styles of key foreign policy actors. 
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Neorealist Explanation
Neorealists believe that the states are the primary actors in the international 
system.473  Their emphasis is on the geo-political and military aspects of power, and 
they place a great deal of importance to issues of stability, state survival, power 
polarity, and war and peace.  For them, the key to understanding a country’s foreign 
policy lies primarily with that country’s place in the international system.   By place, 
they mean structurally – land mass, size of economy, access to natural resources, 
military might, etc.   The ideology or personal chemistry of individual leaders, 
domestic issues such as bureaucratic politics or regime type, or the role of non-
governmental actors and international institutions are of little consequence in 
explaining state behavior.
According to neorealists, the end of the Cold War should lead to greater 
friction between the United States and Europe, especially since there is no great 
security threat to keep the nations united.  For example, Mearsheimer led the pack of 
neorealist scholars who ran counter to the exuberant joy following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the revolutions of 1989-90 in Central and Eastern Europe.  As 
Mearsheimer argues: 
The profound changes now underway in Europe have been widely 
viewed as harbingers of a new age of peace.  With the Cold War over, 
it is said, the threat of war that has hung over Europe for more than 
four decades is lifting....I argue that the prospects for major crises and 
war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends.474
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He based this negative outlook on his belief that the root causes of war and 
peace rest on the distribution and character of military power.  Mearsheimer’s article 
was an example of what Snyder termed an “aggressive” variant of realism.475  Lynn-
Jones and Miller described aggressive realism as a theory where the “international 
system fosters conflict and aggression.  Security is scarce, making international 
competition intense and war likely.  Rational states often are compelled to adopt 
offensive strategies in their search for security.”476
Neorealists might argue that NATO would disband, since the Soviet threat had 
disappeared.  With the US more concerned about strategic competitors and challenges 
outside the European sphere (especially from Asia), neorealists might argue that 
Washington would be more than happy for the Europeans to develop the military 
capabilities necessary to defend their own backyard.
However, is that what occurred?  
In fact, neorealism can explain only so much in the post-Cold War 
developments, and many of the events actually go contrary to neorealist expectations.  
According to Guay, “Neorealism would not have predicted the success of the [Single 
European Act], Maastricht Treaty, Transatlantic Declaration or EMU.”477  Moreover, 
Peterson faults neorealism for not accommodating changing notions of security that 
“give both sides stronger incentives to pool efforts and resources within international 
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organizations.”478  For example, Mearsheimer’s famous prediction that the end of the 
Cold War would lead to greater instability within Europe (especially in terms of 
competition among Big Three powers Germany, France, and the UK) so far has not 
been born out by the facts.479  Wohlforth writes that one of the greatest problems for 
neorealists is that “unipolarity contradicts the central tendency of their theory.  Its 
longevity is a testament to the theory’s indeterminacy.”480
Neorealists might suggest that the G.H.W. Bush Administration’s interference 
in (and opposition to) the pre-Maastricht negotiations over a common European 
defense can be attributed to US concern over a rival to NATO being created.481  It is 
possible that the international environment creates the context and parameters for 
political choice, but it does not dictate the decisions and strategies.482  The actual 
outcome or policy is the result of interagency bargaining and the decision of the 
President.  The inability to maintain coherent national policy can lead to mixed 
signals, thus creating further confusion and misunderstandings.  The lack of 
consistency is often the result of foreign ministries and defense ministries (in Europe) 
and US State and Defense Departments advocating different approaches.
.  
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Beginning in the late 1990’s and through 2003, the neorealist explanation 
revived.483  Particularly, with respect to the 2003 Iraq war, the charge was that the US 
was “cherry picking” its allies in Europe and promoting a policy of 
“disaggregation.”484  Such views would support the contention that structural factors 
best explains US policy toward ESDP.  Neorealists may counter that the Europeans, 
fearful of US military hegemony, have begun to counter-balance or even “soft” 
balance the US, while hedging against complete severing of reliance on the US for 
European defense.485  This could be seen as internal cooperation for external 
competition.  The EU may be developing security liberalization in order to balance 
externally, taking almost a security mercantilist position towards the US.  Wohlforth 
notes that Europeans would need to “suspend the balance of power locally” in order 
to create a “balance of power globally.”  Such a decision would not be easy for the 
Europeans.   “A world with a European pole,” writes Wohlforth, “would be one in 
which the French and British had merged their conventional and nuclear capabilities 
and do not mind if the German controls them.”486
Nevertheless, debate over the future of security institutions and relevance of 
NATO became intense during the first few years of the 1990’s.  For example, Simon 
Duke argued that Cold War logic continues to stifle the innovative and imaginative 
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thinking required to respond effectively to the current uncertainties in Europe.487  In 
fact, Duke contended that NATO should be phased out, replaced by a new pan-
European structure, one that reflected more than just military security. 
Sharing Duke’s pessimistic outlook for the Alliance, Heisbourg reasoned, “At 
best [NATO] will become a transatlantic covenant based on the recognition of a 
uniting Western Europe: at worst the cold war partners will drift apart.”488
Heisbourg claimed that other institutions, especially the European Union, are 
replacing NATO because they serve the needs of a broader-based security, one 
founded in European integration.  Since the United States is not a member of the EU, 
this would represent a threat to American influence in the region.  As a realist 
solution, Christoph Bertram argued for the creation of a new triple alliance composed 
of the United States, Europe, and Russia.489
According to Peterson, conflicts between the US and European countries will 
increase due to three factors that have emerged since the end of the Cold War.490
First, the Soviet threat no longer serves as a common threat that acts as glue holding 
the two sides together.  The need for collective action to defend against the threat no 
longer exists.  During the Cold War, Europeans were dependent on the US for strict 
military security guarantees, which would create forces pushing the two sides 
together.  Now, the pressure is gone, and the forces pushing the two sides together are 
much weaker.  Moreover, the nature of security threats has changed from classic 
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military invasion threat to the asymmetric and/or non-military threats to security: 
transnational terrorism, migration, ethnic conflict, organized crime, proliferation of 
WMD, ecological concerns, and potential for nuclear disaster.491  Such threats do not 
depend solely on US military forces.
Second, there was the expansion of domestic influences in foreign policy.  
According to Guay, “foreign policies have become subject to a wider range of 
domestic pressures.  This has resulted in an expansion in the foreign policy agenda (to 
include trade, investment and environmental issues), and in the groups with a stake in 
international affairs (including sub-national governments, non-governmental 
organizations, and business and labor groups).”492  Manning and Putnam have noted 
the increasingly blurred relationship between domestic and foreign policy interests.493
Cooper adds that such a blurring is particularly evident in the evolution of the 
European Union.494
The third factor is globalization and the increasingly uncontrollable nature of 
the global economy.  As evidenced in the stalled WTO Doha round of trade 
negotiations, the US and EU - although they are the two major power blocs in world 
trade - can no longer dictate the terms of agreement as in the past.  At the same time, 
as other regions began to liberalize their economies following the end of the Cold 
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War, the incentives for the US and the EU to pursue alternative regional arrangements 
(e.g., NAFTA, APEC, Mercosur) established the conditions for economic competition 
as well as cooperation.495
Others have echoed such sentiments.  For example, Michael Smith argues that 
the end of the Cold War created uncertainties over what had been institutionalized 
over the previous four decades: the European Community’s development as a 
“civilian power” and US leadership of European security.496  However, with the end 
of the Cold War, those givens were placed in doubt because the US began to retreat 
from active engagement and intervention in world affairs just as the Europeans had 
begun to seek an expansion of the EC/EU beyond its traditional “civilian” role.497
According to Smith:
The significance of this trend…raises major questions about the ability 
of the US and the EU to take institutional initiatives capable of 
containing or shaping the post-Cold War order and the security politics 
of the new millennium….Not only this, but it links economic and 
political stabilization firmly to the broader security order in ways not 
made as explicit since the end of the Second World War.498
One of the interesting points about the developments surrounding the EDC 
compared to that of the ESDP was the fact that the British remained outside the EDC.  
They supported its creation and promised “association,” but they were determined not 
to be a direct participant.  This contrasted greatly with the evolution of the European 
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Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the late 1990’s.  In the latter case, London 
was not only a participant, but it also was one of the prime leaders.
In the late 1940’s, the UK still considered itself a “world power,” not just a 
“European power.”  As such, London preferred to avoid any organizations with the 
hint of supranationalism.  As one historian notes of the British view, “Status as a 
world power required staying away from entangling commitments with the European 
continent from which the United Kingdom could not ‘extricate’ itself should Europe 
embark on policies that were prejudicial to British interests or British ‘position as a 
world Power [sic].”499
The situation became equally apparent not only concerning economic 
integration but also later when the EDC was under consideration.  Dean Acheson 
concluded as early as October 1949 that the United States should not expect to rely on 
the British to participate in American plans for integrating Western Europe.  
According to Winand, “Tired of waiting for British cooperation, the United States 
hoped that the initiative would now come from the French.”500
Neoliberal Institutionalist Explanation
Another theoretical approach is neoliberal institutionalism.  This approach 
argues that “complex interdependence” between states is an important factor in 
international relations.501  In other words, institutionalism looks beyond the state by 
noting the development of multiple transnational channels connecting societies, as 
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well as the role of international organizations, multinational corporations, non-
governmental organizations, and other transnational actors pursue their own agendas, 
which may differ from those of state actors.502
Contrary to neorealist expectations, there has been quite a bit of cooperation 
between the United States and West Europe after the Cold War.  Neoliberals argue 
that one of the main reasons for such cooperation owes to the intricate linkages that 
remain embedded among the North Atlantic states.  This is because, “despite 
numerous disagreements, European and American interests coincide in the long 
run.”503  In a speech given in 1997 in Germany, Secretary of Defense William Perry 
stated, “One of the great lessons of the 20th century is that American and European 
security are inextricably linked.  The alliance is critical to security on both sides of 
the ocean, and this fact did not go away with the Cold War.”504  The containment of 
Communism was not the only reason for the United States to be engaged on the 
Continent.  The danger of thinking otherwise, as Kahler notes, is that “excessive 
concentration on one feature of the international environment – however dramatic –
may lead to a deceptively monocausal view of the future.”505
While realists seem to have overstated their case regarding the impact of the 
Cold War’s end, institutionalists should not believe that policy will remain in force by 
inertia alone.  The focus of early efforts to respond to the end of the Cold War, 
according to Ronald Asmus, “was much more to sustain the relevance of the old Cold 
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War institutions,...than to apply them to the newly emerging security challenges.”  
Continuing, Asmus writes: 
The problem in European security is not a lack of institutions, but a 
lack of strategic vision and coherence along with political will.  
Without those elements, interlocking institutions become “inter-
blocking” institutions or decaying and impotent institutions; with these 
elements, even radical institutional changes become possible.506
One must be reminded that institutions are in many respects the product of the 
political will of their constituent members.
A weakness of neoliberal institutionalism is its ability to identify the 
appropriate institution through which states work.  According to Guay: 
Institutionalism does not make clear, however, whether the appropriate 
institution for European security is NATO (implying a new mission 
and expanded membership), or the EU (which would require a merge 
with the WEU and a redefining of Europe’s role within NATO), or 
whether some institutional arrangement should exist between them 
(such as the combined-joint task forces concept).507
Neoliberal institutionalism does put the focus on domestic interests in shaping 
national foreign policy agendas, as well as the revival of Kantian notions of 
democratic peace theory.508  As Guay explains: 
Cooperation is more complex, in that international agreements are 
shaped by national preferences, which in turn are determined by the 
demands of influential domestic interest groups.  This approach is 
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“liberal” in the sense that it focuses on the competition among 
domestic interest groups to shape national foreign policy agendas.509
While liberal institutionalist arguments may explain economic cooperation 
and international agreements within the EU (the grand bargains), its explanatory force 
is weaker in the security context.  By overemphasizing the comparative advantages of 
trade - especially the positive-sum logic of free trade - it neglects other aspects of 
international relations.  Even in economic terms, there are limits, since strong, 
protectionist domestic pressure groups exist to limit the bargaining freedom at the 
international level.  Often, the negotiations are more about “fair trade” than “free 
trade.”510
For example, neoliberal institutionalism would have difficulty explaining the 
lack of European unity in responding to the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 
1990’s.  A more plausible rationale for the discord can be attributed to “different 
historical ties of Member States, and disagreement over the organization (EU, NATO, 
WEU, or UN) best placed to handle the conflicts.”511  Likewise, the EU as an 
institution has had trouble forming a common defense because of the “reluctance of 
larger members to relinquish sovereignty in this area, and the preference of others to 
rely on NATO and US involvement in Europe for the region’s security.”512
The role of institutions in impeding the development of new patterns of 
international relations cannot be ignored.  Santis argues, for example, that NATO 
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actually stands in the way of continued European integration, a publicly expressed US 
foreign policy goal.  “It is, therefore, curious,” writes Santis, “that the United States 
and its allies, at the very moment that the division of Europe has ended, are seeking 
ways to sustain the utility of NATO.  In fact, efforts to shore up NATO may actually
serve to retard European unity.”513
Social Constructivist Explanation
Social constructivists would focus on ideological factors, including political 
culture, social norms, and human agency to explain US policy.  One such ideological 
factor centers on the isolationist tendency within American foreign policy.514  Much 
of the European angst mistakenly has been prodded by isolationist rhetoric in the 
United States.  After the Cold War, a debate arose regarding America’s role in the 
world.  Should the United States continue as the world’s sole superpower, or should 
the country go “back to the womb” and retreat into neo-isolationism?
For example, Arthur Schlesinger discusses prospects for continued American 
involvement in world affairs.  Tracing the history of isolationism in the United States, 
Schlesinger argues that a new variant, unilateralism, is threatening the collective 
security model of internationalist presidents such as Woodrow Wilson and Franklin 
Roosevelt.  Schlesinger claims that isolationism put American foreign policy in a 
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“straitjacket” before World War II, allowed Hitler to rise to power, and almost 
prevented the United States from entering the war itself.515
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced what 
Schlesinger calls the “return to the womb in American foreign policy.”516  However, 
it is not classical isolationism.  Instead, the isolationist impulse is reflected in a new 
form of unilateralism.  This occurred, writes Schlesinger, because “as the Soviet 
threat faded away, the incentives for international collaboration faded away too.”517
Others have argued equally as strongly that the only way Europeans will be 
motivated truly to take charge of their own security problems is do so without 
American involvement.  Once the US disengages completely from the Continent, they 
argue, Europe will be forced to confront its own security. 518  Still others argue that 
regardless of the American presence, a European defense identity is, above all, “a 
matter of dignity.”  The emphasis is on “identity.”  In Robert Bussière’s words, “[I]n 
the case of Europe, [defense] is a matter of identity...As an attribute of identity and 
sovereignty, defense does not require a precise threat from a known enemy in order to 
exist.”519  In other words, an EDI is not a means to an end, but an end in itself.520
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Several scholars and officials have observed that NATO and the EU have 
different cultures.521  A concern that topped the minds of many American officials 
was over handling and security of classified material.  In the minds of these officials, 
the EU did not have a “security” culture.522  The response, according to EU officials, 
is the development of EU defense and security institutions that would lead to a 
“socialization” process and lead inevitably to a similar strategic culture.  
Acknowledging in 2000 that the EU was “devoid of any defense culture,” Gilles 
Andréani argued that “only in a specialized institutional setting will such a culture 
hopefully be imported into it, and solidify.”523
Domestic Level Explanations
Bureaucratic Politics
A bureaucratic politics explanation would focus on the different agencies and 
expect their views to reflect the interests of the agencies.  Thus, a bureaucratic politics 
model would expect the Pentagon to defend NATO and for the State Department to 
promote the EU, since NATO is primarily a military alliance and the EU primarily a 
political and economic entity.
In some respects, this bears out.  According to one Department of Defense 
official, there was a general sense of paranoia that the EU was “bad.”  There was a 
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concern that the French wanted to “do away” with the US, and French political 
rhetoric encouraged the sense of threat within the Pentagon.524
In Brussels, this too was seen in the discourse coming from respective US 
Missions to NATO and the EU.  For example, initially, there was little 
communication between individuals working at USNATO and those working at 
USEU.  However, that “stove piping” problem improved as new channels of 
communication developed, including the sending of joint cables on ESDP.525
However, can these perceptions and views be attributed solely to the position 
of office, or can they can be conflated with personal, national, and group interests?  
As Allison himself acknowledged, “Each person comes to his position with baggage 
in tow.  His bags include sensitivities to certain issues, commitments to various 
projects, and personal standing with and debts to groups in society.”526  He also goes 
on to admit that, even within organizations, there will be differences of perceptions to 
a particular issue.  Allison writes, “These differences will be partially predictable 
from the pressure of the position plus their personality.”527  As one Defense 
Department official acknowledged, with respect to ESDP, “Personalities played a big 
part.  They influenced their participation and depth of interest in issues.”528  As 
Allison himself conceded, “The hard core of the bureaucratic politics mix is 
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personality.”529  However, what is the relationship between personality and 
bureaucratic position?  Is personality linked to the bureaucratic position?  As Welch 
argues, “bargaining skills and advantages, and the will to use them, are idiosyncratic.  
They are not necessarily linked to bureaucratic positions per se.”530
Moreover, the views of ESDP tended to reflect less a uniform view of the 
bureaucratic agency than sub-cultures within the agencies.  For example, within the 
State Department, those working in the European Bureau’s Office of Regional 
Political-Military Affairs (RPM) that dealt with NATO tended to side with the 
Pentagon view that ESDP was dangerous – or at least “bad.”  Meanwhile, those 
working in the European Bureau’s Office of European Union and Regional Affairs 
(ERA) tended to be more sympathetic with the goals and aspirations of the EU.531
Consequently, the public speeches on ESDP tended to reflect this ambiguity, by 
stating (with various degrees of emphasis, depending on the official speaking) that the 
US supported the EU and ESDP as long as it complemented and did not threaten 
NATO.
Contrary to bureaucratic politics expectations, General Wesley Clark, then 
SACEUR following the St. Malo declaration and initial development of ESDP, 
reportedly did not provide much input into US policy towards ESDP.  A bureaucratic 
politics paradigm would argue that Clark’s position would result in a strong input to 
defend either NATO or to encourage development of European military 
capabilities.532  But this did not occur.  His successor, General Joseph Ralston, tended 
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to hold an ambivalent position as well.  According to one senior official on the Joint 
Staff, his view was, “don’t obstruct, but don’t encourage either.  If the Europeans can 
do the job, let them.  Just don’t enable them.”  In fact, for many on the Joint Staff, 
their concern was not that the Europeans were too strong, but that they were too weak 
to make a difference.533
To conclude, while there may be some soft relationship between 
organizational affiliation and perceptions toward certain policies, in the end that 
relationship does not seem strong enough to be convincing.  As Kissinger noted, 
“Presidents listen to advisors whose views they think they need, not to those who 
insist on a hearing because of the organizational chart.”534  Thus, it appears that, in 
Welch’s words, “influence may well be fully determined by such intangible factors as 
personality, preference congruity, and access to superiors.”535
Domestic Politics
Turning now to the question of domestic politics, how important are they as a 
factor in explaining US policy toward ESDP?  From a partisan standpoint, there 
seemed to be very little impact.  The Democrats during the Clinton Administration 
responded rather defensively to the St. Malo declaration and subsequent development 
of ESDP just as the G.H.W. Bush Administration had done in 1990-1991.  While 
President George W. Bush continued the Clinton policy of officially supporting 
ESDP, but with caveats (that it not harm NATO), such support remained 
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“shallow.”536  For example, meeting his NATO counterparts during his first trip to 
Europe as Commander-in-Chief, President Bush stated:
We agreed that NATO and the European Union must work in common 
purpose.  It is in NATO’s interest for the European Union to develop a 
rapid reaction capability.  A strong, capable European force integrated 
with NATO would give us more options for handling crises when 
NATO, as a whole, chooses not to engage.  NATO must be generous 
in the help it gives the EU.  And similarly, the EU must welcome 
participation by NATO allies who are not members of the EU.  And 
we must not waste scarce resources, duplicating effort or working at 
cross purposes.537
Thus, it appears that partisan politics has little influence on the US policy 
toward ESDP.  What about the executive-legislative relationship?  Hamilton notes 
that many ESDP skeptics include members of Congress, who “question the wisdom 
of ESDP and prospects of its success.”  These skeptics doubt whether the Europeans 
have the “will or the wallet” to implement stated goals.538  However, both supporters 
and skeptics inhabit both branches of government; there is no fault line between the 
two either one way or the other.
Policy Entrepreneurship and Transnational Networks
What is the influence of policy entrepreneurs and transnational networks?  
Such a variable serves as a bridge between the three levels of analysis by linking 
individual core beliefs, networks of shared interests, all working to shape and 
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implement US policy in response to changes at the systemic level.   By the 1990’s, 
the effort to preserve NATO became an end in itself.  The NATO Secretary General 
and International Staff in Brussels had established connections with their defense 
ministry counterparts and found that their relationships were well placed to curb any 
substantive promotion of ESDP.  The September 11 attacks brought into question the 
role of NATO and made even the debate over ESDP seem “quaint – and largely 
irrelevant.”539
The core beliefs of individuals in key positions reflect a significant variable in 
explaining the views toward the second case.  In the Bush Administration, there were 
three schools of thought that contended for influence in American foreign policy: 
pragmatists, traditional conservatives or nationalists, and neo-conservatives.540  The 
pragmatists were represented by Secretary of State Powell and National Security 
Advisor Rice.  Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld could be 
considered assertive nationalists.  Finally, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz 
and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith represented the neoconservatives.
Unlike the traditional realists or pragmatists, such as Powell and Rice, 
traditional conservatives and neoconservatives share several things in common.  This 
includes a belief in US exceptionalism, the value of US military strength, and a deep
distrust of international agreements and multilateral institutions.  Their belief in the 
exceptionalism of the United States, however, emerged from opposite ends: 
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conservatives from a pessimistic view of the world and neoconservatives from an 
optimistic view of the US ability to remake the world. 541   From that perspective, one 
could almost label them “neo-Wilsonian,” because of the fact that the inherent 
optimism of liberal transformation permeates their ends (reflective of the missionary 
zeal of Wilsonianism to spread democracy), but their means are more aligned with 
realists (i.e., a reliance on military force to transform).542   The main difference 
between the neoconservatives and their traditional conservative counterpart was 
whether to use military power to protect the internal strength of the US or to use it to 
spread “good” and transform the rest of the world.  However, they both shared a 
common disdain for the utility of international agreements and certain multilateral 
institutions.  As Daalder and Lindsay point out: 
Although neoconservatives and assertive nationalists differed on 
whether the United States should actively spread its values abroad, 
they shared a deep skepticism of traditional Wilsonianism’s 
commitment to the rule of law and its belief in the relevance of 
international institutions.  They placed their faith not in diplomacy and 
treaties, but in power and resolve.  Agreement on this key point 
allowed neoconservatives and assertive nationalists to form a marriage 
of convenience in overthrowing the cold-war approach to foreign 
policy….543
Thus, it was no surprise that in Europe there was noted hostility to American 
officials who represented these core beliefs, and that their “favorite American” was 
Secretary of State Powell.
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At first, the traditional conservative view led by Vice President Cheney 
prevailed.  The talk of “national” missile defense and several high profile unilateral 
decisions regarding participation in international agreements (e.g., refusal to sign the 
Kyoto Protocol on climate change and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty) suggested a 
withdrawal from world affairs as many Republicans in Congress would have favored.  
It appeared that the pragmatists, such as National Security Advisor Rice, were being 
overshadowed by Cheney and Rumsfeld.  As NSA Rice described her role at a 
conference in January 2001, “What we need today is an NSC system that unites the 
government to prepare, not for total war but for the total spectrum of policy 
instruments we can use when military power is not appropriate.”  She went on to add 
that:
We’ve gotten ourselves into a quite bipolar discussion: We either 
intervene militarily or we’re isolationist and we don’t intervene at all.  
In fact, there are a whole host of instruments in between that need to 
be fine-tuned for the times when military power is clearly not 
appropriate.544
However, the perception emerged that the US remained focused on its military 
strength.  This perception led to the charge of “unilateralism.”545  That perception was 
cemented after the September 11 terrorist attacks.  The convergence of views changed 
the dynamic and gave the neoconservatives a new lease on American foreign policy.  
Increasingly, traditional conservatives such as Vice President Cheney concluded that, 
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in the long term, “the US would only find security in a world in which US values 
were widely held and spread.”546
Thus, the battle for policy dominance toggled to and fro among the various 
power centers of influence, leading to a series of mixed messages, continuing the US 
ambivalence toward European aspirations for defense autonomy.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Findings
What the research has shown is that the explanation for US 
ambivalence toward European defense autonomy is more complex than what 
systemic theories of international relations alone would suggest.  For example, the US 
decided to pursue the EDC route - one that was sub-optimal from American security 
interests or what systemic theories would expect - but one that was considered more 
likely to succeed in terms of the overall interest in getting Germany re-armed and 
France to participate in West European defense.  Similarly, the interest for the US to 
resist Europe’s development of a non-NATO security and defense policy may have 
been to prevent the emergence of a potential competitor in the absence of a threat, but 
it also shows how policy choices actually run deeper than superficial interests alone.  
For the US, it became as much about the preservation of NATO (defended by a 
transnational network) as it was concern about preventing Europe from counter-
balancing and becoming independent of the US.  At the same time, the US was 
expanding its relationship with the EU.  From an interest standpoint, it served US 
interests to allow the EU to handle security concerns in Europe.
One cannot discount the very real international and domestic components, but, 
as with Snyder’s original thesis a half century ago, decision-making does influence 
the course of a very complex and dynamic process of interactions between states.547
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Moreover, two major meta-level phenomena can be identified that inform 
decision-makers’ calculus: globalization and American power predominance.  These 
areas influence how world leaders and other international actors view the world order.  
As Neack explains in her book:
Within this framework of globalization and American predominance, 
The New Foreign Policy rests on the assumption that foreign policy is 
best understood as a “nested game” in which national leaders attempt 
to “play” the two games of domestic and international politics to their 
advantage.  Foreign policy analysis, then, is best undertaken as a study 
of this nested game, or, as a multilevel study.548
It appears from examination of these two cases – the EDC and ESDP – that 
three factors are important.  First, a perceived problem (including threat perception) 
must exist.  This does not necessarily stem from the distribution of material 
capabilities or resources, which, as Stephen Walt pointed out, may or may not 
indicate a threat.549  Rather, specific events more so than the distribution of material 
resources drove the policy response.  For example, in the 1950’s, the fear of 
Communism and perceptions of aggressive Soviet behavior (based, in part, on Soviet 
military advantage in terms of armed forces and subsequent nuclear capability) 
influenced the general views of US policymakers, but the impetus to move rapidly on 
developing institutional arrangements in Europe resulted directly from external shock 
of the Korean invasion.  Arguably, without that event to heighten the sense of 
urgency and pressure, the US would not have had to choose how to respond to the 
EDC since the Pleven Plan might not have been necessary.   
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In the late 1990’s, the conflict in the Balkans had a substantial impact on US 
policy towards European defense.  Again, it was not so much the distribution of 
material capabilities in the Balkan states or even the material capabilities of states in 
Western Europe (as has been shown), but rather American interest in maintaining the 
credibility of NATO and, in fact, the desire to increase European military 
capabilities.  Structural realists would argue that the US would try to prevent 
Europeans from developing military capabilities, when, in fact, the opposite is the 
case.  US policymakers complained constantly that the Europeans were too weak, not 
too strong.550  Only after the military invasion of Iraq did the rhetoric of “counter-
balancing” the US increase on the European side (and only in several few but vocal 
places), despite on-the-ground cooperation between Americans and Europeans in the 
military, legal, law enforcement, financial, and intelligence spheres.  Moreover, any 
marginal increases in European “power” capabilities do not rise to the level that 
would justify American expressions of concern over ESDP or European hyperbole on 
what ESDP actually has achieved.  Rather, if not for interpretations of certain 
European behavior (namely, the French, but also the British at St. Malo), the US 
would not have had to choose how to respond to ESDP.
Second, institutions – whether they are strong or weak – impact on the courses 
of actions available.  They serve as constraints and produce an element of path 
dependence.  In the 1950’s NATO was relatively undeveloped.  The binding quality 
from allies’ repeated interactions through various committees and military exercises 
had yet to congeal.  NATO was more an agreed treaty than formal international 
organization.  By the late 1990’s, however, NATO had become a mature institution 
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and international organization with its own constituency and interests (e.g., those on 
the International Staff as well as at SHAPE and among the various defense 
ministries).  Overlapping participation between NATO allies and EU members of 
ESDP created institutional challenges that had to be managed and overcome.  The 
fact that the United States was not a member of the EU did influence the behavior and 
perceptions of certain elements within the US government (especially at the 
Pentagon) because of ignorance and lack of information.551  Thus, institutions too are 
important but not sufficient explanations.
Finally, the role of individuals and their philosophical perspectives and 
networks forming power centers are important because they influence the choices 
pursued.  Within any Administration are various power centers.  These are locuses of 
policy influence and may be either individuals or organizations.  For example, a 
strong Secretary of State may represent a power center.  So could the US military 
because of its ability to deploy force quickly.  While these power centers may share 
the goals of the Administration, they may also have other goals.  These goals may 
reflect personal ambitions (if the power center is an individual) or organizational 
goals if the power center represents an organization.  As Hilsman observes:
Secretaries of state, for example, share in the state goals of the United 
States and in the organizational goals of the Department of State.  But 
secretaries of state will also have personal goals.  They will want the 
good opinion of colleagues and of their fellow citizens.  They would 
like to have a place in history.  They might also have further 
ambitions, perhaps to run for president some day.552
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In these case studies, individuals often had additional goals stemming from 
their own ideological mind-sets or perspectives.553  Individual preferences reflected a 
worldview that informed policy decisions and implementation.  Truman and Acheson 
adopted policies that reflected their liberal internationalist leanings.  Eisenhower 
recognized the advantages of promoting the EDC for solving multiple problems both 
at home and in Europe.  Strategic considerations were not the most important or sole 
driver for US policy.  Economic considerations and reducing domestic costs likewise 
were important; however, not in the way often argued by liberal institutionalists.  
Eisenhower found the EDC solution to be one that met several needs and preferences.  
Likewise, the preferences of leading power centers in the both the Clinton and 
Bush Administrations influenced their actions and positions toward ESDP.   For 
President Clinton and his cabinet, promoting NATO as a vehicle for post-Communist 
engagement in Central and Eastern Europe was a primary aim.  A general uncertainty 
over whether European defense initiatives would help or hinder that aim contributed 
to a sense of suspicion and qualified support favoring the status quo.  
Within the Bush Administration, the leading power centers (Vice President 
Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld) had been out of office for years and had 
been influenced by the consequences of the Clinton Administration’s military 
interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans.  They were skeptical generally of 
military intervention for “non-strategic” purposes.  Rumsfeld, in particular, had been 
influenced by his time as Ambassador to NATO in the early 1970’s.  While officially 
supportive of ESDP, their support was shallow and conditional.  The messages that 
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Europeans received from different American quarters were mixed, adding to a sense 
of anxiety and confusion.554
While the analysis reveals that partisan politics (especially between the 
Truman Administration and certain Republican Senators in the first case, and the 
Clinton Administration and Republican Congress in the second case) may have 
contributed slightly to the development of, and reaction to, European defense 
initiatives, it was not as strong a factor as the other elements.  Likewise, analysis of 
traditional bureaucratic politics does not indicate its influence as strongly as other 
variables.  For example, although infighting occurred at lower levels, it tended to 
exist within specific departments rather than between.  Moreover, it has been shown 
that there was general consensus among the different agency heads at the Cabinet 
level (e.g., Slocombe and Talbott worked together).555  Empirical analysis reveals that 
the fight for policy closure or direction often centered on speeches.  As Chollet and 
Goldgeier note, “Speeches are often seen as action-forcing events that serve as
endpoints for internal debates.”556  This study has demonstrated such an insight in 
both the EDC and ESDP cases. 
While appreciating the desire to achieve parsimony of explanation and to 
leverage as much explanatory power as possible from a simplified model of reality, 
there is a danger of distortions or missing important contributing factors.  If one 
assumes that all governments are a “black box” and that outcomes are merely 
“political resultants,” there is a danger of losing intellectual credibility as empirical 
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anomalies multiply.  As Hermann argues, “[D]ecision-making dynamics do not have 
a direct, singular impact on foreign policy.  Rather, they can produce various results 
from consensus to deadlock, from compromise to domination by one individual or 
faction.”557
In this respect, the focus on policy entrepreneurship and decision-unit clusters 
helps to identify the intensity and pace of interest formation and policy 
implementation.  In the 1950’s, there were several US interests, sometimes cross-
cutting, just as there were in the 1990’s.  Such an approach helps to explain why the 
preference ordering came to be.  Structural realism fails to do this.  Liberal 
institutionalism likewise falls short.  Realist theories may be able to show that x 
responds to y, but it does not adequately explain how x came to be x rather than z.  
Distrust of French motives that had developed over decades and after several bad 
experiences contributed to resistance to a European development that arguably was 
actually in the US national interest.  The views of key policymakers and decision-
shapers in Washington and Brussels help to explain how the interests came to be.
The research has shown that policy entrepreneurs are much more important in 
the absence of strong institutions.  When institutions are weak, there are fewer actors 
with entrenched interests or established norms of behavior.  For example, in the 
1950’s, there were only a handful of key actors to influence the decisions.  As an 
institution, NATO was new and relatively unformed, more treaty than organization.  
The International Staff was small.  SHAPE was not established until 1951.  The 
Defense Department had been consolidated and in existence only since 1947.  This 
left policy space wide open for individual actors in which to maneuver and operate.  
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Consequently, we can see the role of policy entrepreneurs as vital in the initial phases.  
Key policy entrepreneurs during this period were: Jean Monnet, David Bruce, George 
Kennan, Dean Acheson, George Ball, and Dwight Eisenhower.  Monnet’s network 
had bought into European integration and served in essential locations for influencing 
policy.  If David Bruce had not written his “long telegram” on the merits of 
supporting EDC, and if Eisenhower had not reversed his own view on the issue, the 
US could have gone in a different direction.558
Convergence of tactical interests allowed for policy partnerships: the US 
wanted Europeans to assist in their defense.  Monnet wanted to build up Europe to 
keep France and Germany from fighting one another again.  Thus, policy 
entrepreneurship helps to explain why second-best solutions sometimes are chosen.  
Systemic theories do not explain which choice is made to achieve the same end.
Similarly, Javier Solana used the force of his personality to carve out a space 
for himself as the EU’s High Representative for CFSP and a power center within the 
EU.  British Prime Minister Tony Blair found a convergence of interests to allow for 
the UK to play in ESDP when the UK had traditionally been aloof toward European 
defense autonomy.  Much less a desire to counter-balance, or even soft balance, Blair 
needed to establish his European credentials, especially since the UK was not a 
member of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  Consequently, a policy space 
available in the EU was security and defense.  The British were able to marry a 
tactical coalition with the French, who did want to use ESDP as a “counterweight” to 
the US.  From their respective positions, the British tended to punch above their 
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weight while the French tended to punch below.  Each of those relative power 
dynamics influenced the direction and development of ESDP.
By the 1990’s, NATO had become a fixed institution, with its own set of 
transnational networks that resisted anything that would threaten its existence.  Why 
did NATO remain when the Warsaw Pact dissolved after the end of the Cold War?  
One reason is that NATO was a voluntary association, not forced upon it like the 
Warsaw Pact.  As soon as the Soviet Union disappeared, so did the Warsaw Pact.  
However, the US was not willing to discard the Alliance.  It still served a purpose.
US anxiety over a particular policy direction may be calmed by the 
introduction of key personalities (e.g., Solana, former NATO Secretary General and 
transatlantic in orientation) whose policy perspectives and world views are shaped by 
their backgrounds.  
Conversely, personalities may have the opposite effect by informing or 
framing the policy debate.  For example, almost all of the principal foreign policy 
advisors to President George W. Bush (e.g., Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, Rice, 
Armitage, and Wolfowitz) had spent some (or even the bulk) of their government 
service in the Pentagon.  None had been career diplomats, trained to develop and 
work through international institutions.  That is not to say that there were not 
disputes, especially between the Departments of State and Defense; rather, most of 
these were over the application of US military power.  This is in contrast to the 
diplomatic experiences of Dean Acheson or George Kennan in the 1950’s.559
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Such a perspective is not limited to the United States but can be applied to 
other states.  Charles de Gaulle also played a strong role in French politics with the 
establishment of the 5th republic and his taking personal control of foreign and 
defense policy (unlike some of his predecessors in the 4th republic).
The second case on ESDP stopped at the EU’s first military mission in 2003.  
Since then, the EU has conducted several more military and civilian ESDP missions.  
Both NATO and the EU have developed various means of working with one another.  
Nevertheless, the American ambivalence towards European defense autonomy 
reveals itself even today, as NATO and the EU encounter tension over how best to 
engage in crisis management operations in Africa and elsewhere.560
Systemic theories of international relations may reflect the rules of the game, 
the dimensions of the playing field, and the ultimate objectives, but decision-units and 
power centers explain the timing of certain actions and serve as regulators of 
progress, either speeding up or slowing down the pace of interaction and state 
behavior.  This helps explain why some actors are effective in certain jobs and are 
more activist in them than others, although the rules of the game and structural factors 
remain the same.
Thus, macro-level theories of international relations might be useful for 
providing a broad brush picture of how states interact, and institutional theory does a 
good job of filling in some blanks for non-state actors and revealing the importance of 
the rules of the game; however, policy entrepreneurship and decision-making 
approaches fill in further for those moments and capture two areas that until now have 
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not been satisfactorily explained: specific state actions (when several policy choices 
are available) and state behavior in conditions of weak institutions and uncertainty.  A 
decision-units approach emphasizing policy entrepreneurship does that.
It has been difficult to isolate American policy towards European defense 
autonomy because the real world application of policies does not occur in a vacuum.  
The context of a problem must also be considered.  By tracing these two cases, it can 
be shown that linkages with other issues under review (linkage politics) often come 
into play as well.  Rarely is one policy implemented to solve a single problem.  As 
Snyder, Bruck and Sapin described, “The burden of simultaneous responses to 
external demands may be a crucial determinant in the timing of actions and the nature 
or amount of policymaking resources which are devoted to specific actions.”561  Thus, 
reducing policy preferences to a single range of preference ordering does not do 
justice to the demands and responses of policy-makers.  However, it does challenge 
the investigator to resist the temptation of allowing the empirical analysis to 
degenerate toward an “everything matters” approach that results in complete 
indeterminacy.562
To avoid the trap of trying to reconstruct the totality of an event (which is 
neither possible nor desirable), it was necessary to focus on particular determinants 
that tended to weigh more heavily on the decision-making process and outcome.  
These determinants were often located in the power centers of key individuals and 
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their corresponding influences.  Since all factors were not relevant to all situations, 
neither did they need to be captured in the analytical framework.  Thus, by returning 
human decision-makers to the equation, there is a hope to bridge some of the 
theoretical islands that have emerged in IR, with a desire to weave theoretical strands 
and contribute to the field.
Avenues for Further Research
It is becoming increasingly apparent that political outcomes in international 
relations are determined by the ratio or balance of several factors – structural 
distribution of power, institutional participation and constraints, and 
individual/philosophical views of actors in domestic power centers.  Therefore, one 
might conclude that it is in this multi-level direction that further theoretical research 
should go.
In foreign policy terms, the metaphor of lanes of the road might be apt.  The 
international systemic conditions reflect the terrain and type of road.  The institutions 
are the signs and rules of the road.  States are the vehicles on the road, each with 
different sizes, engine capacity, capabilities and number of passengers.  Non-state 
actors are the pedestrians and cyclists crossing the road or nearby.  The driver is the 
leader.  Depending on passenger input of power centers and policy entrepreneurs, the 
driver has certain constraints, lest others in the car choose an alternative driver.  The 
temperament and personality of the driver, his/her aversion to risk, also are factors.  
There are aggressive drivers and passive drivers.  Consequently, this mix of variables 
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all contribute to the understanding of why there are collisions, accidents, fatalities, 
brinksmanship, road rage, or safe arrival.
Asserting reductionist views on the major variables influencing American 
foreign policy captures only part of the picture.  If actions and outcomes are the result 
of capabilities, intentions, and opportunity, neo-realists emphasize capabilities, social 
constructivists emphasize intentions, and institutionalists emphasize opportunity. 
Measuring the weight of the different perspectives remains difficult and the avenue 
for further research.  What should be pursued are theoretical frameworks that 
integrate multiple levels of analysis and recognize multiple policy linkages.  As 
Chollet and Goldgeier contend, the goal should be to “integrate propositions about 
decision-making in specific situations with larger structural factors in international 
politics to generalize about behavior.”563  Given the current development of IR 
theory, Moravcsik in a similar vein urges students of international relations to pursue 
what he calls “structured synthesis,” taking different theories from different levels of 
analysis and combining them in a way that proves more effective than merely 
searching for a single overarching dominant paradigm.564
Democratism (promoting the ideological value of democracy), institutionalism
(global economic interdependence), and neo-realism (geopolitical/military 
dominance) all reflect three aspects of American foreign policy.565  In almost every 
State Department mission statement or National Security doctrine is reference to 
promoting democracy, free trade and commerce, and maintaining US values through 
strength of America’s armed forces.  The differences in belief systems are revealed by 
563
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the prioritization of those preferences as seen in foreign policy outputs.566  Thus, 
democratists stress ideology (“free and fair elections”), institutionalists economic 
factors and rule of law, and neo-realists the threat and military aspects of the overall 
power equation.
However, there is another axis by which foreign policy professionals can be 
measured: isolationist or internationalist.  This can be moderated among the three 
earlier schools of thought, as individuals contend whether it is preferable to engage 
the rest of the world or withdraw into the “gated security” of American borders.  The 
effects of globalization may have an impact on either accentuating this axis (e.g., 
increased calls for domestic protectionism) or making it irrelevant, in the sense of 
forcing an internationalist posture.  
A third axis that is similar but different to the previous one is the 
unilateral/multilateral axis.  Should the US work within alliances, ad-hoc coalitions, 
or alone?  Under what conditions?  What policy instruments are best suited for 
alliances, coalitions, or unilateral action?  What are the consequences and perceptions 
of acting in concert with others or alone?  Does it reinforce legitimacy or resentment?  
What if alliance or coalition partners are not able to hold their end of the bargain?  It 
could lead to unequal distribution of labor and mutual resentment.  If the Europeans 
prove their ability to deploy military forces in crisis situations that complement US 
policy goals, policymakers in Washington will gain the reassurance that European 
independence does not guarantee opposition.  As the Europeans regain confidence in 
565
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their ability to providing security, they may be more willing to shoulder a share of the 
defense burden, and the US would be more willing to take on a supporting role in 
certain areas.  
In the end, though, how such desired foreign policy outputs rests on the 
influence and perspective of actors in key positions to formulate and implement 
policies.  Comprehension and understanding of this vital component can come only 
from the state and individual levels of analysis.
way down.”  (Moravcsik, “Liberal Theory,” 168).  Here, constructivist and decision-making theories 
have more to offer.
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Abbreviations
ACE Allied Command Europe
AFSOUTH Allied Forces Southern Europe
ARRC ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
DCI Defense Capabilities Initiative
D/SACEUR Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EDA European Defense Agency
EDC European Defense Community
EC European Community
ECAP European Capabilities Actions Plan
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Area
EUMC European Union Military Committee
EUMS European Union Military Staff
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EPC European Political Cooperation
ERRF European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDI European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP European Security and Defense Policy
EU European Union
GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council
HR High Representative
IS International Staff
IMS International Military Staff
NAC North Atlantic Council
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF NATO Response Force
PfP Partnership for Peace
PJC Permanent Joint Council
PSC Political and Security Committee
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SecGen Secretary General
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TEU Treaty on European Union
USEU US Mission to the European Union
USNATO US Mission to NATO
WEU Western European Union
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Glossary
Berlin Plus:  The agreement at the NATO Summit in Berlin, June 1996, reiterated in 
Washington in April 1999, to make NATO planning and other assets, such as 
intelligence and equipment, available to the European allies for non-NATO
operations.
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF): Concept that was endorsed at the January 
1994 NATO Summit in Brussels and established at the June 1996 NATO Summit in 
Berlin.  The concept permits a more flexible and mobile deployment of forces, 
including new missions.  It is designed to facilitate NATO contingency operations, 
the use of “separable but not separate” military capabilities in EU-led operations, and 
allow non-NATO nations to participate in operations such as KFOR.  CJTF is the 
basic model for NATO’s International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan (ISAF).
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): A framework for EU member states 
to coordinate policy by formulating “common positions” and conducting “joint 
actions” in the name of the Union.  The EU’s stated aim is to use CFSP to create 
consistent policies which are preventative rather than reactive and which assert the 
EU’s political identity.  The CFSP’s scope of activity includes diplomatic, 
humanitarian, economic, military, and security issues.  It was established when the 
Maastricht Treaty came into force in November 1993.  Javier Solana became the first 
High Representative for CFSP in November 1999.
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI): Launched in April 1999 at the NATO 
Summit in Washington.  Its purpose is to improve the Alliance’s defense capabilities 
to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum 
of NATO missions, with a special focus on improving interoperability among 
Alliance forces.  Specific objectives include improvement in deployability, 
sustainability, survivability, effective engagement, and command, control, 
communications, and intelligence (C3I).  The DCI was considered too ambitious and 
was recast at the November 2002 NATO Summit in Prague as the Prague Capability 
Commitments (PCC).
ESDI vs. ESDP:  Developing a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) 
within NATO is viewed as a means of creating a capacity for Europeans to act 
militarily on their own (see CTJF above), while concurrently strengthening the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.  Members of the EU are striving to develop a 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as the military dimension of the CFSP 
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(see above).  ESDP is also the process of building European institutions and 
portraying the EU as a global actor in world politics.  The semantic debates, which 
reached its apex in 2000, have abated with most observers now using the term ESDP, 
even within NATO circles.
EU-Led Operation: A military operation conducted by European forces under the 
political control and strategic direction of the European Union.  It may be an 
operation with or without recourse to NATO collective assets and capabilities.  Since 
2003, the EU has conducted two military ESDP operations and two civilian ESDP 
operations.  Of the military ESDP operations, one – Operation Artemis in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo – was considered an autonomous EU mission.
EU-NATO Links: The formal and informal structures and procedures that will allow 
these two organizations to conduct operations, to include planning, intelligence and 
asset sharing, on a regular basis and in a transparent manner.
Headline Goal: Declared at the December 1999 European Council Summit in 
Helsinki.  Calls on EU members to be able to deploy within 60 days and then sustain 
for up to a year as many as 60,000 troops (corps level) capable of conducting the full 
range of Petersberg tasks, including the most demanding, peacemaking.  The 
geographic range given is 4,000 km.  Based on the shortfalls identified, the EU 
launched a European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) at the December 2001 
European Council Summit in Laeken, to address these shortfalls.
Petersberg Tasks: The tasks identified at the 1992 WEU Summit in Petersberg, 
Germany.  They include humanitarian, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and disaster 
relief.  It is on the basis of these tasks that the EU’s military aspirations focused. 
Three D’s: Phrase popularized by Secretary of State Madeline Albright to present the 
US position on European defense aspirations.  They are: no decoupling of the 
transatlantic link; no discrimination against non-EU NATO members (e.g., Turkey); 
and no duplication of existing NATO capabilities and structures.
Three I’s: Phrase used by NATO Secretary General George Robertson to present a 
less confrontational version of European defense aspirations.  They are: improvement
of military capabilities; inclusiveness of all NATO allies; and indivisibility of security 
structures.
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